



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Economic	Geography			 If	academic	attention	has	not	been	applied	adequately	to	Canadian	issues	and	to	elite	economists	as	a	group,	this	is	especially	true	of	Canadian	economists.	Yet	Canadian	economists	may,	in	this	period	of	economic	history,	be	in	a	position	to	play	a	disproportionate	role	globally	due	to	nearly	universal	approbation	for	Canada’s	performance	during	and	after	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis.	It	is	useful	to	view	these	events	–	and	Canada’s	role	in	them	–	from	the	perspective	of	the	field	of	economic	geography,	an	approach	that	emphasises	the	role	of	time	and	space	in	the	spread	of	capital,	ideas,	and	social	norms.	It	is	also	important	in	exploring	the	ways	in	which	Canadian	national	identity	–	especially	that	which	is	based	in	geopolitical,	historical,	and	economic	relationships	with	powerful	allies	–	may	have	helped	to	shape	how	economics	is	conceived	of	and	taught	in	Canada.			 Financial	geography,	a	particularly	relevant	subset	of	economic	geography,	has	charted	the	rise	of	the	financial	sector	within	and	among	national	economies	and	the	regulatory	‘race	to	the	bottom’	between	the	U.S.	and	the	UK	(Gordon	L.	Clark,	2005;	French	et	al.,	2009),	whose	major	financial	centres	–	New	York	and	London,	respectively	–	achieved	dominance	in	global	finance	from	the	1980s	onwards	(Hall,	2007;	Wojcik,	2011b).	This	wholesale	deregulation	of	the	financial	industry,	starting	in	the	1970s	in	the	U.S.,	spread	sequentially	to	the	UK,	the	rest	of	Europe,	and	emerging	markets	in	the	ensuing	decades	(Wojcik,	2011),	while	Canada	remained	largely	on	the	sidelines	–	a	notable	exception	to	the	trend.				 This	was	an	international	trend,	after	all.	Neoclassical	economists	replaced	Keynesians	at	the	IMF	during	this	period	–	particularly	from	the	1980s	onwards	–	and	after	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis	the	IMF’s	own	Independent	Evaluation	Office	concluded	that	the	IMF’s	failure	to	foresee	the	impending	financial	crisis	was	in	large	part	due	to	“groupthink”	(IEO,	2011,	pg.	17).	But	although	there	seems	to	have	been	an	ideological	and	discursive	shift	towards	market-oriented	thinking	and	policies	beginning	in	the	late	1970s	in	Canada	and	among	its	closest	allies	(Baragar	&	Seccareccia,	2008;	Dalton,	2009;	Goodhart,	2016),	the	results	turned	out	very	differently	in	terms	of	policy.	The	ensuing	deregulation	of	the	banking	industry	in	the	1990s	allowed	the	two	countries’	banking	systems	to	diverge	markedly;	in	Canada,	to	the	extent	that	deregulation	happened,	it	created	a	further	consolidation	of	the	sector,	whereas	it	resulted	in	the	shadow	banking	system	in	the	U.S.	(Bordo,	Redish,	&	
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Rockoff,	2015;	Knight,	2012).	And	while	the	governing	Liberals	followed	governments	elsewhere	in	implementing	their	“fiscal	revolution	of	the	1990s”	(Baragar	&	Seccareccia,	2008,	p.	63),	posting	fiscal	surpluses	–	at	the	expense	of	social	expenditures	(Dalton,	2009)	–	that	bolstered	the	financial	markets,	added	to	household	debt,	and	contributed	to	the	well-documented	shift	towards	financialisation	of	the	economy	more	generally	(Baragar	&	Chernomas,	2012;	Baragar	&	Seccareccia,	2008;	Eichengreen,	2016;	Seccareccia,	2012;	Walks,	2014),	the	Canadian	government	was	strangely	hyper-involved	in	the	process	of	financialisation,	especially	in	the	housing	market	(Walks	&	Clifford,	2015).15				 In	spite	of	significant	deregulatory	pressures	among	other	wealthy	nations,	over	the	course	of	decades	Canada	has	done	things	somewhat	differently.	Although	Canada’s	outsize	troubles	during	the	1980s	downturn16	should	be	accorded	its	share	of	explanatory	power,	it	is	also	possible	that	this	discrepancy	is	–	in	part	–	due	to	Canadians’	beliefs	about	economics	and	the	role	of	the	financial	sector.			 In	the	lead-up	to	the	crisis,	the	literature	shows	that	the	increase	in	relative	wealth	of	finance	workers	in	the	United	States,	the	epicentre	of	global	financial	activity,	far	outstripped	that	of	any	other	sector	in	the	previous	two	decades	and	constituted	the	largest	single	factor	contributing	to	national	income	inequality	(Wojcik,	2011).	This	was	not	true	in	Canada,	where	income	and	wealth	inequality	remained	markedly	lower	than	in	the	U.S.	(and	somewhat	lower	than	in	the	UK),	despite	having	risen	in	the	last	few	decades	(Veall,	2012).	Intergenerational	mobility	in	Canada	is	remarkably	high	relative	to	both	other	countries,	and	indeed	is	comparable	to	that	of	Scandinavia	(ibid.).				 Similarly,	technology	was	increasingly	used	to	bridge	time	and	space	(Harvey,	2007;	French	et	al.,	2009);	“spatial	fixes”	were	used	to	maintain	high	returns,	while	limits	were	converted	into	barriers	to	be	overcome	with	new	financial	instruments	(Harvey,	2011).	Some	of	these	instruments	were	used	to	allow	overseas	investors	to	diversify	their	holdings	in	mortgages,	dispersing	their	risk	through	securitisation17;																																																									15	The	Canada	Mortgage	and	Housing	Corporation	helped	securitise	mortgages	directly,	which	was	uncommon	for	a	government-owned	company.	16	The	recession	in	the	early	1980s	was	particularly	bad	for	Canada,	which	experienced	higher	interest	rates,	inflation,	and	unemployment	than	the	U.S.	at	the	time	and	Canada	itself	post-GFC	(IMF,	2010,	p.	36).	There	were	also	two	bank	failures	in	this	period,	the	first	in	Canada	since	1923	and	therefore	a	great	shock	(Crow,	2002,	p.	159).				17	Packaging	mortgages	together	and	slicing	and	dicing	them	such	that	each	investor	held	a	sliver	of	many	mortgages.	
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autodidacticism,	deschooling,23	and	learner-centred	education	is	highly	relevant,	especially	as	it	relates	to	the	experience	of	COMER	members,	most	of	whom	lack	formal	training	in	economics.	Much	of	the	literature	on	deschooling	and	learner-centred	education	addresses	the	moral	dimension	of	the	learning	process,	which	is	also	deeply	relevant	to	the	question	as	to	whether	economics	education	–	independent	or	institutional	–	affects	learners’	moral	orientations,	attitudes	towards	human	nature,	and	prosocial	behaviour.				 Carl	Rogers,	one	of	the	preeminent	psychoanalysts	and	education	commentators	of	the	past	century,	was	centrally	interested	in	learning	that	influences	behaviour	–	what	he	called	self-discovered	learning	(Rogers,	1990a)	or	the	“person-centred”	mode	(Rogers,	1990c).	Learning	was	seen	to	be	a	process	rather	than	an	end,	with	the	goal	of	facilitating	one’s	evolution	as	a	person	and	inculcating	the	values	of	genuineness,	acceptance/trust,	and	empathetic	understanding;	the	goal	of	the	teacher	was	correspondingly	seen	as	the	facilitation	of	learning	rather	than	teaching	per	se	(Rogers,	1990b).	Rogers	argued	that	this	approach	resulted	in	better	educational	outcomes	as	well	as	an	improved	moral	sense	among	learners.		 Rogers’	propositions	have	found	support	in	the	literature	concerning	intrinsic	motivation	in	the	learning	process;	some	research	(Kohn,	1999	inter	alia;	Pink,	2009)	has	pointed	to	data	indicating	that	curiosity-driven	learning	produces	better	results	than	learning	based	on	extrinsically	motivating	factors.	Other	researchers,	however,	have	found	that	discovery-based	independent	learning	is	less	effective	than	traditional	guided	learning	except	in	the	case	of	already-proficient	learners	(Kirschner	&	Clark,	2006).	Such	disagreements	are	difficult	to	resolve,	as	it	may	be	possible	for	traditional	guided	learning	to	be	supplemented	in	such	a	way	as	to	spark	learners’	intrinsic	motivation,	or	at	least	not	inhibit	it.			 Critiques	of	institutionalised	education	and	its	effect	on	societal	beliefs	and	practices	have	formed	the	basis	of	much	work	in	this	area.	John	Holt’s	classic	“How	Children	Fail”	was	widely	circulated	among	practitioners	prior	to	its	eventual	publication	(1981);	it	critiqued	approaches	to	schooling	that	fostered	in	students	a	fear	of	failure,	a	preoccupation	with	finding	the	‘right’	answer	instead	of	engaging	in	real	learning,	and	the	resulting	disengagement	from	learning	and	loss	of	what	Holt	considered	to	be	children’s	natural	sense	of	curiosity.	Similarly	Paolo	Freire,	in	his																																																									23	“Deschooling”	is	defined	in	many	ways,	but	at	its	essence	it	involves	no	formal	curriculum,	hierarchy,	or	strictures;	students	are	driven	by	curiosity	and	learn	at	their	own	pace	and	direction.	
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widely-read	treatise,	advocated	for	the	co-creation	of	knowledge	between	learner	and	teacher	within	the	public	education	system	as	an	alternative	to	a	pedagogical	approach	that	helped	to	reinforce	existing	power	relations	(2000).		 Here	critical	theory	ties	in	with	critiques	of	universal	public	education;	Ivan	Illich,	in	his	1971	and	1973	works,	identifies	the	link	between	the	institutionalisation	of	education	and	the	institutionalisation	of	society	and	the	role	specialised	knowledge	plays	in	the	legitimisation	of	elites’	positions	in	society	(1971,	1973).	Similarly,	in	Schooling	in	Capitalist	America,	authors	Bowles	and	Gintis	maintain	that	education	helps	to	reinforce	and	justify	inequality	by	“integrating	new	generations	into	the	social	order”	(1976,	p.	102).	Henry	Giroux	(2006,	inter	alia)	and	others	within	the	critical	pedagogy	tradition	maintain	that	education	involves,	or	can	involve,	the	development	of	agency;	critical	pedagogy	examines	the	relationships	between	knowledge,	power,	and	authority.	These	authors	emphasise	learners’	roles	as	engaged	citizens	in	society	and	question	who	controls	the	production	of	knowledge,	elucidating	education’s	role	in	disrupting	or	reinforcing	social	realities.		 Indeed,	the	question	of	legitimacy	is	a	central	one.	“The	legitimacy	of	the	authority	of	superiors	flows	not	from	social	contrivance	but	from	Science	and	Reason,”	(Bowles	&	Gintis,	1976,	p.	105)	–	also	the	basis	of	legitimacy	in	economics	as	a	discipline,	as	it	relies	on	science	and	rationality	to	bolster	its	legitimacy	relative	to	the	other	social	sciences.	Economics	departments’	(and	business	schools’)	well-documented	shift	towards	positivism	and	econometrics	(Siegfried	&	Walstad,	2014)	could	be	considered	to	be	an	effort	to	boost	the	authority	of	the	field	within	the	academic	and	political	realms	(Augier	&	March,	2011;	Khurana,	2007).			 Illich	proposed,	instead	of	institutionalised	education,	“deschooling”	–	the	creation	of	informal	webs	in	which	learners	could	freely	exchange	knowledge	and	skills	with	one	another	(1971).	Illich’s	manifesto	aligns	with	the	autodidactic	approach	to	learning	–	curiosity-driven,	informal	education	undertaken	by	the	learner	him-	or	herself	and/or	in	groups,	as	is	the	case	for	most	COMER	members.	For	Illich,	the	de-institutionalisation	of	education	translated	into	the	de-institutionalisation	of	society.	While	formal	schooling	is	associated	with	authority,	control,	and	mandatory	structured	learning	(Sawchuk,	2003),	informal	learning	represented	a	means	of	questioning	society’s	base	assumptions	and	power	structures.	
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wealth”;	this	view	spread	rapidly	to	other	business	schools	(Augier	&	March,	2011,	pg.	170).				 In	macroeconomics,	Backhouse	and	Laidler	(the	latter	of	whom	was	one	of	my	conversants)	described	a	narrowing	of	the	intellectual	breadth	of	work	in	the	area	(2003);	Schiffman	describes	the	shape	of	their	historical	analysis	as		 	“.	.	.	.	an	hourglass	phenomenon	in	macroeconomics.	They	point	out	that,	during	the	1940s	to	1970s,	many	important	ideas	that	had	been	prominent	before	1936	were	virtually	forgotten	as	the	IS-LM	apparatus	rose	to	prominence.	Once	economists	were	trained	in	IS-LM,	they	were	conditioned	to	simply	ignore	ideas	that	did	not	fit	within	it	(including	some	of	Keynes’	own	ideas).	These	ideas	include	dynamics,	intertemporal	choice,	expectations,	policy	regimes	and	intertemporal	coordination	failures.	[.	.	.]	Some	of	the	neglected	ideas	have	been	rediscovered	recently,	but	others	remain	out	of	sight”	(2004).			 In	particular,	the	Chicago	school	ethos	influenced	cultural	views	of	morality	and	human	nature.	For	example,	fiduciary	duty	–	the	purported	responsibility	of	firms	to	maximise	returns	for	shareholders	–	can	be	used	to	justify,	and	has	been	used	to	legitimise,	a	superseding	obligation	to	increase	shareholders’	profit,	regardless	of	ethical	counterclaims	(Wang	et	al.,	2011).	The	rise	of	fiduciary	duty	in	the	preceding	decades	has	accompanied,	and	perhaps	precipitated,	a	shift	away	from	conceptions	of	the	firm	as	a	social	institution	and	towards	an	image	of	the	firm	as	a	profit-maximising	machine	unconcerned	with	morality	(Eisenberg,	1999).	However,	the	very	existence	of	companies	that	clearly	pursue	ethical	ends,	sometimes	at	the	expense	of	financial	considerations,	raises	questions	as	to	whether	fiduciary	duty	is,	in	fact,	as	strict	as	it	is	sometimes	claimed	to	be;	“[the	American	Law	Institute’s]	
Principles	of	Corporate	Governance	provides	that	a	corporation	‘may	properly	take	into	account	ethical	considerations	that	are	generally	recognized	as	relevant	to	the	conduct	of	business,’	even	if	corporate	profit	and	shareholder	gain	are	not	thereby	enhanced”	(ibid.,	p.	1265).	Besides	which,	fiduciary	duty	signified	more	in	a	legal	sense	and	less	in	a	social	sense	just	twenty	years	ago;	Eisenberg	observed	both	an	increase	in	directorial	attentiveness	to	fiduciary	duty	in	the	1990s	and	a	simultaneous	decrease	in	legal	liability	for	breaches	of	fiduciary	duty	(ibid.,	pp.	1266-7),	a	curious	negative	correlation.	He	identified	a	combination	of	media	publicity,	pressure	from	institutional	investors,	and	a	shift	in	social	norms	that	partly	arose	from	legal	clarity	concerning	the	roles	of	directors;	the	latter	factor,	he	claimed,	allowed	social	pressures	to	reinforce	certain	directorial	behaviour	in	turn	(ibid.	pp.	
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1268-69).	In	any	case,	it	is	clear	that	it	was	the	shift	in	perception	and	social	norms	that	changed	how	strictly	fiduciary	duty	was	interpreted,	rather	than	a	change	in	the	law	itself.		 More	important	even	than	its	indirect	effects	on	the	legal	interpretation	of	fiduciary	duty,	economics	education	–	and	the	Chicago	School	in	particular	–	has	had	a	significant	influence	on	perceptions	of	human	nature.	Homo	economicus,	the	rational	self-interested	man,	serves	as	the	default	decision-maker	in	many	economic	models	(Wang	et	al.,	2011).	Agency	theory,	which	formed	the	basis	of	Jensen’s	policy	recommendations	regarding	executive	compensation,	is	based	on	the	idea	that	managers	and	shareholders	have	fundamentally	divergent	self-interests	that	must	be	compensated	for	(Jensen	&	Meckling,	1976;	Jensen	&	Murphy,	1990);	yet	although	empirical	evidence	contradicts	agency	theory,	it	persists	(Ghoshal,	2005).	These	and	other	assumptions	have	spread	well	beyond	the	confines	of	economics	departments	and	business	schools.				 Furthermore,	it	would	appear	that	current	trends	in	economic	thought	are	slow	to	appear	in	economics	curricula.	Behavioural	economists	and	psychologists	such	as	Ariely,	Thaler,	Sunstein,	Kahneman,	and	Tversky	have	challenged	the	very	assumptions	upon	which	many	neoclassical	models	are	built	(Ariely,	2008;	D.	Kahneman	et	al.,	1986;	D.	Kahneman,	Slovic,	&	Tversky,	1982;	D.	Kahneman	&	Tversky,	2000;	Thaler	&	Sunstein,	2008).	Heterodox	economists	have	challenged	the	scientific	pretensions,	overreliance	on	mathematics,	ahistorical	analysis,	and	self-interest-based	assumptions	of	mainstream	economics	(Chang,	2010;	Fine,	2004,	2013;	Griffith-Jones,	Ocampo,	&	Stiglitz,	2010;	Krugman,	1995).	But	aside	from	some	uptake	of	behavioural	economics,	these	perspectives	are	rarely	found	in	economics	departments.	Instead,	neoclassical	economics,	including	its	quantitative	methodology,	has	colonised	other	social	sciences	(Fine,	2004).		 Of	course,	critiques	of	economics,	as	it	is	currently	taught	and	practised,	abound.	There	are	critiques	of	the	Washington	Consensus,	such	as	those	from	prominent	economists	like	Joseph	Stiglitz,	and	critiques	of	its	critiques	(Fine,	Lapavitsas,	&	Pincus,	2003).	Theories	and	thinkers	from	an	earlier	time	have	resurged	in	popularity	in	the	post-crisis	period;	the	work	of	Hyman	Minsky	has	gained	new	prominence,	for	
	 39	










Economics	Education	as	Socialisation	 			 Education	can	be	usefully	viewed	as	a	formal,	conscious	socialisation	process	undertaken	by	all	–	or	nearly	all	–	of	the	citizens	of	any	country	that	has	a	system	of	universal	primary	and	secondary	education.	Almost	all	of	my	case	study	conversants,	including	COMER	members,	attended	primary	and	secondary	schools,	but	most	of	them	–	excepting,	in	this	case,	the	majority	of	COMER	members	–	have	also	undertaken	several	years	of	formal	education	in	economics.	Economics	education	appears	to	have	a	particularly	strong	effect	on	students’	ethical	outlook	and	behaviour	(Carter	&	Irons,	1991;	B.	Frank	&	Schulze,	2000;	R.	H.	Frank	et	al.,	1993;	D.	Kahneman	et	al.,	1986;	Marwell	&	Ames,	1981;	Wang	et	al.,	2011),	even	though	they	are	usually	first	exposed	to	it	in	adulthood.			 The	form	that	economics	education	takes	has	implications	extending	far	beyond	the	eventual	beliefs	and	behaviours	of	students,	however.	Unlike	scientific	theories,	social	science	theories	are	vulnerable	to	what	Ghoshal	(2005)	terms	the	double	heuristic;	in	being	taught,	they	can	become	self-fulfilling	prophecies.	For	example,	the	infamous	Black-Scholes	equation	was	initially	wildly	inaccurate	in	doing	what	it	was	intended	to	do,	which	was	to	predict	stock	prices.	Within	a	few	years,	however,	its	widespread	use	among	financiers	made	it	highly	accurate	(Ferraro	et	al.,	2005).	What	this	means,	in	essence,	is	that	what	is	taught	in	economics	courses	can	become	reality	(Folger	&	Salvador,	2008);	economics	can	be	performative,	not	just	descriptive	(MacKenzie,	2005).	Ferraro	et	al.	(2005)	identify	three	mechanisms	that	affect	whether	the	double	heuristic	is	activated:	institutional	design,	social	norms,	and	language.	Institutional	design	and	social	norms	are	affected	by	the	educational	experiences	of	those	who	design,	and	operate	within,	the	institution,	while	language	infuses	all	of	the	above	with	assumptions	and	worldviews	that	can	be	difficult	to	question.	My	thesis	therefore	pays	particular	attention	to	economists’	use	of	language	and	narratives.			 Aside	from	language,	Ghoshal	(2005)	identifies	the	dominance	of	positivism28	and	a	pessimistic	view	of	human	nature	among	business	schools	and	economics	programs	as	the	two	most	significant	trends	contributing	to	unethical	reasoning	and	behaviour	among	graduates.	Positivist	trends	within	the	academy	in	general	may																																																									28	The	view	that	facts,	or	truth,	must	be	based	on	scientifically	generated	evidence	or	mathematical	proof.	
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have	a	particularly	pronounced	effect	on	economics	education,	as	seen	in	the	increasing	use	of	econometrics	and	the	mathematisation	of	the	field	(G.	Hodgson,	2011;	Romer,	forthcoming).	Several	experiments	“suggest	that	a	calculative	mindset	leads	people	to	focus	more	on	numbers	rather	than	on	the	social	aspects	of	their	decisions,	resulting	in	less	consideration	of	the	consequences	of	their	behavior	on	others	and	greater	self-interested	and	unethical	action”	(Wang	&	Murnighan,	2012,	p.	26),	rather	a	concern	for	a	discipline	that	is	implicated	in	public	policy.	Other	studies	suggest	that	individuals	behave	more	cooperatively	in	non-economic	situations	than	in	economic	situations	(Pillutla	&	Chen,	1999).	The	redefinition	of	economics	as	a	science	heavily	infused	with	mathematics	could	therefore	have	itself	helped	to	shape	the	ethical	orientations	of	students	of	economics	over	the	past	few	decades.		 Ghoshal’s	second	concern,	that	of	economists’	pessimistic	view	of	human	nature,	could	be	similarly	significant	in	terms	of	shaping	economics	students’	beliefs	and	behaviour.	The	oft-used	“representative	agent”	in	economics,	homo	economicus,	is	a	rational,	self-interested	being	meant	to	represent	the	average	human.	Humans	in	fact	can	be	a	great	deal	more	cooperative	than	the	self-interest	model	predicts,	however,	even	when	such	behaviour	is	costly	to	the	individual	–	context	and/or	socialisation	often	determine	whether	people	think	and	behave	in	a	self-interested	or	cooperative	manner	(or	some	combination	thereof)	(Hammerstein	&	Hagen,	2005;	D.	Kahneman	et	al.,	1986;	Daniel	Kahneman,	2011).	Many	academics	are	aware	of	this	research,	yet	the	curriculum	rarely	reflects	the	growing	evidence	of	a	more	complex	conception	of	human	nature,	thought,	and	behaviour.				 Recently	the	rise	of	behavioural	economics	has	helped	to	change	the	discussion	in	economics	departments.	Thaler	and	Sunstein’s	“Nudge,”	the	bestseller	on	which	the	UK	government’s	MINDSPACE29	documents	were	based	(2008),	and	the	work	of	psychologists	Kahneman	and	Tversky	and	economists	such	as	Ariely	and	Thaler,	among	others,	have	helped	to	challenge	the	conception	of	homo	economicus	as	the	basis	of	some	economic	models	(Ariely,	2008;	D.	Kahneman	et	al.,	1986,	1982;	D.	Kahneman	&	Tversky,	2000;	Daniel	Kahneman,	2011,	inter	alia).				 As	I	learned	in	the	course	of	my	study,	however,	many	students	still	do	not	encounter	behavioural	economics	in	the	course	of	their	economics	education,	and	its																																																									29	MINDSPACE	is	a	British	government	programme	that	used	insights	from	behavioural	psychology	and	behavioural	economics	to	guide	citizens’	unconscious	biases	and	defaults	towards	decision-making	that	prioritises	long-term	planning,	retirement	savings,	pro-environmental	behaviours,	and	so	on.	
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insights	may	be	mostly	confined	to	the	study	of	microeconomics,	leaving	macroeconomics	largely	untouched.	Some	of	my	conversants	claimed	that	behavioural	economics	is	not	relevant	to	much	of	the	work	of	microeconomists	in	any	case;	they	are	in	the	midst	of	an	information	revolution	that	is	more	likely	to	benefit	from	new	and	better	datasets	than	from	changes	in	the	definition	of	the	“representative	agent.”	Others	told	me	that	few	professors	still	believed	in	a	narrow	conception	of	humans	as	a	self-interested	species.	However,	little	of	this	insight	appears	to	have	trickled	down	to	undergraduate	economics	education	in	particular,	and	it	does	seem	that	some	of	the	new	research	in	evolutionary	biology	–	and	by	extension,	behavioural	economics	–	may	be	relevant	to	the	study	of	microeconomics	and	macroeconomics	alike,	especially	where	it	contributes	to	public	policy	decision-making.30		 After	all,	research	has	shown	that	people	are	consistently	more	fair-minded	than	the	self-interest	model	would	predict;	they	are	surprisingly	generous	in	studies	measuring	payouts	to	anonymous	strangers,	and	they	are	willing	to	punish	unfair	behaviour	even	to	their	own	detriment	(Folger	&	Salvador,	2008;	Ghoshal,	2005;	Hammerstein	&	Hagen,	2005;	D.	Kahneman	et	al.,	1986;	Rabin,	1991	inter	alia)	and	reward	prosocial	behaviour	in	others,	even	if	they	are	not	the	direct	beneficiaries	(Keltner,	Kogan,	Piff,	&	Saturn,	2014).		 “The	past	20	years	have	seen	startling	discoveries	that	support	the	supposition	that	humans	have	an	intuitive,	default	tendency	towards	some	degree	of	prosociality”	(Keltner	et	al.,	2014,	p.	25.6),	not	just	self-interest.	Prosociality	has	been	linked	to	releases	of	powerful	neurochemicals	including	oxytocin,	serotonin,	and	dopamine,	and	has	been	shown	to	benefit	human	physical	and	mental	health	according	to	numerous	indicators	such	as	stress	(cortisol)	levels,	life	expectancy,	immune	response,	and	relationship	satisfaction	(ibid.).	Cooperative	behaviour	may,	in	fact,	benefit	and	motivate	humans	in	myriad	ways	that	are	difficult	for	the	dominant	economic	models	to	capture	or	account	for.					 Moreover,	there	is	evidence	that	the	variation	in	prosocial	and	competitive	perspectives	and	behaviours	is	likely	both	genetic	and	environmental,	and	can	be	substantially	influenced	by	socialisation.	Some	research	suggests	that	between	25%	and	65%	of	personality	traits	are	heritable	(Jang,	McCrae,	Angleitner,	Riemann,	&	Livesley,	1998).	In	other	words,	humans’	socialisation	–	social	context	–	can	induce																																																									30	By	taking	into	account	social	norms	and	institutions,	for	example.	
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prosocial	or	competitive	modes	of	behaviour.	Hence	the	role	of	economics	education	
for	economists	may	constitute	a	turning	point	in	moral	orientation	for	some	people	–	especially	because	it	happens	at	what,	for	many,	is	a	particularly	impressionable	age.			 Economics	and	economics-focused	business	school	programs	appear	to	play	a	role	in	shaping	students’	political	and	ethical	orientations,	and	their	view	of	human	nature,	in	other	ways	as	well.	This	is	perhaps	unsurprising;	there	is	less	required	instruction	in	ethics	and	social	responsibility	in	business	schools	than	in	medicine	and	law	schools	(Pfeffer	&	Fong,	2004).	Moreover,	game	theory	–	a	mainstay	in	economics	–	tends	to	emphasise	unemotional	rational	thought	rather	than	social	emotions	such	as	empathy,	guilt,	and	so	on,	which	could	contribute	to	the	devaluation	of	outcomes	that	contribute	to	the	wellbeing	of	society	as	a	whole	(Wang	et	al.,	2011).		 A	growing	body	of	research	takes	this	much	further,	however.	Scores	of	studies	suggest	that	economists	tend	to	“free	ride”	to	a	significantly	greater	extent	than	other	groups	(Marwell	&	Ames,	1981),	while	other	research	showed	that	economics	students	were	more	likely	to	join	the	Republican	party	after	five	courses	in	economics	(Allgood,	Bosshardt,	van	der	Klaauw,	&	Watts,	2012),	that	they	appeared	to	change	their	opinions	towards	an	“individual	freedom”	orientation	in	the	course	of	their	degree	(Hammock,	Routon,	&	Walker,	2016),	and	that	they	were	significantly	less	likely	to	cooperate	in	the	context	of	controlled	experiments	than	were	non-economics	majors	(R.	H.	Frank	et	al.,	1993).	The	latter	was	true	of	Canadian	economics	students	as	well	(Kahneman	et	al.,	1986).	A	survey	of	undergraduate	business	students	in	the	UK	found	that	final-year	students	had	less	moral	awareness	than	they	had	had	prior	to	a	full	year	of	study	in	business	ethics	(Lowry,	2003).	A	study	comparing	undergraduates	(economics	and	non-economics	majors)	at	the	beginning	and	the	end	of	their	first	semester	at	university	found	that	the	self-interest	model	propounded	by	economics	courses	negatively	influenced	economics	students’	tendency	to	respond	prosocially	in	experimental	scenarios	(R.	H.	Frank	et	al.,	1993).	Although	cooperative	behaviour	among	the	student	population	tends	to	increase	with	every	additional	year	in	university,	this	does	not	appear	to	be	true	for	economics	majors	(ibid.).			 There	are	some	indications,	however,	that	economics	students	behave	differently	due	to	self-selection	effects	rather	than	indoctrination31,	according	to	Frank	&	Schulze	(2000);	another	study	suggested	this	as	well,	although	it	had	a	small	
																																																								31	Their	term.	
	 46	






























New	Institutionalism,	which	has	been	enjoying	a	revival	in	recent	years)	concerned	itself	with	power;	instincts,	routines,	social	norms,	and	habits;	and	the	individual	as	a	socially	constructed	being	who	both	affects	and	is	affected	by	institutions	and	other	human	beings.	This	involved	a	complex	view	of	human	nature;	an	emphasis	on	change	and	the	process	of	change,	as	opposed	to	analyses	of	states	of	equilibrium;	an	acknowledgement	of	the	power	of	inertia	and	path	dependence	–	for	example,	the	continued	use	of	the	QWERTY	keyboard	despite	the	disappearance	of	the	initial	need	for	that	particular	configuration	(Schwartz,	2004);	and	an	understanding	of	abduction	as	the	intellectual	process	of	invention	as	opposed	to	deduction	or	induction,	abduction	conceived	as	“the	spark	of	intellectual	creativity	or	intuition,	kindled	in	the	tinder	of	assimilated	facts”	(G.	M.	Hodgson,	1994,	p.	61).		 This	conception	of	the	learning	process	can	be	recognised	in	the	work	of	early	educational	theorists	such	as	John	Dewey	and	George	Herbert	Mead,	who	maintained	that	learning	and	knowledge	are	fundamentally	shaped	by	social	relations.	Social	context	–	habits,	beliefs,	social	norms,	and	institutions	–	affect	and	are	affected	by	one	another,	and	learning	cannot	exist	outside	that	context.	Indeed,	John	Dewey	later	joined	with	Thorstein	Veblen,	a	central	figure	in	institutionalism,	to	found	the	New	School.			 Institutionalism	is	an	approach	that	is	enjoying	a	resurgence	in	the	study	of	economics.	Richard	Lipsey,	perhaps	one	of	Canada’s	best-known	economists,	has	not	explicitly	labelled	himself	an	institutionalist.	Yet	he	has	said	the	following,	which	helps	to	illustrate	the	importance	of	institutions	in	the	study	of	economics:		 	Growth	is	a	largely	path	dependent,	co-evolution	of	technology	and	institutions	in	a	time-irreversible	process.	The	absence	of	a	time	dimension	is	being	addressed	in	some	of	today’s	non-main-stream,	evolutionary	theorising.	The	study	of	path	dependency	and,	more	generally,	the	whole	evolutionary	branch	of	economics,	seeks	to	put	time	into	theories	in	meaningful	ways.	[.	.	.]	The	best	economists	always	knew	that	market	systems	require	an	underpinning	of	good	institutions,	some	of	them	quite	complex.	But	the	importance	of	institutions	is	not	routinely	taught	in	theory	courses	and	it	is	debatable	how	many	economists	understood	the	importance	of	institutions	at	any	one	time.	An	important	test	seemed	to	come	with	the	marketisation	of	the	former	USSR.	Many	US	economic	advisors	said	in	effect:	“Just	free	up	the	markets	and	privatise	all	industries	and	all	will	be	well.”	This	advice	was	profoundly	a-temporal	and	non-institutional.	Russian	privatisation	was	a	fiasco	and	well-functioning	capitalism	has	proved	to	be	unachievable	without	institutions	to	secure	such	important	things	as	effective	intellectual	property	protection,	security	of	private	property,	orderly																																																																																																																																																																														(1994,	pp.	68–69).	
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the	perceived	legitimacy	of	Canadian	economists	from	various	institutions;	this	information	would	have	been	impossible	to	glean	in	other	ways.41		 As	indicated	by	Schoenberger	(1991),	key	conversant	interviews	with	elites	may	be	particularly	useful	in	periods	of	significant	economic	and	social	change.	Schoenberger’s	assertion	became	increasingly	apposite	in	the	course	of	my	research;	I	could	never	have	fully	understood	the	changing	nature	of	the	field	of	macroeconomics,	for	example,	had	I	attempted	to	restrict	my	study	to	survey	data.	Although	I	did	not	have	a	full	grasp	of	the	tenets	of	macroeconomics	prior	to	the	onset	of	my	study	–	indeed,	I	was	and	continue	to	be	lacking	in	formal	economics	education	–	it	clearly	was	essential	that	I	learn	enough	about	economics	to	be	able	to	formulate	appropriate	questions	for	my	study	and	to	discuss	them	meaningfully	with	my	interlocutors.		 Such	systematic	preparation	on	my	part	improved	the	quality	and	depth	of	the	questions	I	was	able	to	ask	of	my	conversants,	and	played	a	crucial	role	in	gaining	access	–	and	establishing	strong	trust	relationships	–	with	conversants	in	the	first	place	(Stephens,	2007).	In-depth	prior	knowledge	of	conversants’	professional	field	and	life	experience	is	crucial	in	gaining	their	respect	as	well	as	their	co-operation;	this	is	true	for	any	in-depth	interviewer,	but	it	is	especially	important	in	interviewing	elites	(Mikecz,	2012;	Ryan	&	Lewer,	2012)	who,	in	the	case	of	my	research,	accounted	for	a	significant	majority	of	my	list	of	interviewees.	In	the	event,	many	of	my	conversants	demonstrated	the	degree	of	their	assurance	by	offering	recommendations	and	introductions	to	other	economists	to	interview.		 Thorough	preparation	is	an	important	defence	against	the	potential	for	elite	conversants	to	patronise	a	researcher	who	may	be	perceived	as	a	novice	or	intellectual	outsider	(M.	Healey	&	Rawlinson,	1993).	This	was	a	particular	issue	for	me	as	a	young	woman	mainly	interviewing	older	men.	In	this	respect,	the	quality	of	my	data	depended	on	the	best	tactical	use	of	any	and	all	defences	against	the	possibility	of	condescension.	Because	economics	as	a	field	supports	an	even	smaller	proportion	of	women	than	many	other	elite	fields,	this	was	a	particularly	important	consideration.				 This	research	could	be	viewed	as	part	of	a	growing	trend	of	academics	studying	academia	itself;	there	now	exist	a	number	of	significant	studies	of	academic																																																									41	Such	difficult-to-elicit	information	was	made	all	the	more	so	by	the	fact	that	interviews	with	elites	are,	for	obvious	reasons,	likely	to	be	particularly	affected	by	time	constraints	(Berry,	2002;	Richards,	1996).	
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	 There	is	a	preponderance	of	special	instructions	from	academics	who	have	conducted	interviews	with	elite	conversants;	these	include	dress	(conservative),	awareness	of	elites’	tight	time	constraints,	the	importance	of	choosing	a	neutral	location	in	which	to	conduct	the	interview	(Ryan	&	Lewer,	2012),	and	the	need	to	be	insistent	that	it	is	the	person	sampled	who	must	be	interviewed	(Aberbach	&	Rockman,	2002).	It	is	also	essential	to	be	aware	of	conversants’	potential	loyalty	to	colleagues	and	awareness	of	outside	audiences	(Ryan	&	Lewer,	2012).	Indeed,	there	is	a	particular	need	to	be	aware	of	the	possibility	that	elites	will	feel	the	need	to	defend	their	reputation,	industry,	or	colleagues	in	an	interview	setting,	and	as	such	their	claims	should	be	met	with	some	healthy	scepticism	(G.L.	Clark,	1998;	McDowell,	1998).	One	way	to	counteract	this	risk	is	to	build	in	verification	checks	to	ensure	that	conversants’	responses	are	internally	consistent	–	a	practice	I	maintained	throughout.	It	was	also	important	to	emphasise	my	educational	credentials,	in	my	written	requests	for	interviews	in	particular,	as	they	constitute	the	only	source	of	“elite”	status	I	have	to	offer	and	were	therefore	an	essential	element	in	gaining	the	respect	of	my	elite	conversants	(Mikecz,	2012).	Equally	important,	in	terms	of	maintaining	friendly	and	trusting	relations,	was	to	invoke	third-party	criticisms	rather	than	voicing	my	own	reservations	in	order	not	to	alienate	the	conversant	(Berry,	2002).	Finally,	I	followed	the	advice	of	Mikecz	in	sending	‘thank-you’	messages	after	my	interviews	–	in	genuine	thanks	for	the	time	and	energy	of	conversants	(2012).		 The	complement	of	58	individual	interviews,	along	with	mixed	quantitative-qualitative	surveys,	form	the	foundation	of	this	thesis.	The	results	of	these	interviews	also	shaped	the	design	of	the	surveys	to	follow;	my	conversants	provided	me	with	insights	I	could	not	otherwise	have	gained.	The	advantages	of	qualitative	research	became	apparent	several	times	in	the	course	of	the	data	collection	process,	as	detailed	below.		 I	employed	a	sampling	frame	for	selecting	conversants	within	each	of	the	case	studies	where	this	was	appropriate,	and	in	the	remaining	cases	I	sampled	different	proportions	of	each	so	as	to	achieve	a	balance	of	conversants.	These	procedures	accorded	with	the	principles	of	theoretical	sampling,	in	which	the	aim	in	this	instance	is	to	gain	an	understanding	of	the	attitudes	of	economists	across	the	political	spectrum,	rather	than	to	interview	a	strictly	representative	sample	of	Canadian	economists.	This	could	also	be	considered	to	be	a	form	of	stratified	sampling,	in	that	I	
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sampled	randomly	from	a	list	of	possible	conversants	within	some	of	the	cases	under	study.				 Among	certain	groups,	on	the	other	hand,	I	simply	sought	out	as	many	conversants	as	possible	–	among	the	COMER	(Committee	on	Monetary	and	Economic	Reform)43	members,	as	my	only	sample	of	autodidact	economists,	and	also	among	the	chief	economists	of	the	major	banks.	As	a	small	group	in	each	case,	it	was	possible	to	interview	nearly	all	of	the	relevant	actors;	the	most	significant	issue	in	these	instances	concerned	questions	of	access.				 In	the	case	of	the	chief	economists	of	the	major	banks,	I	simply	contacted	all	five	of	them	as	many	times,	and	in	as	many	ways,	as	was	conceivably	possible.	In	the	event,	I	was	able	to	interview	four	of	the	five	current	chief	economists	and	two	other	former	(and	particularly	well-known)	chief	economists.	As	for	COMER	members,	I	simply	interviewed	as	many	active	members	(members	who	attend	meetings	regularly	or	were	long-time	regular	attendees	over	the	course	of	several	years	previously;	the	latter	category	is	included	because	many	formative	COMER	members	are	elderly	and	may	have	not	been	physically	able	to	participate	in	recent	years)	as	possible,	via	a	snowballing	sampling	technique	beginning	with	the	COMER	members	known	to	my	grandfather.	This	process	yielded	a	total	of	6	COMER	conversants	(7,	if	the	lawyer	in	the	COMER	Bank	of	Canada	case	is	included)	across	the	country,	mostly	in	Toronto,	with	one	conversant	each	in	Saskatoon	and	Vancouver.				 One	of	the	Torontonian	conversants	was	COMER	co-founder	and	co-litigant	of	the	COMER	case	against	the	Government	of	Canada,	William	Krehm,	who	was	101	years	old	at	the	time	of	our	interview.	Sadly,	in	recent	years	he	has	declined	significantly	and	I	reportedly	saw	him	on	one	of	his	bad	days;	he	was,	as	a	result,	confused	at	times	and	unable	to	answer	the	bulk	of	my	questions	(he	answered	a	few	of	them	by	happenstance	along	the	way,	however),	although	he	was	unfailingly	warm	and	charming	and	his	repeated	attempts	to	give	me	books	and	ask	about	which	musical	instruments	I	played	belied	his	lifelong	curiosity	and	love	of	music.	Fortunately	his	remarkable	life	has	been	documented	elsewhere,	which	allowed	me	to	fill	in	enough	gaps	to	feel	comfortable	including	his	testimony	in	my	study,	although	I	fully	acknowledge	that	this	interview	differed	greatly	from	the	others.	
																																																								43	For	clarity,	refer	to	the	Guide	to	Canadian	Think	Tanks	table	for	a	list	of	think	tanks	and	their	political	orientations.	
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University	of	Calgary50	in	economics,	political	science,	and	public	policy;	and	no	representation	whatsoever	from	Queen’s	University,51	the	University	of	Western	Ontario,52	Université	de	Montréal,53	or	York	University54	–	very	few	from	any	of	the	top	universities	in	Canada,	and	of	the	Americans	listed,	the	academics	hailed	from	institutions	I	was	unfamiliar	with	(which	was	surprising,	as	I	had	lived	and	studied	in	the	U.S.	for	four	years).		 From	my	interviews	with	think	tank	economists	at	either	end	of	the	political	spectrum,	I	determined	which	so-called	centrist	think	tanks	were	most	often	mentioned	by	economists	from	both	poles;	I	weighed	the	centrist	institutions’	relative	importance	on	the	basis	of	mentions	from	fellow	economists,	the	number	of	employees	listed	on	their	websites,	and	their	volume	of	research	output.	The	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	the	Conference	Board,	and	the	IRPP	were	mentioned	the	most	by	economists	in	my	sample,	although	the	IRPP	was	considerably	smaller	and	had	a	more	modest	research	output	than	the	other	two.			 I	selected	C.D.	Howe	Institute	conversants	on	the	basis	of	seniority	and,	as	before,	with	an	emphasis	on	macroeconomists.	I	approached	the	President	and	Chief	Executive	Officer,	Bill	Robson	(an	impressive	number	of	my	other	conversants	had	recommended	speaking	to	him),	initially	with	no	result	–	more	on	that	below.	I	also	approached	Vice	President	of	Research	Daniel	Schwanen	(introduced	to	me	by	Don	Brean,	a	UToronto	professor)	and	Associate	Director	of	Research	Ben	Dachis	(whom	several	of	my	academic	conversants	recommended	as	well).		 I	submitted	a	request	on	the	Conference	Board	of	Canada	website	to	interview	President	and	Chief	Executive	Officer,	Daniel	Muzyka,	and	Glen	Hodgson,	Senior	Vice-President	and	Chief	Economist	at	the	time.	As	detailed	below,	I	ended	up	being	in	a	position	to	interview	both	of	them,	but	as	there	was	some	uncertainty	as	to	whether	I	would	be	able	to	interview	Daniel	Muzyka	I	opted	to	interview	the	Deputy	Chief	Economist,	Pedro	Antunes,	as	well.			
																																																								50	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“UCalgary”	instead	of	“University	of	Calgary.”	51	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“Queen’s”	instead	of	“Queen’s	University.”	52	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“Western”	instead	of	“University	of	Western	Ontario.”	53	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“UMontréal”	instead	of	“Université	de	Montréal.”	54	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“York”	instead	of	“York	University.”	
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	 At	the	IRPP	I	simply	interviewed	Research	Director	Stephen	Tapp,	who	is	a	macroeconomist	and	who	was	recommended	multiple	times	by	fellow	economists;	by	this	point	I	already	had	accumulated	too	many	conversants	and	there	were	no	other	macroeconomists	on	staff	(the	IRPP’s	research	covers	more	than	just	economic	policy,	whereas	the	other	centrist	and	right-of-centre	think	tanks	I	examined	were	more	focused	on	economic	policy	issues).		 I	adopted	a	slightly	different	approach	with	the	Bank	of	Canada	as	there	were	a	great	deal	more	possible	conversants	in	the	Economics	division	there.55	I	initially	intended	to	engage	in	systematic	sampling	of	the	221	candidates	listed	on	the	website	until	a	total	of	15	conversants	had	been	selected.	Unfortunately,	as	I	discovered,	the	Bank	of	Canada	website	does	not	list	contact	information	for	individual	employees.	Because	I	had	received	messages	from	a	Bank	of	Canada	email	address	for	my	Master’s	research,	I	deduced	that	the	Bank	would	use	the	same	formula	for	all	employees	(first	initial	+	first	name	@bankofcanada.ca)	and	proceeded	to	contact	members	of	the	Governing	Council	and	Senior	Management	that	way.	I	did	not	receive	a	single	direct	response	to	any	of	these	messages;	instead,	I	learned	about	the	presence	of	gatekeepers	within	the	Bank	of	Canada.	I	received	a	message	from	an	administrative	assistant	who	noted	that	I	had	contacted	several	employees	at	the	Bank	and	asked	for	further	particulars	as	to	what	I	was	studying,	to	whom	I	wished	to	speak,	and	so	on.	I	complied	with	her	requests	and,	as	detailed	below,	eventually	secured	one	interview.	I	was	unsuccessful	in	a	further	attempt	at	finding	so	much	as	a	second	current	Bank	of	Canada	employee	as	a	conversant,	also	detailed	below;	all	in	all,	then,	my	results	looked	nothing	like	a	stratified	sample.		 I	did,	however,	manage	to	interview	two	high-profile	former	employees	of	the	Bank	of	Canada.	Tiff	Macklem,	now	the	Dean	of	the	Rotman	School	of	Management	at	UToronto,	was	the	Senior	Deputy	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	under	Mark	Carney.	David	Dodge,	now	a	Bay	Street56	lawyer	at	Bennett	Jones	LLP,	was	the	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	from	2001	to	2008.	Perhaps	because	he	had	so	recently	been	a	part	of	the	Bank,	Tiff	Macklem	required	that	questions	be	submitted	in	advance	(from	which	he	selected	a	small,	and	distinctly	uncontroversial,	subset	to	answer)	and	seemed	somewhat	hesitant	to	be	interviewed.	
																																																								55	A	total	of	301	economists	(“with	a	regular	employee	status”)	worked	at	the	Bank	of	Canada	as	of	30	November	2016	(Prom,	2016).	56	Canada’s	Wall	Street	equivalent.	
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	 Finally,	I	selected	my	academic	conversants	on	the	basis	of	several	considerations.	First,	in	line	with	the	goal	of	determining	the	views	and	social	norms	among	elite	Canadian	economists,	I	surveyed	national	rankings	of	economics	departments	and	selected	those	that	most	consistently	appeared	in	the	list	of	the	top	ten;	there	were	eleven	of	these.	Most	were	housed	within	U15	universities.57	They	comprised:	UBC	(Vancouver	School	of	Economics	and	the	Sauder	School	of	Business	–	2	departments	in	the	top	ten);	UToronto	(Department	of	Economics	and	Rotman	School	of	Management	–	2	departments	in	the	top	ten);	Queen’s,	Western;	McGill;	UCalgary58;	and	UMontréal.	The	remaining	two	universities	(not	in	the	U15)	were	SFU	and	York.	Several	other	universities	could	reasonably	be	classed	as	being	in	the	top	ten;	the	rankings	were	less	than	consistent.	I	ended	up	with	conversants	from	two	of	these	institutions,	the	University	of	Ottawa59	and	Carleton	University,	for	other	reasons.	If	time	and	resources	had	permitted,	I	would	have	interviewed	professors	from	Dalhousie	University,	McMaster	University,	the	University	of	Manitoba,	and	the	University	of	Alberta	as	well.			 I	included	the	two	business	schools	for	two	reasons	–	first,	they	did	indeed	make	it	into	most	rankings	of	the	top	economics	departments	in	the	country.	Second,	as	mentioned	above,	business	schools	now	account	for	a	majority	share	of	economics	education	provision	in	some	universities.	Economics	–	and	related	fields	such	as	finance	–	is	now	a	dominant	discipline	in	business	schools	(Fourcade	&	Khurana,	2013),	and	in	Canada,	as	in	the	U.S.,	there	are	more	students	and	professors	in	business	schools	than	in	economics	departments	themselves	(Canadian	Association	of	University	Teachers,	2010).	Among	the	top	twenty	business	schools	and	economics	departments	in	the	U.S.,	there	are	nearly	as	many	economics	PhDs	teaching	in	the	former	as	there	are	in	the	latter.			 Within	the	eleven	institutions	I	prioritised	in	my	sample	(at	nine	universities),	I	targeted	full	professors	and	macroeconomists	initially.	I	targeted	the	former	due	to	my	intention	to	study	elite	economists’	views	and	norms,	and	full	professors	enjoy	the	esteem	associated	with	their	positions	(and	often	attain	those	positions	due	to	respect	for	their	work).																																																										57	A	consortium	of	Canada’s	large	public	research	universities.	58	I	should	note	that	the	University	of	Calgary’s	School	of	Public	Policy,	whose	founder	and	director,	Jack	Mintz,	I	interviewed,	could	be	classified	as	a	think	tank	by	many	measures;	in	my	analysis	I	take	this	into	account.	59	Hereafter	referred	to	in	shortened	form	–	“Ottawa”	instead	of	“University	of	Ottawa.”	
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	 I	targeted	macroeconomists	for	many	reasons.	First,	my	research	concerns,	in	part,	the	contrast	between	autodidact	and	institutionally	educated	economists;	the	COMER	group	is	a	rare	example	of	the	former,	and	they	are	chiefly	concerned	with	macroeconomics.	It	therefore	made	sense	to	make	this	the	basis	of	my	comparison.	Besides	which,	central	bankers,	the	federal	department	of	finance,	and	the	chief	economists	of	the	largest	banks	–	three	of	the	most	important	groups	of	economists	in	my	study	–	deal	in	macroeconomics	as	well.			 Second,	macroeconomists	as	a	group	do	not	appear	to	have	the	same	common	left-	or	right-wing	political	valence	as	do	economists	from	other	specialties	in	economics;	in	their	2000	study	Fuller	and	Geide-Stevenson	found	that,	unlike	propositions	in	microeconomics,		“macroeconomic	propositions	exhibit	a	lower	degree	of	consensus”	(2003,	p.	369),	with	macroeconomists’	views	representing	a	broader	range	of	points	along	the	political	spectrum.	In	contrast	with	microeconomics,	macroeconomics	has	been	termed	“heterogenous”[sic]	(Henriksen,	Seabrooke,	&	Young,	2016,	p.	2)	and	“always	the	hardest	and	most	controversial	part	of	the	subject”	(Coyle,	2009,	p.	271).	As	it	was	put	by	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	“There	are	no	competing	schools	of	thought	in	microeconomics	–	which	is	unified	and	has	a	common	core	among	all	economists.	The	same	cannot	be	said	of	macroeconomics	–	where	there	are,	and	have	been,	competing	schools	of	thought	about	how	to	explain	the	behavior	of	economic	aggregates	(Rodrigo,	2012).”	Although	some	claim	that	these	disagreements	are	lessening	over	time	(Blanchard,	Dell’Ariccia,	&	Mauro,	2010),	there	are	others	who	think	the	gap	has	widened,	speaking	of	“the	chasm	between	different	macroeconomists	in	the	early	2009	debate	about	the	scale	of	the	economic	stimulus	package	needed	to	respond	to	the	banking	crisis	and	the	onset	of	recession.	One	set	of	economists	turned	to	Keynes	for	analysis	and	solutions,	the	other	to	the	monetarists	of	the	Chicago	school.	An	ideological	fissure	which	had	narrowed	during	the	stable	1990s	has	reopened,	and	in	terms	which	have	changed	little	in	a	generation”	(Coyle,	2009,	p.	264).				 Both	the	literature	and	my	conversants	seemed	to	indicate	that	there	was,	indeed,	more	disagreement	among	macroeconomists	than	microeconomists.	Even	those	whose	findings	contradicted	this	assumption	–	Ricketts	and	Shoesmith	did	not	find	this	to	be	the	case,	for	example	–	still	found	that	“the	effects	of	personal	characteristics	on	response	patterns	was	most	evident	in	the	case	of	macro-normative	propositions”	(1992,	p.	212),	meaning	that	social,	educational,	and	other	
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factors	can	have	a	significant	effect	on	one’s	views	in	the	macroeconomics	sphere	to	an	extent	that	is	not	true	of	microeconomics.				 Third,	there	were	sound	methodological	reasons	for	targeting	macroeconomists.	Most	economists	are	microeconomists	(Coyle,	2009;	Woolley,	2013);	macroeconomics	is	the	largest	single	area	of	study	among	economists,	but	the	combined	number	of	microeconomists	vastly	outnumbers	macroeconomists	(Roeder,	2014).	Since	there	are	fewer	macroeconomists	and	they	are	much	less	likely	to	be	divided	into	subdisciplines,	it	was	easier	to	interview	a	viable	proportion	of	macroeconomists	in	Canada.	If	I	had	spread	my	sample	over	microeconomists	as	well,	I	would	have	had	a	much	less	complete	picture	of	any	given	subfield	of	economics.				 A	fourth	reason	is	also	methodological;	it	would	appear	that	the	data	revolution	in	economics	in	recent	years	has	mainly	helped	microeconomics	as	a	field;	macroeconomists	are	more	likely	to	still	be	working	with	models	and	theory,	which	is	where	“representative	agents”	and	the	like	may	play	a	role.	Indeed,	although	most	of	her	book	constitutes	a	defence	of	the	field	of	economics,	Coyle	writes:		 	Practising	macroeconomists	appear	to	be	relying	on	the	analysis	which	featured	in	my	textbooks	of	the	early	1980s;	meanwhile,	the	macroeconomics	taught	in	universities	is	the	blind	alley	of	“dynamic	stochastic	general	equilibrium”	models,	a	massively	technical	approach	which	has	taken	on	board	none	of	the	microeconomic	insights	described	in	the	earlier	chapters	of	this	book.	Why	does	modern	macroeconomics	not	make	more	use	of	multiple	equilibrium	models,	learning	from	the	insights	of	growth	theory?	These	do	exist,	for	example,	in	the	work	of	Roger	Farmer,	which	explains	“animal	spirits”	in	terms	of	self-fulfilling	expectations	(see	Farmer	1993).	Why	have	macroeconomists	not	incorporated	the	now-old	insight	that	the	structure	of	the	economy	changes	dramatically	from	time	to	time	and	there	are	periods	when	“normal”	models	will	not	apply?	Why	have	so	few	macroeconomists	incorporated	characteristics	such	as	imperfect	information?	I	do	not	know	the	answer,	only	that	the	failure	of	macroeconomists	to	learn	from	the	advances	of	microeconomists	explains	why	so	many	people	think	the	economic	crisis	is	also	a	crisis	of	economics.”	(2009,	p.	264).			 A	fifth	reason	is	perhaps	even	more	important:	macroeconomics	is	the	subfield	of	economics	implicated	in	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis.	“Economic	theory	based	on	monetarism	and	the	neoclassical	synthesis,	and	the	equilibrium	and	econometric	models	derived	from	them,	famously	and	spectacularly	failed	to	predict	the	crisis”	(Walks,	2014,	p.	258),	in	part	because	these	theories	and	models	largely	failed	to	include	debt	and	credit	(ibid.).	Market	crashes	at	the	national	and	international	level	fall	within	the	domain	of	macroeconomics,	and	“[t]he	fact	that	neoclassical	
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narratives	(Hendel-Giller,	2010).	The	“narrative	turn”	in	the	social	sciences	in	the	past	two	decades	is	a	recognition	of	the	human	tendency	to	create	narratives	out	of	life	events	(Wyk,	2012)	and	in	fact	Canadian	economists’	narratives	turned	out	to	be	an	excellent	measure	of	the	evolution	of	their	perspectives	and	ideological	commitments	over	the	course	of	their	formal	or	autodidactic	economics	education.			 Some	of	my	conversants	–	especially	many	of	the	COMER	members	–	were	themselves	witnesses	to	major	events	in	economic	history.	Witnessing	the	economic	reality	of	World	War	II,	say,	or	the	stagflation	era	of	the	1970s,	has	the	potential	to	change	the	nature	of	one’s	assessments	of	these	events	and	their	aftermath	(Gardner,	2010);	I	made	sure	to	note	differences	between	my	older	conversants’	perceptions	and	those	of	conversants	whose	views	were	based	on	the	historical	record	and	second-hand	testimony.	I	also,	wherever	possible,	triangulated	my	conversants’	accounts	by	verifying	events,	trends,	and	statistics	revealed	in	my	conversants’	versions	of	history	by	way	of	consultation	with	Statistics	Canada,	official	documents,	and	contemporary	media	accounts	of	the	events	and	facts	in	question	(Duncan,	2004;	N.	L.	Holt,	2003).	Examination	of	various	groups’	historical	narratives	is	not	just	an	academic	exercise;	as	Karen	Ho	indicates:			 	One	of	the	ways	in	which	Wall	Street	investment	bankers	control	their	present	and	future	representations	is	to	strengthen	their	hold	on	the	past.	[In	my	book]	I	thus	examined	in	detail	how	Wall	Street	and	advocates	for	a	finance-centric	approach	to	corporate	America	interpret	and	use	history,	from	their	understanding	of	finance’s	role	as	the	“original”	fountain	of	capital	for	all	public	corporations	to	their	viewing	of	corporations	and	the	stock	market	through	the	lens	of	neoclassical	economic	and	private	property	values	(Ho,	2012,	pg.	40).					 In	essence,	Wall	Street	actors’	interpretation	of	history	allowed	them	to	project	an	image	onto	their	current	and	future	selves;	if	this	is	true	for	Canadian	economists,	their	historical	narratives	would	be	likely	to	continue	to	inform	their	beliefs	and	actions	on	an	ongoing	basis.	Furthermore,	economics	has	a	history	of	being	influenced	by	narrative	accounts	at	times;	the	strange	and	everlasting	popularity	of	Ayn	Rand’s	novels,	especially	Atlas	Shrugged,	helped	spread	of	the	idea	of	the	rational	man,	for	example.	Against	this	background	my	conversants’	narrative	histories	therefore	seemed	particularly	important	to	collect.		 The	other	two	major	components	of	my	interview	questions	were,	first,	those	that	identified	the	conversant’s	view	of	think	tanks	across	the	political	spectrum	and	of	other	economics	departments	in	the	country.	This	was	to	determine	how	legitimate	
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“I	think	that	the	Fraser	Institute	is	viewed	as	more	biased	than	the	C.D.	Howe,	but	they	both	correspond	quite	closely	to	my	views.”			 “The	Fraser	Institute	does	actually	pretty	good	work.	But	they’ve	got	a	terrible	reputation	of	being	in	the	pocket	of	the	corporate	sector	and	they’re	too	right-wing.”					 Conversants	from	the	opposite	end	of	the	political	spectrum	were	somewhat	predictably	dismissive,	declaring,	for	example,	“The	C.D.	Howe	Institute	once	in	a	while	comes	up	with	an	interesting	study.	The	Fraser	Institute	I	think	is	the	worst.”	Even	those	on	the	fringe	of	economic	debate	perceived	the	Fraser	Institute	as	an	outlier;	as	one	COMER	member	put	it,	“They’re	sort	of	really	out	there.”	But	commentators	from	the	middle-of-the-road	or	right-of-centre	were	hardly	more	sympathetic;	one	Conference	Board	conversant	said,	“Fraser	is	viewed	as	an	outlier	in	Canada,	for	example,”	and	in	describing	one	of	their	top	executives,	“He’s	a	true	believer.	Sort	of	–	damn	the	facts,	this	is	what	I	believe.”	A	C.D.	Howe	Institute	conversant	agreed:	“You	know	that	their	entire	mission,	and	everything	they	publish,	will	say	‘The	solution	is	always	a	free-market	solution.	Less	government	is	best.’	If	you	see	something	from	them,	it’s	not	going	to	be	a	terribly	original	solution.”			 The	response	from	academics	was	mixed	but	largely	negative,	with	the	most	positive	comments	mainly	descriptive,	in	the	vein	of	describing	the	Fraser	Institute	as	“libertarian”	and	“not	wildly	influential”;	another	professor	said,	“when	you	know	it	comes	from	them,	you	discount	it	to	a	certain	extent.	[.	.	.]	But	that’s	true	of	all	think	tanks.”		 			 Most	professors	had	fewer	positive	things	to	say;	one	UBC	professor	was	not	aware	of	any	colleagues	affiliated	with	the	Fraser	Institute,	“and	I	think	at	UBC	we	would	kind	of	say,	‘Really?’”	Another	UBC	professor	had	been	approached	to	be	on	their	original	board	of	directors,	to	which	he	responded,	“Not	on	your	life.”	Others	were	equally	dismissive:		 “The	think	tank	that	I	don’t	rate	very	highly	is	the	Fraser	Institute.	[.	.	.]	My	perception	was	that	they	were	a	little	bit	iffy.	You	won’t	see	academic	economists	quoting	their	work	or	relying	on	it.”				 “I	would	never	be	affiliated	with	the	Fraser	Institute.	[.	.	.	They’re]	a	very	right-wing	group.”				 “They’re	garbage.”		
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Prime	Minister	and	founder	of	the	Canadian	Action	Party,	Paul	Hellyer,	for	an	interview;	although	he	at	one	point	responded	to	one	of	my	emails,	he	did	not	respond	thereafter	and	I	was	eventually	forced	to	abandon	the	effort.	As	he	is	now	93	years	of	age,	that	was	perhaps	unsurprising.		 I	had	a	few	entrees	to	the	PEF,	having	interviewed	several	contributing	authors	for	my	MSc	thesis	on	the	Canadian	banking	system,	and	as	I	had	hoped,	PEF	members	were	as	helpful	with	this	research	as	they	were	with	my	previous	project.		 On	the	central	banking	side,	access	was	a	great	deal	more	difficult.	Although	it	was	a	lofty	aim,	I	contacted	former	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	(and	current	Bank	of	England	Governor)	Mark	Carney	in	order	to	reach	high-level	employees	of	the	Bank	of	Canada;	I	had	interviewed	him	for	my	Master’s	thesis	and	still	had	his	personal	Canadian	cell	phone	number.71	Somewhat	predictably,	I	was	not	able	to	reach	him.	As	indicated	above,	I	guessed	the	email	addresses	of	the	current	Governor,	the	Senior	Deputy	Governor,	the	four	Deputy	Governors,	and	a	handful	of	other	employees	and	contacted	them	directly.	I	received	a	response	from	the	Bank’s	Director	of	External	Communications,	who	asked	for	further	details,	which	I	provided	prior	to	receiving	a	response	saying	that	Deputy	Governor	Lawrence	Schembri	had	agreed	to	be	interviewed,	and	that	he	was	“the	executive	sponsor	of	recruiting	for	the	Bank,	so	he	is	the	best	placed,	most	senior	person	for	you	to	speak	with.	Further,	he	is	a	former	professor	of	economics	at	Carleton	University.”	However,	the	interview	was	to	be	“on	background,	which	means	that	you	can	use	the	information	that’s	discussed,	but	you	can’t	quote	DG	Schembri	or	the	Bank.”	I	was	also	asked	to	provide	questions	in	advance,	which	I	politely	declined	to	do	for	methodological	reasons.	I	later	met	with	Craig	Wright,	chief	economist	of	the	Royal	Bank	of	Canada,	who	recommended	that	I	speak	with	Deputy	Governor	Agathe	Cote,	so	I	asked	the	Director	of	External	Communications	whether	that	might	be	possible.	This	request	was	declined	as	well.				 During	our	interview	Lawrence	Schembri	was	unable	to	comment,	even	as	background	information,	on	the	COMER	case	before	the	courts.	Because	of	the	prohibition	against	quoting	Schembri	or	the	Bank,	it	has	been	necessary	to	obscure	whether	my	Bank	of	Canada	conversants	are	current	or	former	employees;	in	this																																																									71	Amusingly,	a	chagrined	Carney	agreed	to	an	interview	for	my	MSc	thesis	after	accidentally	pocket-dialing	me	at	6	AM	Saskatoon	time	(I	believe	he	was	in	London	at	the	time,	perhaps	for	discussions	relating	to	his	later	appointment	to	the	position	of	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	England).	I	had	called	him	after	finding	his	phone	number	in	the	internal	listings	on	our	common	alma	mater’s	alumni	website;	I	assume	it	has	since	been	removed.	
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way	comments	from	the	two	other	Bank	conversants	could	be	mixed	with	Schembri’s	to	maintain	within-group	anonymity.		 Finally,	I	attended	an	event	in	London	featuring	Deputy	Governor	of	the	Bank	of	Canada	Carolyn	Wilkins,	at	which	I	slipped	a	message	to	her	assistant,	who	sincerely	promised	to	pass	it	along	to	her.	Perhaps	for	the	same	reasons	of	confidentiality,	I	did	not	receive	a	response.				 It	was	almost	as	challenging	to	gain	access	to	the	chief	economists	of	the	five	largest	private	Canadian	banks,	which	together	account	for	a	large	majority	of	the	Canadian	banking	sector	as	a	whole.	I	was	fortunate	to	come	across	a	notice	of	the	Canada-UK	Chamber	of	Commerce’s	6th	Annual	Canadian	Chief	Economists	Panel	Debate	&	Lunch	in	the	Canadian	High	Commission	newsletter.	The	event	had	a	hefty	price	tag,	but	I	wrote	to	the	organisers	to	ask	whether,	as	my	thesis	topic	concerned	Canadian	economists,	I	might	attend	as	a	guest.	The	event	coordinator	wrote	back	to	say	that	I	could	attend	if	I	helped	with	administrative	tasks	at	the	event,	to	which	I	readily	agreed.	After	the	panel,	I	quickly	approached	the	chief	economist	who	first	separated	himself	from	the	crowd;	this	was	Avery	Shenfeld	of	the	Canadian	Imperial	Bank	of	Commerce	(CIBC),	who	chatted	amiably	with	me	and	gave	me	his	card	so	that	I	could	follow	up.				 By	the	time	we	had	finished	speaking,	the	other	chief	economists	had	dispersed,	but	once	I	secured	an	interview	with	Avery	Shenfeld	I	mentioned	his	name	in	my	emails	to	the	other	chief	economists.	They	all	eventually	responded	positively	to	my	interview	requests	–	with	the	exception	of	Craig	Alexander	of	TD	Trust,	who,	as	it	turned	out,	was	in	the	midst	of	transitioning	into	retirement.	He	was	to	be	replaced	by	Beata	Caranci,	whom	I	attempted	to	contact	a	few	times.	In	one	instance	she	responded	to	say	that	she	was	busy	with	the	transition	but	would	be	available	during	a	specified	period,	but	when	I	contacted	her	during	that	period	she	did	not	respond.	This	was	particularly	disappointing	as	she	was	the	only	current	chief	economist	of	a	major	Canadian	bank	to	whom	I	did	not	speak.	She	was	also	the	only	woman	of	that	group,	and	TD	Trust	has	at	times	been	an	outlier	in	terms	of	its	behaviour	compared	with	other	Canadian	banks	(Livesey,	2012;	Quigley,	2012).	She	was	in	the	midst	of	a	major	career	transition,	however,	so	was	understandable	that	she	did	not	have	time	for	an	interview	with	a	PhD	student.	Fortunately	I	was	able	to	interview	former	TD	Trust	Chief	Economist	Don	Drummond	as	well	as	former	Executive	Vice-President	
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and	Chief	Economist	of	BMO	Financial	Group	Sherry	Cooper,	who	was	able	to	comment	on	the	experience	of	being	a	woman	in	such	a	position.				 As	an	aside,	I	had	attempted	to	contact	economists	at	the	major	Canadian	banks	for	my	Master’s	thesis,	with	extremely	limited	success.	It	was	clear	that	the	personal	conversation	with	Avery	Shenfeld	of	CIBC,	and	the	legitimacy	conferred	upon	my	other	requests	by	the	use	of	his	name,	made	all	the	difference	in	securing	such	an	outstanding	line-up	of	conversants	among	the	major	banks.	Indeed,	the	journalists	from	the	Globe	and	Mail	and	The	Economist	expressed	astonishment	that	I	was	able	to	speak	with	all	but	one	of	the	chief	economists.		 As	I	had	already	gleaned	from	media	commentaries	and	other	researchers,	the	Department	of	Finance	was	much	more	difficult	to	gain	access	to.	Initially	I	simply	sent	emails	and	made	phone	calls	that	were	not	returned.	After	Craig	Wright	of	the	Royal	Bank	of	Canada	specifically	recommended	speaking	with	Deputy	Minister	of	Finance	Paul	Rochon,	I	wrote	a	message	to	Rochon	in	which	I	mentioned	Wright’s	name	and	recommendation;	an	assistant	replied.	She	asked	a	couple	of	questions	about	my	research,	which	I	answered,	to	which	she	responded	by	declining	my	interview	request	–	citing	“calendar	conflicts”	for	the	unspecified	timeframe	in	which	I	had	hoped	to	schedule	the	interview.	I	replied	to	this	message	offering	to	visit	or	call	anytime	over	the	coming	several	months,	but	received	no	response.	After	the	Liberal	Party	won	the	2015	election,	I	again	attempted	to	contact	the	Department	of	Finance	(long	after	my	other	fieldwork	was	completed);	it	again	declined	to	grant	an	interview	with	Rochon	or	the	Minister	of	Finance,	Bill	Morneau.		 Among	the	think	tanks	access	was	much	easier.	At	the	CCPA	I	interviewed	David	Macdonald72	and	his	colleague	Armine	Yalnizyan,	both	of	whom	responded	swiftly	to	my	request.	The	CCPA	helpfully	sent	along	contact	information	for	Jim	Stanford,	founder	of	the	PEF,	who	was	also	willing	to	meet.			 The	C.D.	Howe	Institute	was	just	as	easy	from	the	second	tier	of	the	hierarchy	downwards,	but	securing	the	interview	with	President	and	CEO	Bill	Robson	was	a	challenge.	Vice	President	of	Research	Daniel	Schwanen	and	Associate	Director	of	Research	Ben	Dachis	both	responded	promptly	to	my	request.	Bill	Robson,	on	the	other	hand,	required	repeated	attempts	at	contact.	I	had	already	called	the	Institute,	to	no	avail,	but	later	emailed	him	directly.	In	my	first	written	message	I	mentioned	that	my	conversants	Michael	Trebilcock,	Chris	Ragan,	and	Angelo	Melino,	among																																																									72	Whom	I	had	interviewed	for	my	Master’s	thesis	as	well.	
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		 As	regards	my	positionality,	my	identity	and	place	in	the	world	could	be	considered	more	of	an	advantage	than	a	drawback	for	the	study	at	hand,	bearing	in	mind	that	objectivity	itself	is	impossible.	Most	notably,	there	is	my	strong	family	tie	to	COMER	through	my	late	grandfather;	my	sympathy	for	COMER	members’	views	is	genuine.	Furthermore,	I	was	raised	in	a	context	of	autodidacticism	–	both	in	terms	of	my	personal	and	familial	context	as	well	as	the	culture	I	was	surrounded	by.		 I	was	raised	by	my	extended	family	in	addition	to	my	parents.	My	grandparents,	with	whom	I	probably	spent	the	most	concentrated	amount	of	time,	lacked	formal	education	to	varying	degrees75	–	yet	they	engaged	fully	in	informal	learning;	my	grandmother	insisted	upon	what	I	later	termed	“the	wonder	principle”	–	if	someone	asked	a	question	to	which	no	one	else	knew	the	answer,	she	would	clap	her	hands	enthusiastically	and	ask	the	questioner	to	run	to	the	encyclopaedia76	before	his	or	her	curiosity	had	waned.	Rather	uncommonly,	aside	from	my	sisters	and	me,	all	of	my	maternal	grandparents’	grandchildren	were	at	least	partly	homeschooled,	“unschooled,”77	or	both,	and	in	my	formative	years	I	failed	to	form	an	opinion	I	later	discovered	was	common	elsewhere	–	that	education	is	strongly	correlated	with	intelligence.	Indeed,	one	of	the	smartest	people	I	know	is	a	cousin	who	has	still	never	spent	a	day	in	a	classroom.		 Furthermore,	my	social	milieu	during	my	formative	years	reinforced	an	autodidactic	cultural	norm;	the	democratic	socialist	history	of	my	home	province	of																																																									75	None	of	my	grandparents	attended	university	during	their	working	lives,	but	my	maternal	grandparents	did	end	up	taking	university	courses	after	they	retired	–	during	their	70s,	80s,	and	even	90s.	My	grandmother	also	kept	up	a	lively	correspondence	with	various	university	departments	over	the	course	of	several	decades;	aside	from	Canadian	Broadcasting	Corporation	radio	shows	and	whatever	books	they	could	afford,	that	was	her	primary	intellectual	stimulation	for	many	years	on	the	farm.	76	The	encyclopaedia	was	itself	evidence	of	the	emphasis	my	grandparents	put	on	the	satisfaction	of	curiosity;	we	forget	this	in	the	age	of	Wikipedia,	but	encyclopaediae	were	a	significant	expense	for	a	family	of	modest	means.		77	Unschooling	involves	no	curricula	whatsoever;	it	is	driven	entirely	by	the	curiosity	of	the	child.	One	of	my	cousins	only	learned	to	read	at	the	age	of	9	because	she	had	previously	expressed	no	interest;	as	a	young	woman	she	later	became	the	Chief	of	Staff	of	the	Attorney	General	of	the	Province	of	Ontario.	My	uncle,	a	wonderful	(and	wonderfully	eccentric)	former	professor	of	Education	at	the	University	of	Saskatchewan,	inaugurated	the	unschooling	movement	in	Saskatchewan;	it	now	boasts	many	thousands	of	members.	He	has	been,	without	question,	one	of	the	greatest	influences	in	my	life;	it	is	therefore	no	exaggeration	to	say	that	the	unschooling	ethos	informed	part	of	my	intellectual	development.	
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	 Another	four	professors	completed	a	PhD	or	DPhil	in	the	UK	–	one	at	Oxford,	one	at	Essex,	and	two	at	the	London	School	of	Economics	(LSE);	four	conversants	completed	an	undergraduate	degree	in	the	UK;	and	six	completed	Master’s	degrees	there.	In	all,	21	of	my	conversants	had	completed	at	least	one	degree	in	the	U.S.	and	13	had	completed	at	least	one	degree	in	the	UK;	20	of	the	former	had	completed	an	American	PhD	while	only	four	of	the	latter	emerged	with	UK	PhDs;	UK	exposure	was	much	more	concentrated	in	Master’s	degrees,	while	U.S.	exposure	was	overwhelmingly	concentrated	in	doctoral	degrees	–	only	the	two	American-born	conversants	completed	undergraduate	degrees	there.		 Among	Canadian	institutions,	the	most	commonly	attended	university	was	UToronto,	somewhat	unsurprisingly	as	it	is	by	far	the	largest	university	in	Canada;	15	conversants	completed	at	least	one	degree	there,	although,	interestingly,	only	three	of	these	were	academics	(three	of	six	bank	chief	economists	were	educated	there)	and	8	of	15	degrees	were	not	in	economics	itself	(although	two	of	these	were	in	business).		 Of	all	other	universities	represented	in	my	sample,	Queen’s	appeared	to	have	the	largest	role	in	educating	economists;	12	conversants	garnered	an	economics	degree	there,	nine	of	whom	completed	a	Master’s	degree	specifically.	This	was	an	unusual	concentration	at	the	Master’s	level,	comparable	only	to	the	pattern	of	conversants	who	had	disproportionately	studied	in	the	UK	for	Master’s	degrees.	At	the	undergraduate	level	Queen’s	is	known	as	Canada’s	blueblood	university,	and	indeed,	the	only	two	substantially	privately-educated	conversants	I	interviewed	were	also	the	only	two	Queen’s	undergraduates	in	my	sample.	Of	those	who	completed	a	Master’s	degree	at	Queen’s,	one	academic	and	one	IRPP	economist	stayed	on	for	a	PhD,	one	bank	chief	economist	entered	the	workforce,	as	did	a	Conference	Board	economist	and	a	C.D.	Howe	economist,	and	four	academics	went	on	to	PhDs	at	MIT,	Yale,	LSE,	and	Essex,	respectively.			 Despite	Western’s	dominance	among	central	bankers,	only	six	conversants	in	my	sample	had	studied	there	–	three	at	the	undergraduate	level,	four	at	the	Master’s	level,	and	three	at	the	PhD	level,	with	four	of	these	having	completed	two	degrees	at	Western.	These	six	conversants	were	variously	academics	(2),	think	tank	economists	(2),	a	bank	chief	economist,	and	a	central	banker.		 Seven	of	my	conversants	attended	UBC	but,	like	Toronto,	most	of	that	number	attended	as	undergraduates	(one	COMER	member	held	a	law	degree	from	UBC,	while	one	academic	continued	on	to	a	Master’s	there).	The	only	other	Canadian	institution	
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with	a	critical	mass	of	graduates	among	my	sample	was	McGill,	which	seven	of	my	conversants	attended	–	four	at	the	undergraduate	level,	two	at	the	Master’s	level,	and	two	at	the	doctoral	level.	Among	all	of	the	Canadian	schools,	UBC	and	McGill	were	the	only	two	whose	graduates	appeared	to	have	a	common	political	valence;	both	were	broadly	more	left-leaning	than	average,	although	one	conversant	with	a	McGill	undergraduate	degree	was	one	of	the	most	right-wing	academics	in	my	sample,	as	was	one	conversant	with	a	UBC	undergraduate	degree.		 Of	the	20	conversants	with	PhDs	from	the	U.S.,	three	attended	Princeton,	three	attended	Harvard,101	two	attended	Yale,	two	attended	MIT,	two	attended	Stanford,	two	attended	the	New	School,	and	one	each	attended	Chicago,	Berkeley,	Duke,	Rochester,	Johns	Hopkins,	and	Pittsburgh.	Aside	from	the	two	who	attended	the	New	School	and	the	professor	who	attended	Berkeley,	all	of	whom	were	clearly	left-wing	or	left-leaning,	and	two	professors	with	a	PhD	from	Princeton	and	Stanford,	respectively,	who	were	both	mildly	left-leaning,	the	others	were	all	centrist,	right-leaning,	or	significantly	to	the	right	politically.		 Of	the	four	conversants	(all	academics)	who	received	a	doctoral	degree	from	the	UK,	three	were	to	the	left	of	my	sample	as	a	whole,	while	one	was	significantly	to	the	right.	The	other	PhDs	in	my	sample	came	from	McMaster	(two	professors)	and	Université	de	Paris	1	(one	professor).	The	doctoral	degrees	of	the	heterodox	academic	economists	in	my	sample	were	variously	awarded	by	the	Université	de	Paris	1,	McMaster,	McGill,	and	the	New	School.	Almost	all	of	the	COMER	members	attended	university	at	UBC,	Toronto,	or	the	University	of	Saskatchewan,	although	one	with	a	degree	from	the	latter	also	attended	the	Royal	Conservatory	of	Music	and	Ryerson	University	(one	COMER	member	dropped	out	of	UBC	and	another	dropped	out	of	UToronto,	while	another	held	four	degrees,	yet	another	held	three	degrees,	and	the	last	held	three	degrees	including	a	PhD	from	UToronto).		 At	the	undergraduate	level,	only	a	few	Canadian-raised	conversants	were	educated	outside	of	Ontario,	Québec,	and	Vancouver;	two	attended	the	University	of	Saskatchewan,	two	attended	the	University	of	Manitoba,	two	attended	UCalgary,	two	attended	the	University	of	Victoria,	one	attended	the	University	of	Alberta,	and	two	were	educated	in	Nova	Scotia.		
																																																									101	One	of	these	was	a	DBA,	not	strictly	a	PhD.	
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Diversity	in	the	Economics	Profession			 Several	studies	have	pointed	to	a	dearth	of	diversity	in	economics,	many	of	them	noting	the	lack	of	women	relative	to	other	social	sciences	(and,	indeed,	most	hard	sciences)	(Fourcade,	2009;	Fourcade,	Ollion,	&	Algan,	2015;	Robb	et	al.,	2006).	This	is	a	particularly	significant	question	for	economists	in	Canada,	as	it	is	an	ethnically	diverse	country	with	a	respectable	relative	level	of	women’s	equality	according	to	a	variety	of	metrics	(Ipsos,	2017).	The	field	of	economics	in	Canada,	however,	does	not	appear	to	reflect	either	of	these	facts	–	in	2012,	for	example,	visible	minorities	accounted	for	a	mere	15.14%	of	Ontarian	economists	(Woolley,	2017),102	and	a	2001	report	found	that	12.7%	of	full-time	tenured	or	tenure-track	professors	and	only	5.4%	of	senior	economics	faculty	were	women	(Dooley	et	al.,	2001).	And	despite	attempting	to	skew	my	sample	towards	women	and	minority	groups,	in	the	end	all	of	my	female	academic	conversants	were	white,	all	of	the	heterodox	economists	were	white	males,	and	all	but	one	of	the	think	tank	economists	were	white	men.	For	a	country	as	diverse	as	Canada,	this	is	a	puzzle.		 As	mentioned	previously,	I	specifically	avoided	mention	of	gender	or	race	in	the	interviews,	instead	noting	whether	and	when	the	topics	arose	unprompted.	In	interviews	with	women,	if	there	was	time	at	the	end	I	often	asked	about	their	experience	as	a	woman	in	economics.	I	also	noted	how	often	women’s	names	came	up	among	the	economists	I	interviewed,	and	whether	conversants’	language	was	gendered,	whether	they	referred	to	my	gender	at	any	point,	and	whether	they	said	anything	offensive	or	insensitive.	I	did	all	of	the	above	for	race	as	well,	although	I	did	not	question	my	non-white	conversants	about	their	experiences	in	that	regard	as	it	felt	inappropriate	to	do	so.	The	principal	minority	groups	mentioned	were	First	Nations	and	immigrants.	I	also	took	note	of	references	to	Francophones	and	Québec,	and	often	asked	my	Francophone	conversants	about	their	experience	if	time	permitted.	Finally,	I	was	careful	to	note	any	further	mention	of	minority	groups,	which	yielded	a	single	mention	of	people	with	disabilities.		 Gender	was	mentioned	by	far	the	most	frequently,	although	even	then	it	came	up	less	than	might	be	expected	given	that	a	woman	was	conducting	the	interviews.	Of																																																									102	In	my	own	examination	of	photos	of	economics	professors,	I	found	no	First	Nations	economists	and	only	a	handful	of	Black	economists,	so	the	level	of	diversity	is	lower	than	even	this	number	would	indicate.	Furthermore,	although	I	did	not	conduct	a	thorough	study,	there	appeared	to	be	significantly	fewer	full	professors	who	were	members	of	visible	minority	groups.		
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58	conversants,	fewer	than	a	third	mentioned	gender	at	all,	and	a	majority	of	these	were	women.103	In	general,	I	should	note	that	I	was	overwhelmingly	treated	with	respect	and	kindness	by	my	conversants.	Even	in	the	two	cases	in	which	I	felt	uncomfortable,104	I	still	felt	that	my	questions	were	taken	seriously	and	that	I	was	treated	as	an	equal	by	all	conversants.		 It	is	worth	laying	out	the	demographics	of	my	conversants.	Among	think	tank	economists,	only	one	was	a	woman.	Of	the	academics,	only	four	were	women.	One	former	bank	chief	economist,	both	financial	journalists,	and	three	out	of	seven	COMER	members	were	women.	There	were	no	conversants	with	a	visible	disability,	and	everyone	was	white	other	than	two	non-white	professors	and	one	mixed-race	professor.105	There	were	six	Québécois	Francophones	in	my	sample,	four	of	whom	were	professors,	one	of	whom	worked	for	the	Conference	Board,	and	one	for	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute,	as	well	as	a	further	few	bilingual	conversants.		 As	a	rule,	women	were	much	more	likely	to	mention	the	names	of	other	women,	but	in	general	men	predominated	among	the	economists	and	public	figures	conversants	mentioned.	Of	the	women	mentioned	by	name,	Armine	Yalnizyan	came	up	seven	times,	Margaret	Thatcher	was	mentioned	five	times,	Joan	Robinson	four	times,	Anna	Schwarz	thrice,	Wendy	Dobson	twice,	Frances	Woolley	twice,	Lindsay	Tedds	twice,	Tammy	Schirle	twice,	Sherry	Cooper	twice,	Sylvia	Ostry	twice,	and	Ayn	Rand	twice.	A	few	other	women	came	up	once	each.	As	a	comparison,	eleven	conversants	mentioned	Milton	Friedman,	six	mentioned	Richard	Lipsey,	and	so	on;	at	least	two	dozen	men’s	names	were	mentioned	more	than	those	of	Armine	Yalnizyan	and	Margaret	Thatcher.	This	is	true	even	though	my	very	presence	as	a	woman	interviewer	–	a	minority	in	all	of	the	academic	departments	and	office	buildings	in	which	I	conducted	interviews	–	may	itself	have	been	a	prompt,	influencing	some	conversants	towards	mentioning	female	economists’	names	more	often	than	they	might	otherwise	have	done.		 Several	times	I	was	very	obviously	a	prompt.	One	conversant	mentioned	a	“guy”	buying	a	pickup	and	then	added	sheepishly,	“I	bet	there	are	a	lot	of	women	who	buy	pickups.”	Another	said,	as	an	aside,	“Boy	.	.	.”	and	then,	looking	at	me,	“girl	–	woman!”	These	corrections	were	relatively	common;	another	conversant	said,	“the	guy	–	the	person	–	who’s	writing	it	.	.	.”	at	one	point,	and	another,	in	discussing	trade	unionists																																																									103	Almost	all	of	my	11	female	conversants	did	so.	104	See	page	57.	105	Of	those	three	professors,	only	one	had	not	been	raised	in	Canada.	
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in	his	father’s	generation,	said	they	“were	not	ideological	men,”	adding	after	a	pause,	“and	women.”	Many	of	these	conversants	were	of	an	older	generation,	and	I	wondered	whether	they	had	often	discussed	economic	matters	with	a	woman.	They	were	clearly	aware	enough	to	correct	themselves,	however.		 Ten	of	my	conversants,	on	the	other	hand	–	nearly	a	quarter	of	the	men	–	seemed	unaware	of	their	language	in	this	respect,	speaking	of	single	moms	as	opposed	to	single	parents	and	using	“he”	in	referring	to	a	hypothetical	lender,	Finance	Minister,	or	potential	employee.106	One	conversant	made	the	comment	that	because	his	was	an	all-boys’	school	it	had	more	of	a	focus	on	math	and	science.	Another	older	conversant	talked	about	“proposing	some	young	guy”	for	tenure	and	“[having]	to	be	on	very	good	terms	with	the	immigration	ladies	from	downtown”	when	bringing	in	U.S.	scholars.		 There	were	regular	mentions	of	“guys.”	For	example,	all	the	“guys”	in	the	Department	of	Finance	and	the	Bank	of	Canada,	or	in	answering	who	the	best	economists	were,	“I’ll	start	with	two	old	guys.”	Others	fairly	peppered	their	speech	with	the	term;	one	said	“these	guys”	and	“those	guys”	dozens	of	times	in	the	hour	and	a	half	in	which	we	spoke,	then	said	at	one	point,	“well,	you’re	a	female	graduate	student	in	Cambridge,	so	at	some	point	you’re	going	to	come	across	[name	redacted].”107	Another	conversant	said	“guy”	and	“guys”	to	such	an	extent	that	it	amounted	to	a	verbal	tick;	as	one	example,	he	said,	“I	would	say	[name	redacted]	is	Canada’s	guy	on	–	in	terms	of	academic	guys	who	study	seriously	income	inequality.	[.	.	.]	Both	of	these	guys	are	just	really	nice	guys.	Very	smart	guys.”	He	later	deemed	departmental	rankings	a	“macho”	exercise,	which	somewhat	surprised	me.		 Even	more	surprising,	perhaps,	was	that	some	of	my	most	“conservative”	conversants	used	predominantly	gender-neutral	language.	One	conservative	C.D.	Howe	conversant	listed	“herself”	before	“himself”	once	–	perhaps	for	my	benefit	–	and	a	seemingly	right-wing	academic	used	“congressperson”	in	discussing	U.S.	politics.	Quite	remarkably,	given	right-wing	critiques	of	identity	politics,	the	most	consistently	gender-conscious	conversant	was	from	the	Fraser	Institute;	he	used	“partner”	and	“their”	throughout	the	interview	without	seeming	to	think	about	it.	
																																																								106	Interestingly,	in	the	latter	case	the	same	person	referred	to	academics’	“partners”	as	considerations	during	the	hiring	process	at	universities.	107	He	then	insisted	–	and	later	reiterated	–	that	I	not	attribute	that	to	him	in	my	dissertation.	
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	 Concern	over	gender	issues	was	the	norm	among	most,	but	not	all,	of	the	women	I	spoke	with.	One	prominent	female	academic	economist	employed	a	gender	lens	in	describing	her	work	at	a	family	planning	centre	in	India,	during	which	she	concluded	that	family	planning	was	a	bandaid	and	that	it	was	more	important	to	get	women	working	–	thereby	delaying	the	age	of	marriage,	spacing	out	generations,	and	bringing	down	population	growth.	But	when	asked	about	her	own	experience,	she	seemed	somewhat	irritated	by	the	question:			 It’s	never	bothered	me.	I	have	three	brothers.	I	often	have	said	to	myself,	my	goodness,	I’m	the	only	woman	in	the	room.	But	what	can	I	do	about	it?	So	I	do	my	best,	and	stand	up	for	being	a	woman	and	being	smart.	That’s	what	I	can	do	day	to	day.	And	helping	–	I’m	delighted	to	see	[.	.	.	that]	everyone	is	recruiting	women	right	now.	It’s	almost	a	reverse	gender	bias.	[.	.	.]	It’s	really	a	hard	world	for	young	men	with	no	particular	credentials	or	talent.			She	added,	“It’s	a	different	world	from	what	I	grew	up	in,	and	that’s	great,”	but	that	she	had	received	financial	assistance	to	go	to	an	Ivy	League	institution	because	she	was	a	woman,	and	she	may	have	been	hired	by	the	Department	of	Finance	in	part	because	she	was	a	woman.	Mentors	were	another	major	factor	in	her	success,	she	said,	and	in	her	case	“every	one	of	them	was	male.”	She	was	glad	she	could	be	the	first	woman	in	my	sample,	however	(we	spoke	early	on	in	my	fieldwork	process).		 A	similarly	mixed	response	came	from	another	female	academic	economist	who	had	been	working	with	a	majority-female	administration113	in	the	last	two	years	for	almost	the	first	time	ever:		 I	gotta	say	.	.	.	I	think	there’s	a	.	.	.	It’s	very	much	a	matter	of	personal	preference.	There	are	frustrations	with	working	in	a	mostly	male	environment;	there	can	definitely	be	a	devaluation	of	certain	kinds	of	research	[.	.	.	and]	sometimes	I	find	it	hard	to	get	my	economist	colleagues	to	take	me	seriously.	[.	.	.]	But	at	the	same	time,	female	politics	can	be	so	complicated	–	it’s	like	high	school.	[.	.	.]	Hierarchy	and	status	is	really	important	to	people	[.	.	.	and]	if	you’re	one	of	one	or	two	women	in	a	mostly	male	environment	you	don’t	really	have	to	worry	very	much	about	your	social	status	–	because	you’re	the	only	woman,	so	you	have	your	own	little	status.	[.	.	.]	You’re	outside	the	hierarchy	–	because	power	hierarchies	are	intrinsically	gendered.			 Finally,	I	asked	one	of	the	COMER	members	about	gender	in	COMER	and	other	activist	groups,	and	she	said,	“Men	defer	to	women	now.”	When	asked	whether	she	
																																																								113	She	noted	that	there	seemed	to	be	an	unusual	number	of	women	in	the	field	who	ended	up	becoming	administrators,	which	is	an	important	trend	to	monitor.		
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thought	this	was	true	in	most	economics	organisations,	she	averred,	“No.	Absolutely	not.”		 First	Nations	were	by	far	the	most	commonly	mentioned	minority	group,	yet	came	up	only	eight	times	(seven	times	as	“Aboriginals”	or	“Aboriginal”	and	once	as	“indigenous”),	all	in	a	sympathetic	fashion	with	one	exception	–	a	C.D.	Howe	conversant	mentioned	that	it	was	unfair	for	teacher	assessments	not	to	take	into	account	demographic	information,	as	educational	attainment	tends	to	be	lower	in	First	Nations	communities.	In	almost	all	other	cases,	First	Nations	communities	came	up	in	the	course	of	discussions	about	inequality,	social	mobility,	and	poverty.	One	former	bank	chief	economist	said	of	First	Nations	poverty:	“It’s	just	a	travesty,”	pointing	to	a	30%	education	funding	gap	on	reserves.	When	asked	whether	Canada	had	an	inequality	problem,	one	academic	said,	“Yeah.	Yeah.	And	it’s	partly	a	general	issue	but	it’s	also	related	to	specific	sub-groups	of	the	population.	So	the	problem	of	Aboriginal	poverty	is	incredible.”	He	said	it	was	a	complicated	problem,	but	that	“we	need	to	provide	more”	and	“ramp	[funding]	up	a	bit.”	I	was	surprised	to	hear,	from	an	older	conservative	academic,	the	following:		 	One	of	the	reasons	I	hate	Stephen	Harper	with	a	passion	is	I	think	he’s	been	so	careless	with	the	federal	government’s	goodwill	among	Aboriginals	and	environmentalists,	et	cetera,	that	just	when	we’re	going	to	need	some	of	those	guys	to	cut	some	slack,	it’s	not	going	to	happen.			 Immigrants	were	by	far	the	next	most	commonly	mentioned	group,	with	four	references	to	immigration	and	four	references	to	foreign	students.	Two	of	the	latter	comments	specifically	referred	to	Chinese	students	coming	to	Canada,	while	another	referred	to	North	African	students	studying	in	Québec;	there	was	neither	a	positive	nor	negative	valence	to	these	comments.	A	fourth	conversant	commented	that	a	lot	of	economics	PhDs	were	foreign	students	who	tended	to	be	math-oriented	and	had	some	difficulties	with	language	and	Canadian	public	policy	knowledge.	One	comment	that	bordered	on	racist	arose	as	a	conversant	opined	about	the	quality	of	the	public	high	school	to	which	he	had	sent	his	children:	“It’s	where	all	the	Asians	try	and	send	their	kids.”		 Immigration	was	mentioned	four	times	–	in	passing	by	a	C.D.	Howe	economist,	by	a	mainstream	academic	economist	who	noted	the	poverty	among	Aboriginal	communities	and	immigrants,	and	by	two	bank	chief	economists.	One	of	the	latter	pointed	out	that	we	make	immigrants	start	all	over	again	in	their	field	of	expertise	if	
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they	lack	a	single	educational	credit,	and	that	language	was	a	big	issue	for	immigrants	trying	to	enter	the	workforce.	Another	bank	chief	economist	said,	“Immigration	is	not	as	left-right	wing	as	people	think	it	is.	If	you	care	about	low-wage	Americans,	do	you	want	to	let	in	more	low-wage	Mexicans?”		 Race	came	up	twice	in	interviews	with	academic	economists	who	felt	it	was	often	overlooked	or	inadequately	integrated	into	economic	analyses.	Another	bank	chief	economist	once	referred,	more	generally,	to	“disenfranchised	groups.”	Finally,	the	sole	remark	about	people	with	disabilities	came	unprompted	from	a	mainstream	UCalgary	economist:	“The	science	model	doesn’t	allow	for	disabled	people.”		 Finally,	fully	a	quarter	of	Canada’s	population	is	Francophone,	and	the	country	is	officially	bilingual,	a	feature	that	distinguishes	it	from	the	U.S.	The	fraught	relationship	between	English	and	French	Canada	has	played	a	significant	role	in	Canadian	history,	moreover,	and	there	are	enormous	cultural	differences	between	Québec	and	the	rest	of	Canada.	For	one	thing,	Québec	tends	towards	public	policy	–	and	voting	patterns	–	to	the	left	of	Canada	as	a	whole.	The	history	of	the	oppression	of	the	Québécois	and	the	suppression	of	their	language	and	culture,	combined	with	the	upheaval	of	the	Quiet	Revolution114	the	October	Crisis	,115	and	two	failed	referenda	on	Québec	separatism,	have	shaped	Anglo-French	relations	in	Canada	to	this	day.			 Two	themes	emerged	in	the	course	of	the	interviews	I	conducted.	First,	most	of	those	who	mentioned	Québec	were	in	fact	Anglo	Québecers,	some	of	whom	had	negative	feelings	towards	Québécois	politics	and	public	policy.	Aside	from	positive	comments	about	UMontréal	and	Laval	and	their	ranking	among	Canadian	economics	departments	–	one	professor	said	that	“English-speaking	Canadians	probably	forget	about”	them,	and	they	are	“more	tied	in	with	Europe”	–	the	most	positive	comment	about	Québec	came	from	an	Anglophone	professor	in	Vancouver,	who	made	the	earlier	comment	about	“modern	trends”	taking	hold	in	Québec	sooner	than	elsewhere	and	who	described	attending	a	1995	Québec	referendum	event	at	Harvard	at	which	there	were	separate	rooms	with	separate	feeds	in	the	two	languages	“and	everybody	cared.”	He	went	on	to	point	out	that,	in	the	past	25	years,	there	has	been	a	steady	increase	in	wellbeing	in	Québec	relative	to	the	rest	of	Canada,	“equivalent	to	a	
																																																								114	A	period	in	the	1960s	and	1970s	in	which	Québec	went	from	the	most	religious	and	conservative	province	to	the	least,	remarkably	quickly.	115	A	1970	incident	that	involved	the	kidnapping	of	a	government	minister	and	a	British	diplomat	in	support	of	the	Québécois	sovereignty	movement.	
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trebling	of	income	[.	.	.]	It’s	a	big	success	story,”	even	on	a	global	scale,	for	a	subpopulation	to	have	such	gains.		 Remarkably,	of	the	four	heterodox	professors	in	my	sample	–	by	all	accounts	the	four	best-known	heterodox	academic	economists	in	Canada	–	three	of	them	are	Francophone	Québécois	(the	fourth,	oddly	enough,	is	British	by	origin).	Two	of	them	scarcely	mentioned	Québec,	although	one	of	them	was	clearly	influenced	by	his	education	in	France,	which	was	only	possible	because	of	the	linguistic	link;	there	the	professors	in	his	group	were	evenly	split	between	mainstream	and	heterodox,	which	would	have	been	highly	unusual	in	Canada.	The	third	Francophone	heterodox	economist	seemed	to	share	others’	criticisms	of	Québec,	noting	that	private	schools	there	are	subsidised	(they	are	not	in	Ontario),	which	intensifies	the	societal	gap	because	good	students	and	teachers	go	to	private	schools.	He	also	described	meeting	Milton	Friedman	in	the	1970s	at	UMontréal,	where	most	people	were	excited	about	Friedman’s	visit;	he	said	UMontréal	was	a	“satellite”	of	Chicago	at	the	time,	and	that	he	had	started	a	Master’s	degree	there	but	“was	disgusted”	and	quit.		 The	only	mainstream	Francophone	Québécois	professor	I	spoke	with	seemed	to	believe	that	“Québec	is	a	separate	model”	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	country.	He	said	that	the	tax	system	is	not	particularly	progressive	“in	that	you	get	to	the	top	level	very	quickly”	and	that	45%	of	people	do	not	pay	taxes	in	Québec,	“so	the	tax	base	is	very	narrow	[and	.	.	.]	extremely	steep	[and	.	.	.]	the	incentive	to	work	is	not	very	high.”	He	later	spoke	of	the	differences	between	Anglophone	and	Francophone	universities,	saying	that	“It	gives	us	a	lot	of	constraints	[.	.	.]	You	have	to	hire	from	a	smaller	pool	of	candidates”	and	that	there	were	only	two	Québécois	academics	in	the	UMontréal	economics	department.	The	university	provides	private	tutors	to	get	an	individual’s	French	up	to	the	appropriate	level,	however	–	there	are	many	people	who	speak	Italian,	Spanish,	or	Portuguese	–	and	they	all	publish	in	English:	“There	are	very	few	people	who	publish	in	French.	It	almost	never	happens.”	He	believed	that	because	of	the	language	preference,	UMontréal	probably	has	a	higher	average	level	of	ability	in	their	programs,	with	many	students	from	Northern	Africa	and	elsewhere.		 Of	the	two	Francophones	working	for	think	tanks,	the	Conference	Board	economist	seemed	to	hold	his	home	province	in	higher	esteem.	He	said	that	Québec	economists	seem	to	reflect	the	more	“social”	focus	of	the	province.116	He	later	said																																																									116	Some	of	them	will	even	defend	supply	management	in	the	dairy	industry,	he	added,	which	most	economists	will	not.	
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decisions,”	but	noted,	“I	did	nothing	in	economics	and	I	got	an	A.	[.	.	.]	Poli	Sci	was	the	other	course	I	did	well	in.	So	I	decided	to	do	a	joint	degree	in	economics	and	political	science.”	This	professor	was	among	the	most	interdisciplinary	and	policy-focused	of	those	to	whom	I	spoke,	and	was	clearly	intellectually	curious,	yet	never	mentioned	a	genuine	interest	in	economics	itself	–	only	his	performance	or	aptitude.			 Another	mainstream	economist	said:		 	Basically,	I	didn’t	want	to	commit	to	anything,	and	I	figured	math	would	be	the	thing	that	would	give	me	the	most	flexibility	and	it	was	easy;	I	was	good	at	it.	But	then	at	the	end	I	decided	that	math	wasn’t	going	to	be	–	I	wanted	to	be	an	academic.	I	was	in	my	third	year	in	math	and	we	were	learning	theorems	that	had	been	proven	in	the	1850s,	and	so	–	[it’s	an]	awfully	long	way	to	go	to	reach	the	frontier	in	a	field	like	that.		When	asked	what	appealed	about	economics,	he	said,	“It	was	easy	for	me.	That’s	part	of	it.	The	reason	I	took	math,	quite	bluntly,	was	because	there	were	no	labs	and	no	essays	–	you	just	had	to	do	assignments.	And	I	was	good	at	it.	So,	you	know,	it	was	easy.”	He	went	on	to	explain,	“It	was	really	just	an	interest	in	human	behaviour	and	in	mathematical	modelling.	So	it	sort	of	put	them	together	in	an	interesting	way.	And	incentives.	[.	.	.]	But	I	can’t	really	say	it	was	a	drive.		It	was	basically	something	I	figured	I	would	do	okay	at.”		 A	bank	chief	economist	said	something	similar:	“I	was	doing	really	well”	and	“I	was	good	at	it”	but	also	“I	was	doing	it	for	the	sake	of	doing	it.”	He	thought	he	would	“be	a	so-so	academic”	in	economics.	Unlike	many	economists	he	was	good	at	writing	and	presenting,	and	saw	a	chance	to	excel	as	a	bank	chief	economist.135			 A	Conference	Board	economist	said,	along	those	lines,	“Basically	it’s	how	my	brain	works,	what	I’m	good	at.	I’m	good	at	lots	of	things,	but	not	brilliant	at	anything.	Although	I	can	write	pretty	well	for	an	economist.	I	can	write	in	a	way	that	people	can	read	it.”	Several	people	noted	that	economists	tend	not	to	write	well,	so	this	was	a	clear	competitive	advantage	for	him.136			 Fourteen	conversants	cited	the	broad	explanatory	power	(including	of	human	behaviour),	and	its	implication	in	big	questions,	as	part	of	the	appeal	of	economics.	“You	can	explain	the	world,”	said	one	professor;	it	“explains	people’s	behaviour.”	A																																																									135	Besides	which,	he	added,	“Did	anyone	tell	you	how	cushy	a	job	this	is?	It’s	a	dream	job.	But	don’t	tell	anybody.”	136	Like	the	chief	bank	economist	above,	the	Conference	Board	economist	clearly	enjoyed	his	work,	saying,	“I	love	my	job	because	[whispering]	–	I	can	do	almost	anything	I	want.”	
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Conference	Board	economist	said	it	was	“the	skill	set	you	need	to	take	on	big	big	problems”	and	a	mainstream	professor	concurred;	after	listing	other	factors,	he	said,	“The	other	thing	I	liked	is	that	it	really	asked	big	questions.”	A	Fraser	Institute	economist	said	that	“the	technical	definition	[of	economics]	is	the	study	of	the	scarcity	of	resources,	but	what	it’s	really	about	is	understanding	human	behaviour.”	A	PEF-affiliated	economist	cited	learning	about	the	history	of	thought	and	major	economic	debates,	“and	that	really	grabbed	me.”			 For	ten	conversants,	economics	suited	the	way	they	thought,	or	they	appreciated	the	mode	of	analysis	economics	employed.	One	professor	took	an	introductory	economics	course	during	her	Master’s	at	Harvard	“and	I	never	looked	back.”	When	asked	what	appealed	about	it,	she	said,	“I	guess	the	way	my	mind	works.”	Another	professor	said	his	first	economics	course	“was	like	a	revelation	–	I	just	found	that	the	subject	was	approaching	things	and	analysing	things	in	a	way	that	seemed	very	natural	to	me,	so	I	was	immediately	taken	with	it.”	Another	professor	liked	the	“rigorous	way	of	thinking;	there’s	a	model;”	a	bank	chief	economist	said	he	was	“captured	by	the	way	that	the	economics	profession	looks	at	the	world.”	By	one	C.D.	Howe	conversant’s	third	economics	class,	he	thought:			 	Oh	my	god,	this	is	it	for	me.	I	wasn’t	doing	really	well	at	math	because	I	didn’t	understand,	you	know,	calculus,	and	in	economics	it	became	immediately	clear	what	calculus	was	all	about.	It	was	just	expressed	differently,	in	these	very	concrete	terms.	[.	.	.]	Because	I	understood	economics	I	understood	math,	and	not	the	other	way	around.			 Two	others	perceived	an	appealing	neutrality	in	economics’	methods;	one	Bank	of	Canada	economist	commented	that	economics	“seemed	to	have	a	stronger	analytical	basis,	and	it	didn’t	seem	to	matter	as	much	what	the	views	of	the	professor	were;	[.	.	.]	analysis	was	fairly	judgement-free.”	A	mainstream	professor	said,	“I	liked	the	reasoning	that’s	involved.	[.	.	.]	Economics,	to	my	mind,	is	the	application	of	physics	–	of	pure	cold	logic	–	to	just	make	sense	of	the	world	out	there.	I’m	just	fascinated	by	it,	always	have	been.”		 A	substantial	number	of	conversants	–	eight	altogether	–	ended	up	in	economics	by	default	or	happenstance.	One	professor,	when	asked	how	he	had	come	to	economics,	said,	“Probably	accidentally.	I	was	a	commerce	undergraduate	and	knew	I	didn’t	like	it.”	Another	professor,	originally	from	Kenya,	said	that	“in	my	case	it	was	especially	random”	–	it	was	partly	a	process	of	elimination	as	his	school	had	few	options;	he	could	not	draw,	so	architecture	was	out;	his	family	thought	he	could	only	
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teach	if	he	studied	English	or	math;	engineering	was	basically	mechanics;	and	economics	was	the	only	other	option	–	“a	fall-back.”	A	third	professor	followed	a	similar	process:	he	did	not	want	to	join	the	army,	did	not	want	to	be	a	schoolteacher,	and	had	not	studied	enough	science	to	enter	that	domain,	“so	I	think	the	only	thing	available	was	social	science.	The	only	social	science	I’d	heard	of	was	economics,	so	I	applied	to	the	LSE	and	a	number	of	other	places	and	got	in.”	Another	British-born	professor	originally	applied	to	study	American	Studies	before	entering	the	workforce.	When	he	finally	went	to	university	at	the	age	of	21,	he	told	the	director	that	he	was	interested	in	political	science.	When	asked	if	he	was	good	at	math	he	said	yes	(“I	wasn’t.”),	so	the	director	recommended	economics;	“nonetheless	I	think	it	was	a	good	choice,	for	me,”	he	said.		 For	another	three	conversants	economics	truly	was	the	default.	One	heterodox	professor	said	simply,	“Well,	my	father	was	an	economist.”	He	wanted	to	go	into	medicine	at	first,	but	Laval	did	not	admit	him	because	they	could	not	compare	his	grades	from	France	(they	advised	that	he	go	to	Cégep,	to	essentially	repeat	two	years	of	high	school),	“so	I	thought,	okay,	give	this	up	and	go	into	economics.”	A	bank	chief	economist’s	father	was	a	banker,	so	he	was	familiar	with	the	field,	and	used	to	read	the	business	section	of	the	newspaper.	He	did	not	know	much	about	economics,	but	wanted	to	do	something	other	than	business	–	so	it	was	“by	default,	happenstance.”	Another	bank	chief	economist’s	brother	is	an	academic	economist	and	his	mother	was	a	consumer	debt	counsellor,	so	economics	was	a	natural	choice.		 Five	conversants	mentioned	practical	considerations	or	job	prospects	as	factors	in	the	decision	to	become	an	economist.	Upon	finishing	his	Master’s	in	history,	one	professor	was	“faced	with	the	likelihood	of	unemployment	or	hanging	my	diploma	in	the	back	of	a	taxi.”	He	was	torn	between	being	“completely	practical”	and	doing	an	MBA,	or	trying	to	maintain	“academic	interests	but	still	be	marketable	[.	.	.]	so	I	just	kind	of	drifted	into	economics.”	Another	professor	chose	economics	“somewhat	randomly,	maybe	because	I	was	good	at	math.	Jobs	were	also	better	for	economists,	so	that	maybe	played	a	little	bit	of	a	role.	But	I	hesitated.”	A	CCPA	economist	said,	“I	just	stumbled	into	it,	really,”	after	working	and	traveling	for	ten	years	and	realising	that	she	would	need	a	career	of	sorts:	“I	just	wanted	to	get	a	piece	of	paper	so	I	could	make	more	money;	that	was	my	only	rationale.”		 Five	conversants	noted	the	versatility	of	the	discipline;	one	bank	chief	economist	said,	“you	can	do	anything	and	everything”	and	“can	apply	that	framework	
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in	a	power	sense	–	among	social	scientists.	That’s	bad	for	everybody”	and	“it’s	probably	led	to	quite	a	bit	of	bad	science.”	Physicists	do	not	consider	economists	“very	scientific,”	and	he	reported	that	a	former-physicist	colleague	kept	notes	on	cases	in	which	economists	were	“busy	assuming	everything	that	should	have	been	investigated.”	He	continued:		 You	assume	self-interest	without	testing	it;	you	assume	high	levels	of	information	without	testing	it;	you	assume	something	called	rational	expectations;	you	assume	something	called	rational	choice;	as	though	it	was	a)	a	standard	of	good	behaviour	and	b)	a	feature	of	actual	behaviour	–	and,	of	course,	that’s	wrong	in	all	dimensions.	That’s	gradually	changing,	but	it	was	true	for	much	too	long.			 The	scientific	aspirations	of	economics	arose	in	discussion	with	another	professor	as	well;	she	said,	“So	many	economists	think	they’re	objective	and	scientific.	[.	.	.]	In	order	for	it	to	be	economics	it	has	to	have	statistics	or	math	in	it.	When	did	we	define	a	discipline	on	the	basis	of	which	method	we	use	to	explore	a	problem?”		 	Remarkably,	the	idea	that	the	discipline	was	objective	and	free	of	politicisation	–	although	supported	by	three	academic	conversants,	as	we	shall	see	below	–	was	challenged	by	an	older	conservative	conversant,	one	of	Canada’s	best-known	economists.	He	said,	“Macroeconomics	is	and	was	always	very	very	contentious.”	Microeconomics	is	about	individual	behaviour	–	“there’s	an	almost	unexamined	assumption	that	markets	work,”	which	is	not	to	say	that	people	have	not	looked	at	the	conditions	under	which	they	do	–	but	they	proceed	with	the	assumption	that	they	do,	and	“it	must	be	partly	true,	right?	Because	the	stuff	works.”	However,	he	said	of	the	monetary	system:			 It’s	the	set	of	social	institutions	through	which	individual	behaviour	gets	coordinated.	And	that’s	how	we	organise	our	lives.	And	that’s	very	political.	It	has	to	be	political.	And	macroeconomists	can	go	around	shouting	as	loud	as	they	want	about	being	scientists,	and	I	assure	you	we	are	–	we	indulge	in	deductive	analysis	and	we	try	to	test	our	theories	against	data,	and	sometimes	we	change	our	mind	if	someone	shows	us	we’re	wrong,	not	always,	but	sometimes	–	I	don’t	think	we’re	any	worse	than	physicists	or	anything	like	that	at	these	things	–	so	we’re	scientists,	but	there’s	also	this	other	stuff.	Because	our	science	is	immediately	about	political	issues.		When	asked	what	his	response	was	to	the	students’	movement,	he	said:			 Sort	of	a	bit	of	warm	sympathy.	[.	.	.]	My	big	grumble,	which	if	listened	to	would	take	a	lot	of	the	steam	out	of	this,	is	that	economic	departments	no	longer	pay	enough	attention	to	economic	history	and	they	no	longer	pay	any	attention	to	
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the	history	of	economics.	If	they	did,	the	students	would	meet	some	of	these	traditions	at	least	in	a	historical	context	and	at	least	they	would	learn	why	they’re	not	in	the	middle	of	the	theory	curriculum.	They	might	then	want	to	go	disagree	with	it,	but	at	least	they	would	understand	what	the	issues	are.	Now	I	think	they	just	have	a	feeling	things	are	being	kept	from	them,	and	it’s	all	part	of	a	conspiracy,	and	that’s	not	so	good.			 Economic	historians	do	not	often	secure	appointments	in	major	graduate	schools,	however,	he	said,	and	“economics	gets	into	trouble	when	one	particular	group	gets	a	lock	on	the	journals	and	the	conferences	and	appointments	in	certain	key	departments.”	He	continued,	“So	I’m	not	one	for	destroying	the	core	curriculum	of	economics,	but	I	do	think	there’s	room	for	some	of	the	other	stuff.”	Another	mainstream	professor	took	issue	with	the	scientisation	of	the	profession	more	generally,	saying,	unprompted	in	response	to	a	different	question:		 	My	frustration	with	economics	is	that	the	scientists	tend	to	sneer	at	the	engineers,	say	‘you’re	not	doing	real	economics;	you’re	helping	people	build	a	homeless	shelter.	That’s	not	real	economics.’	And	I	just	get	to	say,	that’s	fine.	Go	and	do	what	you	want,	but	I’m	actually	saving	somebody’s	life.	What’re	you	doing?	So	there’s	a	frustration	I	have	that	my	work	is	pooh-poohed	by	scientists.	[.	.	.]	There’s	a	conflict	in	academia.	I	sometimes	think	of	academics	as	one	of	two	types	–	I’m	stealing	this	from	Greg	Mankiw,	who	said	you	can	either	be	a	scientist	or	an	engineer.	And	the	scientist	is	that	kind	of	economist	who’s	so	–	theoretical	models,	based	on	extreme	–	interesting	–	assumptions	about	how	people	behave	and	how	the	world	works.	Very	simplifying	assumptions,	very	abstract	descriptions.	But	very	technical,	mathematical	approach	to	understanding	economics.	The	engineer,	which	is	how	I	would	classify	myself,	says,	that’s	helpful,	but	a	lot	of	the	abstractions	you’ve	done	in	order	to	allow	you	to	do	the	science	prevent	you	from	answering	questions	that	are	relevant	for	understanding	the	real	work	and	in	particular	the	policies	that	governments	want	to	introduce.			 If	you	are	wondering	why	there	are	so	many	homeless	people,	he	said,	“the	scientist	really	can’t	answer	that”	because	you	need	to	take	into	account	addictions	and	other	human	factors.	Earlier	in	his	career	he	had	to	do	this	“science	stuff,”	but	“it	really	didn’t	turn	my	crank.”	He	realised	that	his	work	would	only	be	read	by	a	handful	of	other	scientists	“and	it	wasn’t	like	I	was	actually	helping	anybody,”	which	is	partly	why	he	became	involved	in	policy.	As	a	“young	Turk”	your	“route	to	promotion”	is	the	science,	modelling	route,	“but	then	over	time	you	realise	you	have	to	self-teach.	I	self-taught.	If	I	wanted	to	do	more	interesting	things,	I	needed	to	[make	
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connections].”	This	he	had	clearly	done,	working	with	social	workers	and	sociologists	on	homelessness.148			 Of	economics	education,	he	said,	“I	think	mainly	we’re	educated	badly”	in	part	due	to	working	within	the	science	paradigm.	“There	should	be	at	least	one	course	that	says,	this	is	how	politics	works.	[.	.	.]	Most	of	the	students	want	to	be	engineers.	The	ones	who	want	to	be	scientists	become	faculty	members.”	Of	the	students’	movement,	he	warned	not	to	“throw	out	the	baby	with	the	bathwater,	but	it’s	certainly	true	that	we	need	to	emphasise	things	that	we	had	stopped	emphasising”	such	as	institutions,	as	the	crisis	showed	–	“we	hardly	even	mention	[institutions]	anymore.	[.	.	.]	That	was	a	fair	criticism,	that	economics	teaching	was	not	emphasising	enough	the	role	of	effective	institutions	and	not	emphasising	enough	the	role	of	government.”	Of	my	dissertation	topic,	he	said,	“I	think	it’s	a	super	interesting	question.	And	it	really	speaks	to	what	we	should	be	doing	to	graduate	schools,	and	how	they	should	be	reformed	–	and	how	they’re	failing.	They’re	failing	students,	they’re	failing	society	by	not	turning	out	people	who	[could	really	help].”			 For	him,	and	for	a	number	of	other	professors,	the	question	clearly	tapped	into	a	well	of	frustration.	When	asked	whether	economics	education	had	changed	since	he	went	through	the	system	nearly	50	years	ago,	one	professor	said:		 	No,	and	to	me	that’s	a	little	bit	of	frustration.	There’s	a	tremendous	emphasis	on	competitive	markets	–	in	macro	certainly,	but	even	in	micro	–	and	efficient	outcomes.	It’s	a	useful	paradigm	up	to	a	point,	and	of	course	in	grad	school	you’re	basically	just	learning	what	you’re	taught.	[.	.	.]	And	yet,	there	are	alternatives.	They’re	not	always	better	alternatives,	but	there	are	alternative	ways	of	thinking	about	it.	And	it	would	be	nice	if	we	did	a	bit	more	of	it.	And	I	think	that	what	typically	happens	is	people	start	off	right	down	the	middle	of	the	paradigm,	and	as	they	get	older	and	as	they	get	tenure	they	start	getting	wiser	and	thinking	about	other	things,	exposing	themselves	to	different	ideas,	and	then	it	can	be	frustrating.	For	me	it	was	frustrating,	because	it	was	harder	to	publish.	It’s	easier	to	publish	if	you	don’t	offend	anybody.	The	economic	way	of	thinking	about	that	is,	when	you	publish	a	paper	that	is	complementary	with	existing	work,	in	other	words	it	adds	to	it,	then	you	make	the	existing	work	more	valuable.	[.	.	.]	It’s	partly	why	you	end	up	with	schools	of	thought.		You	have	a	whole	bunch	of	people	who	will	cite	each	other.																																																												148	He	said	that	at	the	beginning	of	that	project	he	had	said	to	his	collaborators	in	other	disciplines,	“I	am	an	economist	so	you’re	going	to	think	I’m	a	son-of-a-bitch	sometimes	because	of	some	of	the	things	I’m	going	to	say,”	like	that	if	your	homeless	shelter	is	too	nice,	a	drug	user	may	trade	rent	for	drugs	and	live	in	the	shelter	–	“That’s	thinking	like	an	economist.	[.	.	.]	Social	workers	wouldn’t	have	thought	in	those	terms.	They’re	nicer	people	than	economists	are,”	he	laughed.	
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In	his	long	career,	the	papers	he	thought	were	his	best	took	ten	or	twelve	years	to	publish.149	When	asked	whether	he	believed	Canada	had	a	dominant	school	of	thought,	he	answered,	“Yeah,	the	dominant	school	of	thought	is	the	standard	efficient	markets	kind	of	hypothesis.	That’s	largely	what	macroeconomics	teaches.”	Behavioural	economics	is	“more	realistic”	but	there	are	still	limitations;	it	“has	no	way	of	doing	welfare	economics”	so	you	have	no	idea	if	people	are	better	off	after	a	policy	is	implemented.	If	you	are	looking	at	things	like	cigarette	taxes,	“the	standard	model	is	perfect	for	that.	But	if	you	start	talking	about	more	complex	things,	and	things	where	you’re	actually	trying	to	make	a	point	prediction	about	what	people	will	do,	the	standard	model	does	terribly.	And	it	does	it	in	the	laboratory	–	it’s	exposed	again	and	again	in	the	laboratory	as	being	wrong.”	He	clarified	that	there	was	no	one	model	that	works.	When	asked	whether	he	thought	he	was	alone	in	thinking	that,	he	said,	“No,	no,	of	course	not.	[.	.	.]	But	there’s	still	a	strong	central	core,	particularly	in	macroeconomics,	that	looks	at	efficient	markets	and	competitive	markets.”	Of	the	students’	movement,	he	said:			 I’d	love	to	see	more	of	that,	and	I	don’t	know	what	has	come	of	it.	[.	.	.]	I	haven’t	seen	any	real	response	in	macroeconomics.	[.	.	.]	One	of	the	issues	is,	politically,	just	getting	stuff	done	when	big	money	has	huge	influence	on	regulation.	Economists	understand	that;	we	study	that.	But	there	aren’t	a	lot	of	practical	solutions	that	come	of	studying	the	problem	when,	basically,	rich	people	own	the	government.	What	do	you	do?			 Another	professor	seemed	to	think	that	the	critiques	“will	tell	you	a	lot	more	about	monetary	economics	and	macroeconomics,”	which	is	“maybe	20%	of	economists.”	A	further	professor	agreed:			 	The	call	for	reform	is	always	in	macroeconomics,	I	think,	more	than	any	other	area.	In	macroeconomics	there’s	both	the	analytical	material	and	there’s	sort	of	historical	institutional	material.	And	it’s	that	historical	institutional	material	that	you	don’t	pick	up	at	the	graduate	level	in	course	work.	You	pick	it	up	as	an	undergraduate	or	you	pick	it	up	as	a	practitioner,	but	it’s	not	something	that’s	taught	as	part	of	a	PhD	training.				He	felt	that	the	criticisms	targeted	PhD	training;	“The	PhD	focuses	on	tools.”	However,	he	said,	“I’m	not	as	convinced	that	we	need	to	re-think	the	way	we	do	things.	Macroeconomics	changes	every	25	years	the	way	it	teaches	everything	anyway.	[.	.	.]	I																																																									149	“A	lot	of	economists	seem	to	be	creationists	or	something.	I	don’t	completely	understand	what	it	is.	But	there’s	a	tremendous	opposition	to	evolutionary	psychology	in	economics,”	for	example.	
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	 Another	professor,	among	my	most	conservative	conversants,	said	of	the	student	critiques,	“I	would	say	[they	are]	legitimate	to	a	certain	extent.	It’s	certainly	the	case	that	I’ve	revamped	[my]”	undergraduate	macroeconomics	course,	and	that	models	were	“quite	deficient”	in	terms	of	“money	and	financial	intermediation.	[.	.	.]	So	yes,	I	think	there’s	a	case	that	can	be	made	for	adapting	the	way	we	teach,	what	we	teach,	and	the	models	we	try	to	transmit	to	take	into	account	this	particular	imperfection	that	was	kind	of	neglected	up	until	the	financial	crisis.”	He	confessed	that	it	was	difficult	to	adapt	his	teaching	because	the	new	models	are	more	complicated,	or	“maybe	I’m	just	not	a	good	enough	teacher.”	He	went	on	to	say	that	maybe	one	of	the	weaknesses	of	economists	is	“that	we	try	to	formalise	everything.	[.	.	.]	I	can	tell	a	pretty	good	story	[about	the	crisis]	but	I’m	a	little	bit	frustrated	because	I	can’t	build	that	into	a	model.	And	if	I	can’t	built	that	into	a	model	then	I’m	not	happy	as	an	economist.”		 Another	professor	wrote	a	newspaper	article	defending	Economics	101	because,	although	it	is	can	be	improved,	it	nevertheless	“is	very	valuable.”	He	went	on:			 	But	I	think	there’s	also	some	things	where	we	go	wrong.	I	think	we	don’t	talk	enough	about	policy	–	we	don’t	talk	enough	about	the	real	world.	[.	.	.]	We	teach	them	the	theory,	which	is	good;	we	teach	them	the	math,	which	is	good;	I’m	a	big	fan	of	theory	and	math.	I	don’t	think	we	should	obsess	on	the	math,	and	if	we	ever	feel	that	we	cannot	teach	economics	without	math,	then	we’re	doing	a	major	disservice.			He	felt	that	“policy	courses	[are]	the	obvious	way”	to	connect	economics	to	the	real	world,	saying	that	they	teach	theory	and	math	“partly	because	that’s	what	we	like,	and	what	we’re	good	at”	as	professors,	expecting	students	to	connect	the	material	to	the	real	world	themselves:		 	They	quite	often	come	out,	and	they	say,	well,	great,	I	can	derive	this	model,	and	I	can	show	this	diagram,	and	I	can	shift	this	curve,	but	now	my	mother	has	just	asked	me	what	inflation	targeting	is	all	about	and	how	it	works	and	is	the	Bank	doing	a	good	job,	and	my	answer	is,	‘Oh,	I’ve	taken	this	course	on	monetary	policy	and	I	don’t	know.’	And	you	think,	whoa,	there’s	something	wrong	with	that.			He	felt	courses	should	cover	questions	such	as	the	size	of	Canada’s	GDP,	what	the	economy	looks	like,	what	the	policy	debates	are,	and	the	like.	They	do	some	of	this,	he	said,	but	it	is	not	enough.	In	all,	a	large	number	of	conversants	gave	mixed	responses	of	just	this	kind,	combining	critiques	of	the	field	with	defences	of	it.		
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“nirvana”	of	the	States.	No	conversant	disputed	the	superiority	of	the	top	U.S.	universities,	and	several	brought	up	this	point	unprompted.		 There	was	also	substantial	agreement	as	to	the	ranking	of	the	top	economics	departments	in	Canada.	Eleven	conversants	listed	UBC	and	UToronto	as	the	best	two	departments	(a	professor	said,	“fairly	clearly”),	with	four	listing	UBC	as	the	top	(“At	the	moment	I	would	say	the	best	is	UBC	quite	clearly,	now,”	said	one	professor;	another	said,	“I	think	UBC	really	stands	out”).	Another	believed	that	UToronto	is	probably	closest	to	the	top-tier	U.S.	universities	and	UBC	is	“trying	very	hard,”	with	yet	another	judging	that,	for	his	field	(international	finance),	UToronto	was	the	best.			 There	was	yet	more	agreement	on	the	top	four	departments,	which	“have	been	the	top	departments	forever;”	fully	13	professors	and	three	non-academics	concurred.	One	professor	said,	“after	the	top	two	it’s	hard	to	rank;”	it	was	Queen’s	and	Western	historically,	but	Queen’s	had	fallen	back	in	the	past	15	years	and	some	good	people	are	nearing	retirement,	so	“it’ll	be	a	struggle	to	stay	in	the	top	5.”	Another	professor	said,	“Queen’s	–	unionisation	has	killed	that	department.	They	can’t	compete	for	academic	economists	the	way	that	they	used	to.”	There	was	the	greatest	disagreement	about	Queen’s,	in	fact;	for	one	bank	chief	economist,	it	was	the	top	department,	as	it	was	for	a	McGill	professor	who	had	taught	there	(“I	guess	Queen’s	and	UBC	are	to	my	mind,	with	a	policy	bias,	the	places	where	I	see	the	most	interesting	stuff	coming	from”),	although	he	also	said,	“I’m	probably	somewhat	biased.”	As	a	rule,	however,	as	one	professor	claimed:		 	Well,	the	best	departments	–	I	don’t	think	there’s	any	doubt.	Toronto,	UBC,	Queen’s,	Western,	and	in	Montréal	it’s	hard	to	tell	now.	It	used	to	be	the	University	of	Montréal	for	sure.	But	McGill	has	really	hired	some	excellent	people,	so	their	ranking	has	gone	up.	But	I	still	think	that	neither	one	of	them	is	in	the	same	camp	as	the	first	four	I	mentioned.			 The	story	seemed	to	be	the	relative	ascendancy	of	UBC	and	the	relative	decline	of	Queen’s	and	Western	among	the	top	four.	As	one	professor	said,	“Western	Ontario	was	a	powerhouse.	It’s	no	longer	a	powerhouse.	[.	.	.]	They	were	by	far	the	best	department	in	Canada	in	the	early	80s,	and	they’ve	blown	up	and	rebuilt	themselves	twice	since	then,	but	it’s	never	getting	back	to	the	same	level.”	Another	professor	said	of	Western,	“Thirty,	forty	years	ago	they	were	always	in	the	top	four.	You	might	not	say	that	now.”	A	Western	professor	himself	agreed;	“Economists	like	to	rank	departments,	right?	That’s	usually	done	on	publications,	and	when	I	first	came	here	Western	was	distinctly	above	the	other	three	places,	and	that	changed	over	time.”	A	
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bank	chief	economist,	a	Western	alum,	said,	“Maybe	this	is	a	bias,	but	I	still	think	Western	is	up	there,	but	I	don’t	think	it’s	as	clearly	pulled	away	from	the	pack	as	in	the	past.”	Another	bank	economist	pointed	to	the	number	of	central	bankers	who	had	gone	to	Western,	however,	so	its	influence	likely	is	still	felt,	if	less	so;	a	Bank	of	Canada	economist	confirmed	that	Western	had	been	dominant	in	macroeconomics	in	the	1970s,	1980s,	and	1990s,	but	not	so	much	now.		 UBC,	on	the	other	hand,	was	most	commonly	referred	to	as	the	top	department,	but	often	expressed	as	“is	now	the	top	department”	or	“has	become	the	top	department.”	Two	conversants	pointed	to	factors	that	would	bolster	UBC	and	Toronto	in	the	coming	years;	one	said,	“UBC	has	been	extremely	successful.	The	weather	and	the	academic	climate	both	help	UBC	do	their	recruiting.”	Toronto’s	ranking	was	often	viewed	as	partly	“by	sheer	force	of	numbers”	as	the	country’s	largest	economics	department,	but	one	professor	attributed	this	success	in	part	to	the	advantage	of	being	located	in	Canada’s	largest	city.			 Many	conversants,	especially	professors,	noted	the	relative	rise	of	two	French-language	universities	–	UMontréal	and	Laval	–	particularly	in	econometrics.	McGill	was	“viewed	as	a	weaker	spot	historically”	but	several	mentioned	that	its	relative	standing	had	improved;	one	professor	said,	“McGill’s	reputation	has	improved	quite	a	lot	in	the	last	10	years.	In	fact	in	some	fields	like	econometrics	they’re	arguably	among	the	best	departments	on	the	continent	right	now.”161			 UMontréal	came	up	more	frequently	as	a	front-runner,	however.	One	UBC	professor	praised	their	econometrics	group	as	“world-class”	in	“that	important	niche.”	Another	professor	felt	that	“English-speaking	Canadians	probably	forget	about”	the	French-speaking	universities,	which	are	“more	tied	in	with	Europe,”	but	they	are	among	the	best.	Yet	another	professor	judged	that	Montréal	is	a	“strong	department”	that	“has	risen	a	lot,”	as	has	Laval,	pointing	to	the	generous	funding	these	institutions	receive	at	the	provincial	level	in	addition	to	their	federal	allocation.	One	of	the	financial	journalists	ranked	UMontréal	and	Laval	alongside	UToronto	and	Queen’s,	and	a	Conference	Board	economist	declared	that	he	predominantly	hires	from	Queen’s	and	Laval.			 Aside	from	UMontréal	and	McGill,	McMaster,	UCalgary,	and	Alberta	were	most	commonly	listed	among	top	departments,	with	5	or	6	mentions	each.	One	professor																																																									161	One	UMontréal	professor	laughed,	saying	that	he	thought	they	would	continue	to	move	up	the	rankings	“partly	by	stealing	some	of	our	people.”	
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said	McMaster	had	improved,	another	believed	it	had	slipped,	and	a	further	three	professors	specifically	put	it	in	fifth	place,	just	behind	the	top	four.	Laval	received	four	mentions,	while	the	common	view	seemed	to	be	that	“Alberta’s	star	has	also	risen.	In	terms	of	rigour,	certainly	in	terms	of	funding,”	as	one	professor	put	it;	some	said	that	this	was	true	in	terms	of	specific	specialties	–	one	specifically	mentioned	that	“Calgary	is	getting	better	in	behavioural	economics.”	A	Conference	Board	economist	joked	that	UCalgary	“smells	like	money.”			 SFU	received	three	positive	mentions	–	a	fourth	commented	that	“SFU	is	big”	but	that	the	“lastingness”	of	its	research	“is	not	commensurate	with	the	size	of	the	place.”	Three	universities	received	two	mentions	each:	Dalhousie,162	Ottawa,	and	Guelph.	Carleton,	Waterloo,	and	the	Victoria	all	received	a	single	mention;	each	of	these	three	was	deemed	to	have	improved	of	late.			 Among	private	sector	economists,	the	perspective	was	somewhat	different.	For	one	thing,	these	economists	were	all	based	in	the	East,	where	the	major	banks,	the	Bank	of	Canada,	and	federal	government	departments	are	located,	so	they	tended	to	overlook	the	Western	universities	–	even	UBC,	arguably	the	top	department.	An	exception	to	this	rule	was	the	Bank	of	Canada;	a	quarter	to	a	third	of	their	fellowships	go	to	UBC,	said	one	Bank	conversant,	who	went	on	to	suggest	that	“the	school	[a	potential	employee	attended]	has	a	limited	impact”	but	that	it	was	exceptional	for	someone	to	come	from	anywhere	other	than	the	top	five	or	six	universities.	One	bank	chief	economist	said	that	almost	all	of	those	they	hire	come	from	one	of	the	top	departments,	but	that	there	is	a	bias	in	favour	of	hiring	people	from	your	own	institution;	they	will	“give	the	same	answer	you	had.”	A	Conference	Board	economist	made	a	similar	point,	saying,	“you	tend	to	use	your	networks”	for	hiring,	and	that	the	concentrations	of	graduates	from	the	same	schools	is	partly	due	to	this.			 A	second	Conference	Board	economist	replied	that	he	prefers	to	hire	Master’s	graduates	because	they	are	“more	malleable”	and	team	players.	He	went	on	to	point	out	that	“it’s	kind	of	hard	to	find	a	bad	undergrad	in	Canada.	I	think	the	standard	for	undergrad	training	in	the	country	is	actually	remarkably	uniform	and	high,”	and	that	he	would	hire	from	pretty	much	any	undergraduate	program.163	A	bank	chief																																																									162	Dalhousie	was	given	particular	kudos	in	both	cases;	one	of	my	most	conservative	academic	conversants	said,	“I	tend	not	to	be	as	progressive	as	the	people	at	Dalhousie,	but	I	think	they	do	good	work.	It’s	always	worth	reading.”	163	He	added	that	he	would	expect	Master’s	degree-holders	to	have	attended	a	top-tier	graduate	programme,	however.	
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economist	concurred,	pointing	out	that	in	OECD	education	rankings,	Canada	comes	in	the	“top	of	the	pack”	and	has	excellent	universities.	Another	bank	chief	economist	said	that	there	was	not	much	of	a	gap	among	the	top	departments,	and	that	if	you	do	a	PhD	at	one	of	these,	you	still	need	to	find	a	way	to	stand	out	because	there	is	none	of	the	automatic	prestige	that	comes	from	holding	a	degree	from	Harvard,	for	example.			 A	few	professors	declined	to	rank	their	own	institutions,	while	some	from	the	top	institutions	politely	listed	their	own	department	last	within	its	class.164	One	aspirational	UMontréal	professor	listed	his	university	right	after	the	top	four	(“People	talk	about	the	top	five”),	while	his	colleague	said,	“I’m	hoping	here”	(UMontréal)	would	be	listed	among	the	departments	in	the	“second	tier,	below	UBC	and	Toronto.”		 These	conversants	were	not	alone	in	this	tendency.	One	McGill	professor	focused	on	the	undergraduate	level,	where	McGill	ranks	higher,	saying,	“at	the	undergraduate	level	there	are	several	departments	which	are	equally	good	[.	.	.]	I	would	rank	McGill	at	the	top.”	A	bank	chief	economist,	a	Queen’s	alum,	said	that	they	had	been	in	the	top	place,	although	not	since	the	mid-1990s.	A	current	Queen’s	professor	said,	“We	would	like	to	say	UBC	and	Queen’s	are	the	best”	for	graduate	school	and	especially	placement	of	graduates,	and	a	Calgary	professor	commented,	“I	know	the	Calgary	School	of	Public	Policy	is	very	influential.”	As	above,	one	Toronto	professor	said,	“I	know	in	the	fields	I’m	involved	in,	all	the	good	people	are	around	here.”			 That	same	professor	had	earlier	said,	however:	“I’ve	never	really	thought	of	ranking	[the	departments],”	and	several	other	professors,	similarly,	had	not	thought	much	about	ranking	or	were	actively	opposed	to	the	practice.	One	professor	simply	stated,	“I	would	say	I	don’t	know,”	and	that	she	does	not	follow	rankings	closely,	although	she	was	at	a	top-ranked	department;	“My	flair	is	for	policy;	it’s	not	for	mathematical	economics,”	she	said,	perhaps	implying	that	rankings	are	more	likely	to	take	the	latter	into	account	more	than	the	former.	One	Conference	Board	economist	simply	refused	to	answer,	saying,	“I’ll	pass	on	that	one	[.	.	.]	I’m	not	going	to	name	names.”		 Others	simply	thought	ranking	irrelevant;	one	C.D.	Howe	conversant	said	that	in	hiring	“we’re	not	looking	for	any	particular	institutional	background.”	This	contrasted	with	the	economists	involved	in	hiring	above	who	did	tend	to	hire	from	the	top																																																									164	For	example,	one	UBC	professor	listed	UBC	after	Toronto,	while	a	Western	professor	listed	Western	last	among	the	top	four.	
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and	it	was	from	these	schools	that	Western	recruited.	Unlike	UToronto,	Western’s	economics	department	split	off	from	the	other	social	sciences	50	years	ago,	and	by	the	early	1980s	it	comprised	50	faculty	members,	a	large	cadre	of	economists	by	Canadian	standards.	My	conversant,	a	monetarist	himself,	felt	that	a	big	department	in	a	small	country	needed	“an	awful	lot	of	diversity	if	it	was	going	to	be	doing	right	by	its	students”	–	not	like	the	U.S.,	where	there	are	many	departments	with	diversity	mainly	in	interdepartmental	(as	opposed	to	intradepartmental)	form	–	but	that	Western	never	succeeded	in	becoming	particularly	diverse;	“Western	is	very	very	freshwater,	very	market-oriented	in	its	outlook.”	When	I	asked	whether	that	was	true	now,	he	said,	“Oh,	yeah.	If	you	see	where	the	PhDs	come	from,	they	come	from	Chicago	and	Minnesota,	Rochester	and	so	on.”			 His	colleague	at	Western	concurred;	“We’re	very	much	in	the	freshwater	zone.”	However,	he	continued:			 	The	department	has	become	less	conservative	over	time.	I’ve	been	here	37	years,	and	when	I	first	came	it	was	really	distinctly	a	small-c	conservative	place	and	then	just	over	time	because	no	one	was	particularly	paying	attention	–	certainly	no	one	was	hiring	on	the	basis	of	people’s	political	outlook	–	and	what	happened	over	time	is	just	people	arrived	who	were,	in	U.S.	terms,	they	were	Democrats	rather	than	Republicans,	so	the	centre	of	gravity	has	shifted.			 One	heterodox	conversant	remarked	upon	a	shift	among	central	bankers	who	are	Western	graduates,170	noting	that	the	views	of	current	Bank	of	Canada	Governor	Stephen	Poloz	now	diverge	quite	markedly	from	the	standard	monetarist	view,	probably	due	to	experience.	Similarly,	Deputy	Governors	have	begun	expressing	opinions	that	would	have	been	unusual	before	the	financial	crisis,	he	said,	such	as	the	view	that	low	interest	rates	are	not	a	panacea	–	instead,	you	may	end	up	encouraging	speculation,	which	breeds	instability.	Pre-crisis,	low	interest	rates	were	viewed	as	stable	and	raising	interest	rates	was	not	thought	to	have	a	long-term	effect	on	the	economy,	but	this	has	changed	–	they	now	say	that	long-run	potential	output	is	affected	and	that	supply	factors	influence	the	rate	of	labour	productivity	growth.	This	view,	that	short-term	policies	and	events	affect	the	long-term,	is	something	Post-Keynesians	have	believed	for	a	long	time,	this	conversant	said,	but	only	recently	have	central	bankers	–	disproportionately	products	of	Western	–	begun	to	agree.	
																																																								170	Western	graduates	account	for	a	significant	proportion	of	Canadian	central	bankers;	half	of	the	current	Governing	Council	attended	Western	(Parkinson,	2014).	
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	 Interestingly,	a	Bank	of	Canada	conversant	appeared	to	think	that	the	freshwater	orientation	persisted	across	the	country,	saying,	“I	think	in	Canada,	the	current	generation	are	pretty	much	all	freshwater.”	He	offered	the	example	of	the	Carleton	macroeconomics	study	group,	which	he	judged	to	be	basically	all	Real	Business	Cycle	–	“Being	from	MIT,	I	was	kind	of	the	exception.”	His	view	of	how	it	came	to	be	that	way	highlighted	Western’s	role:	“Partly	it	was	Western,	Ontario,	University	of	Western	Ontario,	and	that	for	many	years	was	the	strongest	department	in	the	field	of	macroeconomics.”	Many	Western	graduates	spread	out	across	the	country,	which	created	a	“critical	mass”	in	the	profession.	A	mainstream	economist	agreed,	“Yeah,	the	dominant	school	of	thought	is	the	standard	efficient	markets	kind	of	hypothesis.	That’s	largely	what	macroeconomics	teaches.”	A	Conference	Board	economist	noted	that	“McGill	was	one	of	the	few	post-Keynesian	places	in	North	America”	when	he	was	there,	a	rarity	in	the	profession.		 Another	Conference	Board	conversant	suggested	that	this	trend	was,	if	anything,	intensifying;	“I	kid	the	youths	that	come	in	here	–	the	new	economists	–	about	their	being	very	capitalistic,	some	of	them.	[.	.	.]	Most	of	the	schools	are	quite	laissez-faire,	let’s	say,	Chicago	School-style	thinking.”	A	heterodox	academic	economist	made	a	related	comment:	“I	think	the	people	who	are	most	friendly	to	heterodox	ideas	now	are	the	older	people.	Like	Richard	Lipsey.	[.	.	.]	If	I	listen	to	him,	there	is	a	lot	I	would	agree	with.”	Older	mainstream	economists,	he	said,	were	“not	hardliners”	and	“not	dogmatic”	compared	to	many	of	their	younger	colleagues.			 This	is	not	how	a	Fraser	Institute	economist	saw	it,	however;	he	said,	“in	the	profession	Keynes	is	still	dominant.”	A	left-leaning	UBC	professor	agreed,	“Well,	broadly	speaking,	I	think	the	rest	of	the	world	regards	saltwater	as	mainstream.	[.	.	.]	Among	my	European	colleagues	they	often	regarded	the	U.S.	as	a	strange	place,	and	still	do.”		 Several	other	conversants	contrasted	Canada	with	the	U.S.,	mainly	in	terms	of	polarisation	or	variation.	One	professor	said,	“The	U.S.	is,	I	would	say,	more	polarised	and	more	politicised.”	Three	professors	used	the	same	phrase,	referring	to	Canada’s	economics	departments	as	“more	homogeneous”	than	in	the	U.S.	Another	professor	said,	“We	have	a	kind	of	consensus	here,	which	basically	means	that	we	don’t	get	the	extremes	that	the	U.S.	has.	We	don’t	have	a	conservative	extreme	especially.	[.	.	.]	The	Conservative	Party	here	is	not	like	the	Republican	Party.	It’s	much	more	centrist.”	When	asked	whether	there	were	departments	that	deviated	from	the	norm,	one	
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professor	said,	“The	boring	norm?	Not	so	much;”	there	was	no	“strong	ideological	stamp”	on	departments.	“I	don’t	think	there’s	anything	like	what	there	is	in	the	U.S.,”	said	one	professor;	“the	departments	as	a	whole	are	fairly	balanced.”	“I	think	it’s	easy	to	have	that	kind	of	polarity	in	the	U.S.,”	said	another	professor,	because	they	have	so	many	schools;	“maybe	Canadians	are	less	ideological	in	that	sense,”	although	he	thought	that	even	in	the	U.S.	the	polarisation	had	lessened	due	to	the	shift	to	empirical	work	across	the	profession:	“My	guess	is	the	Friedman	years	are	behind	us.”		 Many	of	these	professors	seemed	to	approve	of	the	fact	that	Canadian	economics	departments	were	less	polarised,	or	at	least	they	did	not	view	it	negatively.	One	bank	chief	economist	said,	neutrally,	that	there	was	not	much	difference	among	departments	in	Canada,	at	least	through	the	Master’s	level;	they	are	“fairly	uniform”	and	the	curricula	“tend	to	be	fairly	similar.”	A	professor	said	in	partial	explanation,	“Well,	they’re	all	state-financed”	in	Canada;	“none	of	them	is	particularly	rich.”		However,	one	PEF-affiliated	economist	viewed	Canada’s	homogeneity	as	problematic,	saying:		 It’s	not	a	coincidence	I	did	both	my	graduate	degrees	outside	of	Canada	–	there	isn’t	a	lot	of	diversity	in	Canada.	If	anything,	even	though	our	political	discourse	in	Canada	is	more	open,	I	think,	than	certainly	it	is	in	America	and	maybe	than	it	is	in	Britain,	the	way	our	universities	are	structured	is	such	that	almost	all	the	departments	are	homogenous	mainstream	departments.			 For	some	mainstream	or	right-of-centre	economists,	their	lack	of	concern	over	this	homogeneity	may	have	been	in	part	due	to	the	perception	that	Canada	was	“less	ideological”	–	as	one	C.D.	Howe	conversant	said,	“I	wouldn’t	say	there’s	very	obvious	colourations	to	the	economics	departments	when	it	comes	to	ideological	points	of	view.”	He	said	that	Canada	had	several	“large,	diverse	economics	departments”	and	seemed	to	suggest	that	the	variation	was	simply	intra-	rather	than	inter-departmental.	Another	right-of-professor	appeared	to	agree	with	the	latter	point;	when	asked	whether	departments	had	an	ideological	slant	in	Canada,	he	said:		 I	don’t	think	so.	But	it	raises	a	good	question;	I	hope	your	thesis	will	tell	us	why.	I	don’t	think	there	are	big	differences	of	doctrine	across	departments.	I	think	within	departments	there’s	a	wide	range	of	opinion.	But	is	there	a	department	in	Canada	that	is	our	equivalent	of	the	Chicago	School?	I	don’t	think	so.		
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	 In	all,	a	large	number	of	conversants	–	20	altogether	–	concurred	with	the	view	that	there	were	no	significant	political	or	ideological	differences	among	departments,	and	many	of	these	did	not	see	a	split	within	departments	either.		 Two	professors	objected	to	the	very	concept	of	ideological	departments.	One	thought	the	saltwater/freshwater	divide	“is	a	macro	thing”	and	that	people	with	a	background	in	engineering,	math,	and	physics	“take	economics	courses	that	are	mainly	math	–	they	don’t	necessarily	have	any	ideological	commitments	to	various	points	of	view.”	Due	to	changes	in	data	collection	and	methodology,	she	continued,	“I’d	say	economics	in	general	is	less	ideological	than	it	used	to	be.”	Another	professor	concurred;	“Nobody	sees	their	research	as	being	ideologically	driven.	It’s	just	a	set	of	logical	reasonings	that	should	be	confronted	with	the	data.”			 Two	conversants	observed	more	of	a	difference	in	the	business	community;	one	bank	chief	economist	said	that	economists	“tend	to	differentiate	more	in	the	business	schools.”	Oddly,	a	heterodox	economist	registered	less	mainstream	thinking	outside	of	academia:			 [In	the	private	sector]	probably	the	majority	are	not	mainstream.	Certainly	a	lot	that	I’ve	met.	Where	do	they	dominate?	Well,	academia,	which	is	subsidised	by	the	state	primarily,	in	our	case,	and	guess	where	else?	Government,	Bank	of	Canada,	all	these	places.	They	dominate	there.	Not	everyone	who	works	for	the	Department	of	Finance	is	mainstream.	But	the	vast	majority	of	the	people	they	hire	there	tend	to	be.	[.	.	.]	It’s	ironic;	they	celebrate	the	virtues	of	the	market,	but	the	only	reason	why	these	guys	are	able	to	dominate	in	the	profession	is	
because	of	government.				 In	general	the	heterodox	economists	felt	keenly	the	loss	of	heterodoxy	in	economics	departments	in	the	past	30	years.	One	professor	described	the	gradual	homogenisation	of	the	profession	thus:			 I	would	never	be	hired	at	the	University	of	Ottawa	today.	[.	.	.]	[two	of	my	other	heterodox	conversants]	would	never	be	hired	today.	[.	.	.]	At	Harvard	40	years	ago	they	hired	a	Marxist,	but	they	wouldn’t	do	that	today.	[.	.	.]	There	was	a	time	when	departments	were	more	open,	more	interested	in	debate.	The	whole	concept	of	debate	has	vanished	in	economics.			 Another	heterodox	professor	told	me	as	preamble,	“you	have	to	understand,	in	economics	orthodox	programs	are	more	or	less	everything.”	As	exceptions	he	pointed	to	the	PEF	and	“there’s	a	group	of	quite	interesting	Post-Keynesians	in	Canada”	along	with	a	few	heterodox	professors	at	the	University	of	Manitoba	and	in	Political	Science	at	York,	but	little	else.	
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	 A	heterodox	colleague	said,	“Well,	it	depends	what	you	call	a	range.	Within	neoclassical	economics	you	have	new	classical	economics	and	New	Keynesian	economics,	so	the	people	who	are	in	macroeconomics	in	the	mainstream	would	say	yeah,	there	is	a	variety	of	views.	[.	.	.]	From	our	standpoint,	they	start	from	the	same	assumptions;	they	just	make	a	few	modifications.”171	He	pointed	to	heterodox	economists	at	Manitoba,	Laurentian,	and	York,	and	“a	few	[individual	economists]	here	and	there”	including	in	large	departments	like	Toronto;	there,	he	said,	they	will	often	be	found	in	history	of	economic	thought	or	fields	unrelated	to	micro	or	macro	theory.	Another	heterodox	economist	said,	“In	Canada	I’d	say	it’s	more	homogeneous.	There	are	a	few	places	that	are	known	as	more	heterodox”	–	Laurentian,	Ottawa	(with	only	two	heterodox	economists,	but	“they	really	pack	a	punch”),	and	Manitoba	(“but	they’re	getting	completely	silenced	now,”	for	which	the	CAUT	sanctioned	the	university).	A	PEF-affiliated	economist	noted	the	conflict	at	Manitoba	(“that’s	a	significant	blow	to	the	constellation	of	heterodox	thinkers”),	which	“has	a	heterodox	tradition,	and	the	department	until	recently	embraced	the	idea	of	a	diversity	of	thought	that	was	being	presented	there.”172	He	also	mentioned	two	non-economics	departments	with	heterodox	teachings	(York	and	Carleton)	and	two	economics	departments	with	a	few	heterodox	members	(Ottawa	and	Laurentian).		 Some	mainstream	economists	named	a	number	of	departments	with	heterodox	economists.	Two	mentioned	Ottawa	–	one	said	it	and	Laurentian	have	“more	Marxist-type	economists”	and	that	they	are	“outside	the	general	orthodoxy.	I	think	they’d	say	yes,	they’re	heterodox.”	One	mildly	left-leaning	economist	spoke	of	heterodoxy	as	a	sort	of	Marxism,	saying	that	Saskatchewan	has	some	Marxists,	SFU	used	to	have	a	few,	and	Dalhousie	may	as	well.	Finally,	a	left-leaning	professor	said,	“University	of	Manitoba	prides	itself	on	being	more	heterodox.	[.	.	.]	I	think	what	they	really	mean	is	low-productivity.”		 It	was	noteworthy	that	none	of	the	heterodox	academic	economists	mentioned	Dalhousie,	although	one	PEF-affiliated	economist	noted	their	department	“has	some	open-minded	people.”	Four	mainstream	economists	identified	Dalhousie	as	being	on																																																									171	Interestingly,	he	said	that	in	terms	of	policy	prescriptions	in	the	short-term,	Post-Keynesians	and	New	Keynesians	would	agree	(e.g.	what	to	do	in	a	recession),	and	that	“in	the	long	run	the	New	Keynesians	are	similar	to	the	neoclassicals.”	172	Now	that	they	are	considering	splitting	off	the	heterodox	part	of	the	department,	he	feared	that	it	“as	you	could	imagine	is	likely	to	become	a	poor	cousin	and	perhaps	eventually	abolished.	That	exact	same	thing	happened	to	another	heterodox	department	in	the	States,	at	Notre	Dame.”	
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road	between	Keynesian	and	neoclassical”	relative	to	the	U.S.,	agreed	another	professor;	“As	right-wing	as	Harper	is,	he’s	still	left-wing	relative	to	the	U.S.”			 One	bank	chief	economist	agreed.	“I	actually	think	Canadians	have	a	very	different	political	attitude	than	Americans	do.”	He	spoke	of	the	healthcare	debate	in	the	U.S.	and	how	“although	they	wouldn’t	say	it,”	the	crux	of	it	was	that	people	did	not	want	to	pay	for	other	people’s	coverage.	“In	Canada	it’s	unquestioned	that,	no,	you	pay	for	that	other	person’s	healthcare,	and	you	will	do	so	without	complaint.”	He	watched	someone	on	American	television	complain	about	Obamacare	and	the	challenge	of	making	ends	meet	on	an	annual	income	of	$500,000,	“and	I	happen	to	work	in	an	industry	where	there	are	a	lot	of	these	people.	And	they	may	gripe	among	themselves	or	this	and	that,	but	no	one	would	go	on	TV	saying	‘you’re	killing	the	job-creators.’”	In	Canada	“there’s	a	level	of	understanding	that	governments	are	going	to	make	some	policies	that	are	going	to	help	people	who	are	poorer	than	you	and	you	may	not	like	it,	but	you’re	going	to	lump	it	quietly.	You’re	going	to	recognise	that	that’s	the	way	it	goes.”	Is	that	decorum,	I	asked,	or	a	different	attitude	towards	taxes?	“I	think	it’s	a	different	attitude	towards	the	role	that	government	has	to	play	to	support	the	people	who	are	the	least	well-off,”	he	responded.183	He	went	on	to	say:		 If	a	Canadian	politician	spoke	like	any	of	those	people	[running	for	the	Republican	primary],	their	political	career	would	be	over.	[.	.	.]	And	they’ve	got	a	whole	party	saying	those	things.	So	there	is	definitely	a	different	political	spectrum	here.	[.	.	.]	Even	among	the	economists,	who	would	tend	to	be,	I	would	say,	on	average,	more	right-wing	than	left-wing,	among	bank	economists	–	just	the	nature	of	the	beast	–	although	I	consider	myself	a	centrist,	and	some	of	them	are	too,	but	even	then	they	wouldn’t	be	as	right-wing	as	some	of	the	clients	they	would	have	to	go	meet	in	Texas.				 There	seemed	to	be	general	agreement	among	conversants	about	the	difference	in	political	spectra	in	Canada	and	the	U.S.,	and	several	others	echoed	this	bank	economist’s	point	about	the	role	of	government.	One	professor	said,	“I	think	there	is	a	general	view	among	Canadians	that	there’s	more	collectivism,	in	our	thinking	about	
																																																								183	He	added	that	he	thought	part	of	the	issue	in	the	U.S.	is	race-based,	that	people	do	not	want	to	pay	for	a	black	person’s	healthcare;	“they’re	not	feeling	an	affinity,	that	we’re	all	in	this	together.”	He	thinks	Canadians	do	not	picture	a	particular	race	or	identity	when	they	think	of	paying	for	someone	else’s	healthcare	–	they	think	of	a	poorer	region	of	Canada.	
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policy	and	what’s	appropriate	for	government,	than	there	is	in	the	States.”184	Another	professor	elaborated:		 	American	ones	are	funny.	It’s	such	a	different	system	in	the	U.S.	[.	.	.]	Maybe	it’s	the	recognition	in	Canada,	just	in	broad	terms,	there’s	more	of	an	acceptance	among	economists	that	there	is	an	important	role	for	government	to	play.	And	the	science	of	economics	says	yeah,	there’s	an	important	role	for	government	to	play;	no	one	should	ever	deny	that.	Government	has	very	important	roles	to	play.	The	question	is	to	maximise	what	it	does	well	and	minimise	what	it	does	badly.	I	think	there’s	a	lot	of	economists	in	the	States	that	tend	to	forget	that	basic,	really	fundamental	theorem	of	economics	–	that	there	is	in	fact	a	role	for	government.	[.	.	.]	To	pretend	that	you	could	have	some	sort	of	well-functioning	society	without	some	redistribution	of	income	is	just	beyond	me.185			 A	bank	chief	economist	agreed	that	in	the	U.S.	“some	things	are	more	extreme	from	a	tax	policy	perspective;”	they	pay	more	for	healthcare,	for	example,	but	“do[n’t]	have	full	coverage.”	He	said	he	meets	with	clients	in	the	U.S.	“and	you	say,	there	are	some	solutions	here,	and	they	call	you	a	socialist	from	Canada	who	likes	high	taxes.”	One	professor	pointed	out	that	the	UK	and	Europe	are	“more	sympathetic	to	egalitarian”	beliefs	than	the	U.S.	as	well,	and	that	“the	U.S.	has	always	been	the	odd	man	out	on	many	things.”		 Aside	from	the	commentary	on	political	differences	between	Canada	and	the	U.S.	and	the	implication,	either	stated	or	implied,	that	these	differences	extended	to	economists,	most	conversants	pointed	to	relatively	minor	variations	in	economics	education	between	the	two	countries.	One	difference	was	that	a	U.S.	liberal	arts	education	requires	fewer	economics	courses	in	an	economics	undergraduate	degree	relative	to	Canada;	one	bank	chief	economist	said	that	when	he	arrived	at	Harvard	for	his	PhD,	even	with	a	3-year	undergraduate	degree	he	was	around	the	middle	of	the	class	in	terms	of	preparation.	A	professor	who	attended	MIT	for	his	PhD	was	told	he	could	skip	several	microeconomics	courses	as	he	had	already	covered	the	material	during	his	undergraduate	program;	this	was	true	for	another	professor	who	attended	Harvard.	A	professor	with	a	PhD	from	Stanford	said	that	a	Canadian	economics	B.A.	was	“much	better	preparation”	than	its	U.S.	equivalent.	Yet	another	professor,	this	one	with	a	PhD	from	Harvard,	said,	“The	way	economics	is	taught	in	Canada,	and																																																									184	He	went	on	to	say,	“And	I’m	not	sure	how	to	quantify	that	difference	–	I’m	sure	it	has	been	quantified,	in	surveys.”	These	sorts	of	comments	–	attempts	to	quantify	or	measure	statements	when	asked	to	share	their	own	personal	opinions	–	were	common	among	the	economists	I	spoke	with.	185	It	is	worth	noting	that	he	was	among	the	small	group	of	professors	affiliated	with	the	Fraser	Institute,	arguably	Canada’s	most	right-wing	think	tank.	
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collect	large	datasets”	they	seem	to	have	done	it	carefully	in	this	case,	although	she	thought	the	Canadian	data	was	suspect.	She	said	it	might	depend	a	bit	nationally	and	internationally,	but	within	Canada	“I	would	work	much	more,	first,	on	the	poverty	piece,”	and	that	opportunity,	distribution	according	to	age,	and	mobility	are	all	worth	looking	at.			 The	international	comparison	centred	on	the	U.S.	A	right-wing	academic	colleague	referred	to	Piketty’s	book	as	“good	quality	work”	and	“useful”	but,	similarly,	pointed	to	“limitations”	in	the	data.	He,	too,	did	not	care	about	the	people	at	the	top,	but	rather	more	the	people	on	the	bottom	“and	that	people	feel	they’re	advancing,”	pointing	out	that	the	Canadian	and	U.S.	numbers	were	very	different;	in	the	former,	there	had	been	a	big	jump	in	inequality	in	the	1990s,	but	it	was	flat	in	the	2000s.	People	were	angry	after	the	financial	crisis	and	inequality	became	a	bigger	deal,	however,	“so	I	can	understand	the	hostility.”		 Another	mainstream	professor	mentioned	Piketty	unprompted,	saying	his	data	“hasn’t	been	seriously	challenged”	but	that	his	“policy	prescriptions	[were]	total	fantasy.”	Fortunately,	“Canada	doesn’t	look	nearly	as	bad	in	this	respect”	because	of	its	public	education	and	healthcare	systems,	and	he	believed	that	the	income/wealth	of	the	top	1%	had	declined	in	Canada.	In	Canada	the	state	is	“more	generous”	and	its	“politics	not	as	dysfunctional.”204			 Another	professor	pointed	out	that	“In	Canada	there	hasn’t	been	a	debate	about	distribution	of	wealth,”	and	noted	that	there	is	no	estate	tax	in	Canada	–	and	very	little	discussion	of	that	fact,	either.	In	contrast,	in	Europe	historically	there	has	been	much	more	of	a	debate	around	“breaking	up	inherited	wealth,”	and	there	were	“punitive”	estate	taxes	in	the	UK.	Piketty’s	book,	he	claimed,	explains	that	money	makes	money,	basically,	which	is	why	wealth	can	continue	through	the	generations	–	because	you	can	live	on	the	interest.	Inequality	“has	become	an	issue,”	particularly	in	the	U.S.,	but	“it’s	not	as	big	an	issue	here.	[.	.	.]	There’s	concern	for	the	poor”	and	“what	to	do	with	the	homeless”	but	we	do	not	often	hear	about	CEOs’	pay.			 One	mainstream	economist	said:			 I’m	not	worried	about	the	1%	too	much,	if	a	few	bankers	get	rich.	My	Dean	here	[redacted],	former	Dean,	he	gets	on	his	high	horse	about	that.	But	that’s	not	the																																																									204	He	made	the	interesting	point	that	all	of	the	“lightning-rod”	issues	in	U.S.	politics	–	education,	healthcare,	immigration,	gay	marriage,	and	abortion,	are	all	“non-issues”	here;	Liberals	may	advocate	for	a	slightly	more	expansive	social	policy,	for	example,	but	all	of	the	main	political	parties	essentially	agree	on	these	topics.	
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big	social	problem.	It’s	that	there	are	no	good	institutions	to	weigh	against	increasing	income	inequality.			This	conversant	went	on	to	say,	however,	that	“I	honestly	think	that	income	inequality	is	corrosive”	and	that	Piketty’s	theory205	is	“legitimate,	defensible	–	it	makes	a	lot	of	sense.”		 One	mainstream	professor	seemed	discomfited	when	asked	whether	inequality	concerned	him,	responding,	“Yeah,	it	does.	[long	pause]	I’m	not	sure	why,	but	partly	.	.	.	I	guess	the	source	of	my	discomfort	is	we’re	all	in	this	together,	as	Red	Green206	says,”	and	that	people	become	disengaged	if	they	see	that	kind	of	wealth;	they	“won’t	see	that	the	free	market	system	works	for	them”	and	will	start	voting	for	a	party	that	promises	to	“dismantle	capitalism.”	I	asked	whether	he	would	still	have	a	problem	with	inequality	were	that	not	a	risk;	he	said	that	he	did	not	mind	high	earned	income,	but	“I	believe	we	should	have	a	progressive	taxation	that	takes	more	from	the	rich	than	it	takes	from	the	poor.	And	we	have	that.	We	have	a	large	redistribution.	The	richest	people	in	Canada	pay	80%	of	taxes.”207	When	asked	whether	he	would	change	Alberta’s	flat	tax,	and	he	said,	“Yeah,	probably.	But	it’s	not	a	big	deal”	because	of	the	exemption	of	$15,000,	“but	I	would	make	it	more	progressive	than	it	is.”	When	I	asked	whether	he	thought	he	was	alone	among	Albertan	economists	in	thinking	that,	he	laughed,	“No.	Jack	[Mintz]	wouldn’t	like	it,”	although	the	tax	has	attracted	a	lot	of	rich	people,	so	there	is	a	danger	there.	However,	he	said,	gesturing	upwards,	“The	1%	has	gone	like	this,	and	even	scarier	is	the	0.1%.”		 Responses	from	the	bank	chief	economists	were	particularly	interesting	because	they	are	frequently	exposed	to	the	1%	as	high-level	employees	of	institutions	that	serve	this	group	and	have	its	constituents	as	top	executives.	One	chief	economist	had	clearly	given	the	issue	some	thought	and	had	developed	great	concern	for,	and	knowledge	of,	segments	of	the	population	that	live	in	poverty;	yet	he	shied	away	from	discussions	of	inequality	itself:		 So-called	inequality	–	I	like	to	look	at	it	in	its	pieces.	I	say	if	you’re	a	single	mother	with	a	gross	income	of	$24,000,	your	biggest	problem	is	not	your	next-door	neighbour	who	makes	a	million	dollars	–	perceptions	of	welfare	are																																																									205	Notably,	he	thought	Piketty’s	thesis	had	gained	authority	in	part	due	to	his	collaboration	with	Tony	Atkinson	in	the	UK.	206	A	comedic	Canadian	television	personality.	207	He	thought	it	was	a	problem	that	many	people	pay	no	taxes	at	all,	because	“you	don’t	have	a	dog	in	the	fight,”	and	even	a	small	minimum	tax	would	communicate	that	“you’re	not	just	a	poor	person,	you’re	still	contributing	to	society.”	
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relative	to	a	degree,	I	get	that;	thanks	to	the	economics	of	happiness	we	have	series	that	show	that	–	but	your	biggest	problem	is	you’ve	got	$24,000	and	you’ve	got	3	hungry	kids.	So	I	think	we	gloss	over	the	real	problems	by	totally	looking	at	it	in	the	relative	context	we	do.	And	I	don’t	like	looking	at	it	as	a	zero-sum	game,	that	we	have	to	take	something	away	from	the	millionaire	to	give	to	somebody	else.			In	Canada,	he	continued,	“who’s	poor?	There’s	three	main	camps”:	single	mothers,208	recent	immigrants,209	and	the	indigenous	population,	and	we	are	not	going	to	solve	these	issues	by	thinking	of	them	as	relative,	as	opposed	to	absolute,	problems.	When	I	enquired	as	to	what	he	thought	of	the	current	level	of	inequality	in	Canada,	he	said:		 I	don’t	even	like	to	think	of	it	that	way.	I	don’t	know	what	the	right	level	is.	I	think	a	lot	of	executive	compensation	is	excessive,	but	only	excessive	when	it’s	not	tied	to	performance,	so	that	would	tend	to	lower	it	[.	.	.]	and	we	have	way	too	many	poor	people,	that	would	reduce	inequality,	but	I	tend	to	look	at	it	as	the	pieces.			 A	fellow	bank	chief	economist	called	Piketty’s	book	an	“amazing	piece	of	work”	but	noted	the	criticisms,	one	being	that	within	countries	inequality	is	up,	but	globally	it	is	down	–	which	“kind	of	goes	against	his	theory.”	Yet	“it’s	very	obvious	that	there	are	winners	and	losers	in	free	trade”	and	“even	Ricardo	says	you	have	to	compensate	the	losers.”	He	was	in	favour	of	consumption	taxes,	luxury	taxes,210	and	land	transfer	houses	on	high-end	homes,211	but	felt	income	inequality	was	“a	little	bit	overblown.”	The	Gini	coefficient	in	Canada	is	not	so	bad,	he	said.	It	is	worse	in	the	U.S.,	in	part	because	of	the	financial	crisis;	quantitative	easing	benefited	investors	–	“a	pretty	small	price	to	pay,”	but	it	did	cause	some	wealth	inequality.	When	asked	whether	inequality	was	too	high	in	the	U.S.,	he	said:	“People	take	chances	and	they’re	rewarded	hugely.	But	unfortunately,	of	course,	on	the	downside	you	do	have	a	much	bigger	underclass	in	the	U.S.	than	you	do	in	almost	any	other	industrialised	economy.”	Although	he	said	he	was	biased,	“I	think	it’s	about	right	in	Canada.”	He	went	on	to	say,	however:	“I	have	a	problem	with	cranking	personal	income	taxes”	above	50%;	“it’s	a	mistake”	as	it	disincentivises	risk-taking	and	incentivises	tax	avoidance.	He	said	it	was	better	not	to	“cut	down	the	high	poppies”	but	to	support	the	lower	end.		 His	counterpart	at	another	bank	said:																																																									208	Fully	80%	of	child	support	payments	are	in	arrears,	he	pointed	out,	and	people	are	better	off	on	welfare	than	working	for	minimum	wage.	209	Selection	and	integration	are	both	issues	for	this	group,	he	noted.	210	This	was	a	novel	suggestion	among	my	conversants.	211	“That’s	not	a	terribly	productive	activity,	so	why	not	crank	the	taxes	on	it?”	he	asked.	
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	 I	think	the	data	are	really	interesting,	and	are	telling	a	story	that’s	true.	I	think	the	evidence	is	that	in	Canada,	if	you	look	at	it	on	an	after-tax	basis	in	particular,	because	we	have	a	more	redistributive	tax	system	–	which	had	swung	around	a	little	bit,	but	which	is	now	becoming	more	redistributive	again	–	[.	.	.]	on	an	after-tax	basis	I’m	not	sure	we’ve	had	the	same	drift	toward	inequality.		He	went	on	to	question	whether	this	would	hold	true	in	the	future,	however;	“Pay	scales	at	the	top	have	exploded	relative	to	pay	scales	at	the	bottom,”	although	he	noted	that	Canada	lacked	the	proportion	of	hedge	fund	managers,	movie	stars,	and	other	groups	that	skew	the	numbers	in	the	U.S.	“I	don’t	think	you	can	perpetually	have	[increasing	inequality],”	however,	citing	critiques	of	Piketty’s	work	by	some	who	are	generally	supportive	of	his	argument.	When	asked	what	he	thought	of	inequality	in	Canada,	he	said:			 I	think	that’s	a	matter	of	taste.	I	don’t	think	an	economist	is	in	any	better	a	position	to	say	that	than	anyone	else	[.	.	.]	and	yes,	there	are	costs	of	having	higher	marginal	rates,	but	.	.	.	there’s	a	range	of	possibilities,	let’s	put	it	that	way,	that	are	not	ruinous	to	the	economy.	[.	.	.]	How	much	do	you	want	to	reward	personal	initiative,	but	also	accidents	of	birth?			When	asked	what	he	would	prefer,	he	said:			 	That’s	irrelevant.	[pause]	I	think	Canada’s	not	bad	in	that	regard,	actually.	I	think	that	we	strike	a	reasonable	balance.	Whether	it’s	perfect,	I	don’t	know.	[.	.	.]	There	are	arguments	to	be	made	that	maybe	the	tax	system	should	become	a	little	more	redistributed	if	the	income	distribution	has	become	a	little	less	equal	on	a	pre-tax	basis.	I’m	sympathetic	to	some	of	that,	but	I	think	you	have	to	be	careful	not	to	go	so	far	that	you	cause	an	exodus	of	wealthy	people	who	simply	move	to	a	jurisdiction	with	less	taxes,	for	example.				 Yet	another	bank	chief	economist	argued,	“We’re	starting	at	a	better	point”	than	the	U.S.	and	Europe,	but	“when	you	get	into	a	slower-growth	period,	distributional	issues	become	more	important”	–	along	with	environmental	issues,	which	he	saw	as	a	looming	problem	in	the	coming	years.	“Everybody	would	like	inequality	to	be	reduced	as	long	as	it	didn’t	hurt	them	–	it’s	like	green	energy.	[.	.	.]	The	real	issue	is	in	helping	people	who	are	vulnerable,	who	are	at-risk,”	whether	they	are	high-	or	low-income.	He	went	on	to	say,	“My	view	is	that	governments	get	bigger	and	not	smaller	in	the	coming	years	[.	.	.]	the	question	is,	are	they	in	your	life	efficiently	or	inefficiently?”	He	thought	public	opinion	was	fairly	clear;	if	you	asked	people	whether	they	would	prefer	widening	or	decreasing	inequality,	he	would	be	very	surprised	if	10%	of	respondents	fell	into	the	former	camp	–	probably	fewer.	When	asked	whether	
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	 Another	mainstream	academic	opined,	“Economists	have	never	had	much	to	say	about	inequality,	and	what	to	do	about	it.	And	there’s	a	reason	for	that	–	their	tools	are	not	political,	or	values-based.	[.	.	.]	Economics	has	always	said:	we’re	not	about	values.	We	take	them	as	given.”216	When	asked	whether	inequality	concerned	her,	she	said,	“Of	course.	Inequality	of	opportunity	is	a	bigger	concern.”	When	asked	whether	Canada’s	current	level	of	inequality	was	too	high,	she	said	drily,	“Given	the	taxes	I	pay,	I	doubt	it.	[.	.	.]	Canada	–	I	think	it’s	done	a	pretty	good	job	on	opportunity.	And	then	you	have	to	redistribute.	And	it’s	done	quite	a	job	compared	to	the	United	States	on	redistribution.	But	it	hasn’t	solved	the	problem.”	When	asked	how	we	might	solve	the	problem,	she	said,	“It’ll	always	be	with	us;”	the	only	place	she	had	seen	equality	was	in	pre-reform	China,	where	there	was	“equality	in	poverty.”		 A	fellow	mainstream	economist	had	studied	top	income	taxation	and	social	insurance.	His	research	on	self-employment	examined	whether	the	fact	that	good	and	bad	years	will	be	taxed	differently	affects	whether	people	choose	to	become	self-employed,	and	he	found	“little	effect.”	Similarly,	he	said,	evidence	shows	that	“people	are	not	very	sensitive	to	income	tax	rates,”	which	does	not	mean	you	can	do	anything	in	that	regard,	but	small	changes	will	not	make	much	difference.	His	comment	on	this	was	remarkable:		 	A	lot	of	economists	seem	to	think	there’s	a	big	impact,	even	though	there	are	no	studies	to	support	it.	So	that	seems	to	be	very	ideological,	and	that	seems	to	be	quite	American,	actually;	a	lot	of	American	economists	tend	to	put	that	slant	on	it.	And	it	seems	to	be	just	a	belief	they	have	–	people	must	be	responding	to	this,	even	if	they	can’t	find	it	in	the	data.			This	conversant’s	work	showed	that	the	top	tax	rate	has	fallen	almost	everywhere	since	the	1960s,	yet	“I	don’t	think	that	raising	the	top	tax	rate	would	have	much	of	an	impact	on	anything,	other	than	collecting	more	tax	revenues.	[.	.	.]	It’s	not	the	high	tax	rates	that	are	encouraging	people	to	work	less;	it’s	the	generous	retirement	packages.”	He	went	on	to	critique	the	work	of	economists	who	say	otherwise;	“they	seem	to	want	to	think	that	high	taxes	are	bad,	and	they	spin	the	arguments	to	make	it	
																																																								216	She	said	of	Piketty,	“It’s	good	that	he	can	write	well,	and	it’s	phenomenal,	his	timing.”	However,	“it’s	not	totally	thought-through.	He	recognised	that	himself,	and	he’s	done	a	public	service	by	making	all	his	data	publicly	available.”		
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work.”	Just	to	clarify,	I	asked	whether	he	was	in	favour	of	increasing	the	top	tax	rate.	He	said,	“Yes,	I	would,”217	contending:			 I	think	there	is	a	lot	of	danger	in	the	really	extreme	high-end	–	the	fact	that	top	incomes	and	top	wealth	distributions	are	so	concentrated	now.	That	could	have	implications	for	social	cohesion;	it	could	have	implications	for	the	distance	–	not	so	much	in	Canada,	but	Washington	–	has	from	ordinary	people.		He	went	on	to	cite	a	paper	arguing	that	inequality	was	a	“threat	to	social	solidarity”218	and	brought	up	the	sociological	concept	of	anomie,	the	gap	between	expectations	and	reality,	and	its	links	to	the	rise	of	populism.	Yet	he	finished	by	saying,	“So	yeah,	[inequality	is]	something	to	be	concerned	about,	but	it’s	not	something	I	worry	about	on	a	daily	basis.”		 A	second	Conference	Board	conversant	seemed	deeply	concerned	about	inequality.	He	began,	“I’m	not	at	all	surprised	to	see	that	there	is	a	shift	towards	owners	of	capital	and	people	with	a	big	stock	of	capital	making	gains	over	time,	but	even	if	it’s	true,	it’s	hard	to	fix,”	and	asserted	that	Canada’s	inequality	had	levelled	off	since	the	mid-1990s.	But	when	I	asked	him	whether	income	inequality	concerned	him,	he	said:			 	Oh,	always,	always.	One	of	the	ways	to	make	a	stronger	society	is	to	raise	the	poorest,	raise	the	productivity	of	the	poorest,	find	ways	to	make	them	feel	that	they	can	flow	into	the	workforce.	And	it’s	a	destabiliser.	If	you	don’t	do	that,	you	end	up	hiring	police	and	putting	up	walls,	which	has	been	the	American	solution.		When	I	asked	whether	his	concern	was	more	about	poverty	or	inequality	itself,	he	said,	“Certainly	for	me,	raising	the	floor	is	the	starting	point,”	and	volunteered	that	we	need	a	guaranteed	annual	income.	When	asked	whether	the	level	of	inequality	in	Canada	was	acceptable	currently,	he	said,	“It’s	probably	a	little	bit	higher	than	ideal.	But	I	would	really	focus	more	on	inter-generational	mobility.	[.	.	.]	And	that’s	why	our	research	always	focuses	on	as	strong	a	public	education	system	as	possible,	where	
																																																								217	It	is	worth	noting	that	this	conversant	had	conducted	research	for	the	right-wing	Fraser	Institute	in	the	past,	yet	he	was	one	of	few	conversants	to	state	an	explicit	preference	for	raising	taxes	on	the	top	income	bracket.	218	He	also	mentioned	an	article	that	describes	the	advent	of	advertisements	for	products	no	one	can	afford,	but	whose	purpose	is	to	boost	the	status	of	the	few	who	can	buy	them.	
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When	asked	whether	he	thought	his	views	were	common	among	economists,	this	professor	said,	“I	think	in	Canada	there	is	a	consensus	on	the	points	I’ve	been	making.	This	is	far	less	so	in	the	States,”	where	“there	are	a	lot	of	people	who	believe	in	a	wide-open	market	and	.	.	.	let	it	behave	as	it	does.	And	however	it	behaves,	it	must	be	efficient.”			 This	had	been	the	sort	of	response	I	had	been	expecting	from	heterodox	and	PEF-affiliated	economists,	but	there	was	widespread	concern,	even	indignation,	about	inequality	among	the	majority	of	my	conversants.	No	progressive	economists	took	the	contrary	view,	however;	as	one	heterodox	professor	said,	“I’m	not	on	the	poor	street.	I’m	okay.	But	I	have	a	problem	with	[inequality]	from	a	policy	perspective,	from	an	economics	perspective.	I	think	it	can	represent	a	very	dangerous	–	it’s	a	powder	keg.	That’s	what	inequality	is	–	it’s	a	powder	keg,”	going	on	to	say	that	inequality	was	too	high	in	Canada.	He,	too,	invoked	Occupy	Wall	Street:		 If	you	talked	about	inequality	ten	years	ago,	you	were	crazy,	you	were	a	Marxist.	Now	inequality	has	come	into	the	mainstream.	I	think	two	things	happened:	the	social	movement	of	Occupy,	that	sort	of	put	a	human	face	on	it,	and	a	bunch	of	people	were	always	doing	work	on	inequality.	But	then	the	book	by	Thomas	Piketty229	[.	.	.]	Now	people	are	very	aware	of	CEOs,	and	bonuses,	and	it’s	being	covered	in	newspapers	.	.	.	I	think	that’s	a	good	thing.230	[.	.	.]	I’ve	always	said	that	the	greatest	triumph	of	the	right	is	[the	idea]	that	deficits	are	bad.	And	I	think	the	greatest	triumph	of	the	left,	still	in	the	making,	is	this	idea	of	inequality.			 A	CCPA	economist	also	emphasised	the	Occupy	connection,	saying,	“This	is	all	about	Occupy;”	there	had	been	plenty	of	papers	about	inequality	for	30	years,	but	without	Occupy	Wall	Street	Piketty’s	book	would	not	have	been	noticed.	He	agreed	that	inequality	in	Canada	was	too	high,	and	as	policy	prescriptions	he	recommended	higher	taxes,	capital	gains	taxes,231	and	a	renewal	of	the	union	movement.232	He	also	made	the	point	that	there	is	less	pre-tax	inequality	within	a	high-tax	regime	because																																																									229	He	had	several	critiques	of	Piketty’s	work	–	“Oh,	I	have	lots	of	criticism”	–	but	agreed	with	the	bulk	of	his	academic	colleagues	that	it	was	a	“wonderful	dataset”	and	“it’s	given	people	a	glimpse	of	the	extent	of	inequality.”	230	He	gave	the	example	of	the	Tim	Horton’s	CEO	opposing	a	$15	minimum	wage	and	the	ensuing	criticisms	of	his	level	of	compensation.	231	He	pointed	out	that	long-	and	short-term	capital	are	taxed	differently	in	some	countries	(inflation	is	taken	into	account,	in	other	words),	so	there	is	no	need	to	tax	capital	gains	at	50%	as	is	the	case	in	Canada.	232	“That’s	why	the	middle	class	exists,”	he	said,	but	unions	are	now	mostly	public	sector	organisations	in	Canada;	new	companies	are	not	unionising	and	thus	the	overall	rate	of	unionisation	is	decreasing.	
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the	CEO	will	ask	for	a	golf	membership	instead	of	the	higher	wages	s/he	knows	will	be	taxed	away	anyway.		 The	other	conversant	to	invoke	Occupy	Wall	Street	was	a	COMER	member	who	had	invited	Occupy	protesters	to	camp	in	her	yard	for	several	weeks	after	they	were	evicted	from	a	Toronto	park.	She	said,	“To	me,	poverty	is	a	problem.	To	me,	social	injustice	is	a	problem.”	A	fellow	COMER	member	concurred;	inequality	is	“proof	that	the	system	has	failed,”	and	she	opposed	“such	gross	inequality,	because	it	speaks	of	injustice	and	somebody	exploiting	somebody	else.”	Yet	another	COMER	member	connected	inequality	with	the	aims	of	COMER:	“Income	inequality	is	adversely	affected	by	austerity,	and	vice	versa.	And	the	austerity	is	because	mainstream	people	won’t	recognise	–	or	refuse	to	recognise	–	or	just	cannot	believe	that	money	can	be	created	out	of	nowhere	and	spent	into	the	economy,”	going	on	to	warn	that	the	issue	is	“getting	worse	incrementally.”		 A	PEF-affiliated	economist	agreed:		 	There’s	always	a	problem	of	inequality	under	capitalism,	but	it’s	certainly	gotten	worse	under	neoliberalism.	Piketty’s	work	has	been	taken	seriously;	he’s	gotten	a	huge	amount	of	attention,	and	rightly	so	–	he’s	been	very	careful	in	his	empirical	research	and	his	historical	work.	And	I	think	he’s	opened	up	lots	of	opportunities	for	us.	I	don’t	accept	his	ultimate	conclusions	in	terms	of	which	sorts	of	policies	are	required,	or	feasible	–	this	idea	of	a	global	wealth	tax	and	just	doing	straight	redistribution	I	don’t	think	is	feasible	for	all	kinds	of	reasons,	some	of	which	are	economic.			 Aside	from	his	use	of	the	word	“neoliberalism,”	these	views	echoed	many	of	the	earlier	comments	from	mainstream	economists.233	Two	heterodox	academic	presented	a	similar	mix	of	critiques	and	support	when	it	came	to	Piketty;	one	said	cryptically,	towards	the	end	of	our	interview	and	without	time	for	elaboration,	that	Piketty	had	made	the	same	mistake	as	Marx.	Another	heterodox	academic	economist	expounded,	“It’s	extraordinary	empirical	work,”	but	“on	the	theory	side,	he’s	much	weaker.	He’s	not	really	neoclassical,	but	he’s	relying	on	neoclassical	theory,	so	the	little	he	has	on	theory	has	been	heavily	criticised	by	my	colleagues.”	However:		 [Inequality	has]	been	an	important	issue	for	heterodox	economists	plus	a	few	mainstream	economists	from	way	in	the	past.	[.	.	.]	We	have	always	argued	that	it’s	part	of	the	explanation	of	the	crisis,	that	the	wage	share	has	been	
																																																								233	Remarkably,	almost	everyone	in	my	sample,	across	the	political	spectrum	no	less,	agreed	that	a	global	wealth	tax	would	not	be	practicable.	
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diminishing	[.	.	.]	so	the	only	way	to	keep	up	with	the	Joneses	is	to	borrow	heavily.			When	asked	whether	inequality	in	Canada	was	too	high	at	present,	he	said,	“Well,	it’s	probably	too	high.	It’s	not	as	bad	as	in	many	other	countries,”	and	we	have	welfare	programs	and	the	like,	“but	it	is	certainly	shocking	to	see	medical	doctors	earning	as	much	as	they	do;	they	are	putting	our	public	health	system	in	jeopardy.	And	of	course	it’s	shocking	to	see	how	much	money	people	in	finance	make.”234			 A	PEF-affiliated	academic	economist,	when	asked	whether	inequality	was	an	issue,	responded	simply,	“Yes,”	especially	for	rural	Aboriginal	communities,	the	inner	city,	low-income	earners,	mental	health	sufferers,	and	other	marginalised	groups;	inequality	would	be	worth	addressing	regardless,	but	these	pockets	deserve	particular	attention:	“It’s	abhorrent	that	in	an	economy	as	healthy	as	Canada’s	we	have	people	who	do	not	have	access	to	safe	water,	do	not	have	access	to	basic	food,	do	not	have	access	to	affordable	housing	–	and	let’s	throw	in	there	–	do	not	have	access	to	affordable	childcare.	[.	.	.]	Definitely	it’s	untenable.”			 This	was	the	view	of	a	CCPA	economist	who	characterised	Piketty’s	work	as	a	reprise	of	Kuznets’	ideas.235	“What	he’s	tapped	into	is	this	idea	that	the	game	is	rigged,”	with	600	pages	of	data	and	stories	to	back	it	up.236	This	economist	went	on	to	prescribe	policies	to	address	the	issue	–	affordable	housing,	childcare,	post-secondary	education,	transit,	and	clean	water:		 	De-marketise	them.	De-marketise	some	element	of	them.	[.	.	.]	It’s	a	great	leveller	to	have	these	fundamentals.	[.	.	.]	If	you	provided	those	things	at	prices	that	did	not	have	profits	built	into	them,	just	covering	the	costs	of	them,	it	would	be	great.	It	would	not	necessarily	reduce	income	inequality,	but	it	would	reduce	the	impact	of	income	inequality.			When	asked	if	it	would	be	sufficient	to	“vanquish	the	sting”	of	inequality,	as	she	phrased	it,	she	said	that	the	only	way	to	pay	for	her	policy	prescriptions	was	to	“go	where	the	money	is”	by	taxing	the	rich,	capital	gains,	inheritance,237	and	carbon.	“I																																																									234	For	example,	UOttawa	spends	$10	million	in	management	costs	for	their	pension	fund	annually	and	he	felt	he	could	do	almost	as	good	a	job	for	way	less	–	“so	that’s	part	of	the	inequality.”	235	Kuznets’	work	suggested	that	the	rising	tide	does	indeed	raise	all	boats	in	the	early	stages	of	industrialisation,	but	Piketty	and	Saez	showed	that	there	may	be	a	reversal	of	this	trend	in	its	later	stages.	236	She	did	note	that	some	of	the	best	critiques	are	from	Canada,	however,	where	wealth	is	mainly	in	real	estate	and	does	not	follow	Piketty’s	pattern.	237	$1	trillion	will	be	passed	down	in	the	next	20	years	in	Canada,	she	pointed	out.	
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actually	would	argue	we’re	going	to	have	to	raise	revenues	to	move	into	the	21st	century,”	she	said;	healthcare	and	infrastructure	will	cost	a	fortune	in	the	coming	decades.	“You’ve	got	a	major	infrastructure	deficit	and	we’re	balancing	the	books?	Who	cares?”	she	asked.		 As	it	happens,	the	overwhelming	condemnation	of	inequality	among	my	conversants	may	have	been,	in	part,	a	function	of	the	selection	of	full	professors	as	a	priority	within	my	interview	sample.	In	my	survey	of	99	academic	economists	across	the	country,	there	turned	out	to	be	a	stark	generational	divide.	Among	younger	economists	–	everyone	younger	than	the	Baby	Boomers	generation,	52	years	of	age	and	younger	–	support	for	reducing	the	level	of	income	inequality	in	Canada	decreased	sharply,	with	fully	35%	opposed	to	the	idea	of	reducing	the	level	of	inequality	in	Canada.	Among	those	aged	53	and	older,	the	vast	majority	was	in	favour	of	reducing	inequality;	only	11%	were	opposed.			 Among	survey	respondents	as	a	whole,	77%	agreed	or	agreed	with	provisos	that	“the	distribution	of	income	in	Canada	should	be	more	equal.”	Yet	the	age	differential	was	extreme	–	fully	34.6%	of	academic	economists	aged	28-40	disagreed	with	this	statement,	as	compared	to	16.7%	of	academic	economists	over	the	age	of	71.	Similarly,	29.2%	of	academic	economists	aged	41-52	disagreed,	as	did	only	13.2%	of	Baby	Boomers	(aged	53-71).	There	was	more	or	less	a	consistent	increase	in	support	for	income	equality	with	economists’	increase	in	age,	with	the	older	two	categories	so	supportive	that	they	are	off	the	charts	of	surveys	of	American	economists,	including	particularly	progressive	subsets	like	female	economists	(May	et	al.,	2014).	This	is	especially	remarkable	given	the	fact	that	income	inequality	in	Canada	is	already	significantly	lower	than	it	is	in	the	U.S.		 As	an	additional	data	point,	it	is	worth	noting	that	on	specific	measures	of	inequality	Canadian	economists	appear	to	be	even	more	the	outliers;	Canadian	academic	economists	were	significantly	more	likely	to	think	that	top	executives	were	overpaid	(81%	felt	this	way)	than	members	of	the	American	public	(66.8%),	who	were	in	turn	significantly	more	likely	to	think	so	than	American	economists	(39.39%)	(Sapienza	&	Zingales,	2013,	p.	13).	As	direct	measures	of	egalitarian	sentiment	among	Canadian	economics	professors,	these	numbers	are	truly	remarkable.				
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Tax	Evasion			 In	the	course	of	58	interviews,	I	raised	the	issue	of	tax	evasion	in	20	of	them	and	three	of	my	conversants	–	including	one	bank	chief	economist	–	brought	up	the	issue	unprompted.	I	did	not	have	time	to	ask	the	Fraser	Institute	conversants,	nor	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute	conversants,	which	may	have	affected	the	distribution	of	the	responses.	Of	those	who	answered	the	question,	however,	only	three	conversants	had	a	forgiving	attitude	towards	tax	evasion	and	all	three	were	older,	right-wing,	and,	notably,	full	professors.			 One	of	these	professors	said,	directly,	“You	can’t	blame	anyone	for	wanting	to	pay	as	little	tax	as	possible.	And	I	grew	up	in	Britain	when	the	marginal	tax	rate	was	96%.”	He	described	‘one-hit	wonders’	who	ended	up	in	bankruptcy	court,	and	others	who	moved	out	of	the	country	to	avoid	the	high	marginal	rate:	“The	problem	is	the	high	tax	rate.	[.	.	.]	There’s	a	long	literature	on	why	taxing	consumption	is	a	more	economically	efficient	and	equitable	thing	to	do.”		 The	second	professor	to	take	this	view	picked	up	on	my	language,	questioning	my	use	of	the	word	“evasion”	as	opposed	to	“avoidance,”	going	on	to	say,	“I	don’t	think	you	can	blame	them”	for	using	legal	loopholes;	“the	job	of	the	accounting	adviser	in	a	firm	would	be	to	minimise	the	tax	liabilities	of	his	or	her	company.	Why	not?”	When	I	asked	whether	legality	and	morality	line	aligned	for	him	in	this	area,	he	answered	indirectly,	saying	that	the	tax	system	is	far	too	complicated	and	that	he	would	get	rid	of	most	tax	loopholes,	especially	because	small	firms	cannot	afford	accountants	like	the	big	firms	can.	When	I	circled	back	to	the	question	of	illegal	tax	evasion,	he	said	reluctantly,	“Yeah,	I’m	not	in	favour	of	doing	things	that	are	illegal.	But	the	temptation	is	certainly	there.”	He	cited	the	high	taxation	rate	in	Québec,	saying,	“So	I	don’t	condone	it	completely,	but	I	can	kind	of	understand	why	people	look	for	opportunities	that	are	there	to	hide	things,	even	if	it’s	illegal.”		 The	third	professor	who	held	this	view	said,	baldly,	“What	creates,	of	course,	a	strong	incentive	to	use	all	that	stuff	is	a	high	marginal	rate;”	a	person	will	“have	a	much	stronger	incentive”	to	evade	high	marginal	taxes,	which	creates	a	vicious	cycle	as	evasion	decreases	tax	revenue	and	fuels	the	need	for	yet	greater	tax	increases.		 He	went	on	to	explain	that	it	is	hard	to	measure	tax	evasion.	“Revenue	Canada	comes	up	with	estimates	[.	.	.]	and	I	don’t	think	the	numbers	have	gone	up	all	that	much.	And	theory	says	that	with	reductions	in	top-end	marginal	rates	they	should	be	
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coming	down	a	bit.238	[.	.	.]	Big	increases	in	top	marginal	tax	rates?	I	think	that’s	going	to	screw	up	the	world	fairly	substantially”	and	the	money	will	go	under	ground	and	into	retirement.	In	what	I	thought	was	a	noteworthy	balance	between	acknowledging	the	role	of	society	in	individual	success	and	alluding	to	his	own	line	in	the	sand	in	terms	of	fairness,	he	went	on	to	say:			 I	think	we	should	try	to	teach	people	to	be	good	people.	If	you	become	phenomenally	wealthy	you	shouldn’t	just	get	fat;	you	should	spread	the	wealth	around	and	try	to	do	good	–	that’s	a	social	obligation	that	you	have.	And	I’m	not	opposed	to	a	progressive	income	tax,	but	a	rule	of	one	for	you,	one	for	me,	seems	to	be	a	kind	of	time-honoured	rule,	and	one	for	you,	two	for	me	just	doesn’t	–	I	understand	that	the	person	didn’t	earn	their	income	all	on	their	own,	that	there’s	a	social	structure	and	so	on,	and	it	takes	a	village,	and	Steve	Jobs	didn’t	really	do	it	all	by	himself,	but	once	you	get	two	for	me,	one	for	you,	two	for	me,	one	for	you,	I’m	very	uncomfortable	with	that.			 These	sentiments	seemed	to	be	very	much	a	minority	view,	however,	even	among	those	who	could	understand	the	temptation	to	avoid	a	very	high	tax	rate.	One	academic	and	former	Finance	Department	official,	when	asked	about	tax	havens,	said	without	hesitation,	“They	should	be	closed.	They	create	enormous	distortions.	Again,	they’re	not	about	to	go	away	–	because	we	live	in	a	Westphalian	world.”	When	I	ask	what	should	be	done,	she	asked,	“But	are	they	a	huge	problem?”	This	seemed	to	be	a	genuine	question,	so	I	cited	a	study	that	suggested	7	trillion	USD	as	a	conservative																																																									238	We	had	an	interesting	exchange	along	those	lines:		 Professor:	“I	guess	I’m	not	viscerally	as	anxious	about	people	escaping	taxes	in	one	way	or	another	as	I	am	about	government	being	overly	intrusive	in	people’s	lives.	But	if	we	had	a	tax	system	that	was	simpler,	and	fairer,	had	fewer	loopholes,	and	lower	rates,	then	I	think	there’d	be	a	much	smaller	incentive	to	take	advantage	of	those	loopholes	and	you	could	be	much	more	outraged	by	people	who	would,	even	so,	try	to	avoid	taxation.	These	days	anybody	who	pays	a	50%	marginal	rate	–	or	higher	because	of	claw-backs	of	various	social	programs	–	tends	to	sympathise	with	people	who	try	to	evade	their	taxes.	And	if	you	had	a	much	lower	rate,	I	think	there	would	be	much	less	public	sympathy	for	people	trying	to	escape	a	reasonable	rate	of	taxation.	Fifteen	years	ago	it	was	even	worse,	with	rates	of	55,	and	close	to	60%.	So	there’s	been	some	reduction	of	marginal	rates,	and	I	think	that	helps,	but	I	think	we	can	go	further.”			 Me:	“So	there’s	been	a	decrease	in	the	amount	of	tax	evasion	since	then?”		 Professor:	“Um,	the	incentive	to	evade	taxes	has	come	down	with	the	reduction	in	tax	rates.”	
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	 A	third	bank	chief	economist	brought	the	matter	up	unprompted,	saying,	“Wealthy	individuals	shouldn’t	be	able	to	manage	to	avoid	taxes	just	because	they	have	the	luxury	of	wealth	and	can	hire	people	to	do	it	for	them.”	He	felt	that	this	is	on	a	“downward	trend”	and	that	it	“used	to	be	viewed	as	a	smart	thing	to	do.	[.	.	.]	I	suppose	it	was	always	frowned	upon”	but	it	is	more	so	now.		 This	consensus	among	the	bank	chief	economists	was	striking,	as	it	much	more	closely	mirrored	the	views	of	my	left-wing	conversants	than	I	would	have	expected.	One	CCPA	conversant	echoed	the	bank	chief	economist’s	point	regarding	the	group	of	taxpayers	most	able	to	avoid	taxes,	saying:			 	The	tax	loopholes	are	a	huge	issue.	They’re	largely	constructed	for	wealthy	Canadians,	those	are	the	people	who	use	them	–	you	look	at	things	like	the	stock	option	deduction	–	who	gets	paid	in	stock	options?	That’s	what	it’s	built	for.	That’s	how	the	top	1%	gets	paid.	When’s	the	last	time	you	got	paid	in	stock	options?	And	that’s	just	one	of	the	more	egregious	ones.	There	is	a	whole	variety	of	those	tax	loopholes	that	are	constructed	only	for	people	who	get	paid	in	particular	ways	that	most	people	don’t	get	paid	in.		This	conversant	went	on	to	describe	the	corporate	side	of	the	taxation	question,	which	is	a	“total	free-for-all,”	especially	if	you	have	international	operations	–	“you	choose	what	you	pay.”	Tax	avoidance	is	comparatively	difficult	on	the	personal	side,	on	the	other	hand;	putting	money	in	the	Barbados	is	illegal	for	people,	not	corporations.	But	“the	tax	breaks	that	are	implemented	on	the	personal	side	go	almost	exclusively	to	the	wealthy,	unless	they’re	explicitly	designed	not	to.”	Furthermore,	a	lot	of	wealth	is	tied	up	in	small	businesses,	which	can	allow	owners	to	write	off	expenses,	engage	in	income	splitting,	and	the	like.		 A	CCPA	colleague	pointed	out	that	the	Canada	Revenue	Agency	(CRA)	just	took	a	major	cut,	some	of	which	was	due	to	automation	but	some	of	which	was	a	“mind-blowing”	move	to	cut	the	big	business	and	international	teams,	which	is	where	the	profits	are.	“What	happens	is,	when	you	talk	more	about	tax	evasion	but	you	don’t	do	anything	about	it,	people	feel	like	the	game	is	rigged,	people	get	disaffected,	and	then	they’re	less	likely	to	want	to	participate,”	the	conversant	said.	She	echoed	the	point	made	earlier	by	one	of	the	bank	economists,	emphasising	that	the	laid-off	CRA	employees	had	more	than	paid	for	themselves.	She	worried	that	the	Harper	government’s	refusal	to	work	with	the	G20	on	tax	evasion	could	gradually	allow	social	norms	to	move	towards	those	of	Greece:	“If	you’re	paying	taxes,	you’re	a	putz.”	One	of	the	COMER	members	repeated	the	concern	about	the	government’s	
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management	of	the	CRA,	wondering,	“Why	doesn’t	the	government	pay	more	money	to	get	smarter	people”	to	keep	up	with	tax	evaders?	Another	COMER	member	pointed	to	the	cadre	of	wealthier	people	profiting	from	real	estate	but	avoiding	taxes	on	the	proceeds.		 A	PEF-affiliated	academic	economist	returned	to	the	theme	of	“the	people	who	can	afford	to	evade	taxes,”	pointing	out	that	we	should	want	to	pay	taxes	to	live	in	Canada.	But	“I	don’t	think	most	economists	think	about	[tax	evasion]”	and	the	right-wing	is	envious	of,	and	apologists	for,	high	income-earners.	“I	don’t	think	they	understand	the	scope	of	it,”	she	said,	and	cited	IMF	statistical	discrepancies	that	jumped	in	the	late	1980s	from	1-2%	to	over	10%,	when	it	become	technologically	easier	to	transfer	funds	overseas	without	detection.		 The	above	views	amounted	to	a	near-unanimous	condemnation	of	tax	evasion	among	heterodox	and	mainstream	economists	alike.	All	but	three	professors	expressed	something	ranging	between	distaste	and	outrage	when	asked	about	tax	evasion.	Notably,	only	one	professor	I	spoke	with	thought	that	a	global	wealth	tax	was	practicable,	yet	almost	everyone	advocated	for	global	coordination	on	tax	evasion	–	surely	just	as	much	of	a	collective	action	problem.	One	professor	said,	unprompted,	that	there	should	be	international	coordination	around	tax	data	and	the	like:	“Am	I	in	favour	of	that?	100%.”	Another	professor	said,	directly	contrasting	the	scepticism	around	a	global	wealth	tax	with	calls	for	international	coordination	around	tax	evasion,	“I	think	that	has	more	traction.	[.	.	.]	That,	of	course,	calls	for	some	kind	of	coordinated,	cooperative	approach	among	countries.”	But	of	developments	in	tax	treaties	to	prevent	tax	evasion,	“I	think	this	is	very	promising.”	A	colleague	concurred,	saying,	“It’s	a	significant	issue	and	there’s	lots	of	money	involved”	for	individuals	and	companies	alike,	and	that	global	coordination	would	be	good,	although	the	rich	fund	politicians	and	it	is	therefore	difficult	to	tax	both	corporations	and	those	who	are	enriched	by	them.		 Another	professor	said,	“I	haven’t	thought	about	it.	I’m	not	a	fan	of	tax	evasion.	Not	a	fan	of	that.	I	think	the	Canadian	banks	are	engaged	in	pretty	big	ways	too.”	He	had	read	about	huge	capital	flows	to	the	Caribbean;	“it’s	kind	of	insane,”	although	there	is	“not	much	we	can	do	in	Canada”	as	the	lead	has	to	come	from	the	U.S.	and	others	in	the	international	community.	Yet	another	professor,	when	asked	about	tax	evasion,	said,	“Sure,	sure.	That	should	not	happen,”	although	it	is	hard	to	do	anything	about	it.	When	I	asked	what	should	be	done,	the	response	was:	“It’s	a	bit	beyond	
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conversants’	views	of	human	nature	and	their	life’s	work	or	political	views.	Yet	several	interesting	themes	emerged.		 First,	the	extreme	range	among	COMER	members	is	worth	noting	as,	in	the	course	of	other	questioning,	they	tended	to	fall	towards	the	far	left	of	the	political	spectrum.	One	member	was	clearly	motivated	to	work	on	monetary	reform	in	order	to	curtail	what	she	saw	as	a	dangerous	human	tendency	towards	greed,	while	another	was	motivated	by	a	belief	in	human	goodness.	Similarly,	to	hear	a	centrist	former	senior	official	of	the	Department	of	Finance	characterise	humans	as	‘greedy’	came	as	a	surprise.			 One	academic	economist	also	saw	a	human	tendency	towards	greed,	regardless	of	culture,	saying,	“Just	because	you’re	an	American	or	a	Canadian,	you’re	still	trying	to	maximise	your	profit.	You’re	trying	to	diddle	the	other	guy	as	best	you	can;	that’s	what	competition	is.	[.	.	.]	I	think	we’re	all	self-interested.	For	sure.	But	sometimes	you’ll	have	trouble	seeing	my	behaviour	as	me	being	self-interested.”	He	was	right;	this	professor	had	taken	his	economics	students	to	speak	with	homeless	people	directly,	and	his	work	in	the	area	could	only	be	called	exemplary.	Furthermore,	he	said,	“I	give	to	charity	because	it	feels	good,	and	it	seems	necessary,”	and	he	was	the	only	conversant	to	mention	people	with	disabilities.	Yet	he	said	of	humans,	“I	firmly	believe	we’re	all	autistic;	it’s	just	some	of	us	are	further	down	one	end	than	the	other.”		 The	above	individual	did	not	make	explicit	the	argument	that	two	conservative	professors	and	both	Fraser	Institute	conversants	went	on	to	elaborate	upon,	but	he	alluded	to	it	–	namely,	the	idea	that	what	looks	like	cooperation	is	really	self-interest.	As	one	professor	said,	“Well,	I’m	a	Smithian,	and	I	think	our	self-interest	drives	us	to	cooperate.	[.	.	.]	Maybe	not	everything,	and	maybe	not	even	the	most	important	things	worth	studying”	are	covered	by	Smith’s	conception,	but	“in	economics	I	think	a	lot	of	stuff	is	that	kind	of	stuff.”	He	went	on	to	indicate	that	several	psychological	studies	have	shown	that	that	is	not	exactly	true,	“and	I’m	willing	to	buy	that,”	but	in	a	lot	of	cases,	he	continued:		 	To	get	useful	predictions	out	of	what’s	going	to	happen,	we	probably	don’t	have	to	consider	all	of	those	behavioural	complications.	For	other	problems	maybe	we	will	behave	in	perverse,	irrational	ways,	and	if	we	observe	that	kind	of	behaviour,	well,	we’d	better	work	on	a	different	explanation.	[.	.	.	But]	when	analysing	the	price	of	potatoes	we	probably	don’t	need	that.			
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For	fiscal	and	monetary	policy,	he	said,	“I	think	we	have	all	the	tools	we	need,”	but	we	probably	need	psychology	for	poverty	and	other	such	issues,	although	you	may	find	that	people	are	behaving	rationally	and	not	“something	stranger.”	He	believed	that	that	Smith,	Ricardo,	and	Marshall	all	“had	a	deep	understanding	that	people	were	kind	of	strange.”			 A	fellow	conservative	academic	averred,	when	asked	where	on	the	spectrum	humans	fall,	“In	the	space	between	The	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments	and	The	Wealth	of	Nations	on	my	bookshelf!”	To	him	Smith’s	invisible	hand	meant	that	“self-interest	induces	cooperative	behaviour.”	As	a	near-majority	of	my	conversants	agreed,	“Well,	we’ve	got	to	start	somewhere”	and	homo	economicus	is	a	helpful,	if	not	always	completely	accurate,	tool	for	economists:			 In	a	huge,	huge	range	of	cases,	rational	maximising	behaviour	is	just	the	same	thing	as	consistent	behaviour.	Because	after	all	you	can’t	see	utility	function.	[.	.	.]	So	it’s	a	fairly	innocuous	assumption	in	all	sorts	of	places.	[.	.	.]	The	difficulties	arise	when	you’re	dealing	with	situations	where	the	outcomes	are	risky.	[.	.	.]	So	I	would	just	as	soon	stick	with	maximisation.	My	beef	with	modern	economics	is	they	don’t	pay	enough	attention	to	those	coordination	issues	that	have	to	do	with	the	monetary	system.			 A	more	extreme	version	of	the	above	Smithian	argument,	that	self-interest	drives	humans	to	cooperate,	was	expressed	by	a	Fraser	Institute	conversant:			 	We’re	beings	that	cooperate	.	.	.	It’s	also	the	idea	of	the	collective	is	built	right	in	–	the	feeling	that	we	have	to	support	other	people	is	built	right	into	us.	Cooperation	is	the	result	of	a	selfish	instinct,	that	we	cooperate	because	it’s	in	our	self-interest	to	cooperate	–	so	everything	from	blood-sucking	bats	to	orcas	are	cooperative	producers.		His	Fraser	Institute	colleague	made	a	similar	point,	but	did	not	invoke	self-interest	at	all;	instead	he	invoked	Ayn	Rand	in	making	the	point	that	we	would	need	much	more	government	if	humans	were	not	cooperative.		 Two	conversants	made	the	argument	that	cooperation	tended	to	be	restricted	to	a	narrow	set	of	circumstances.	One	bank	chief	economist	claimed	that	we	are	more	likely	to	cooperate	with	family	members	and	the	groups	closest	to	us,	but	not	to	the	exclusion	of	strangers:		 It’s	a	little	bit	like	social	Darwinism,	right?	Maybe	you	help	people	whose	genes	are	closer	to	your	own,	right?	There’s	all	that	theory.	But	to	a	certain	extent,	we	do	cooperate.	You	know,	I’ve	been	in	situations	.	.	.	Lots	of	times,	people	will	do	
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something	for	a	total	stranger,	but	it	helps	if	they	have	some	sense	of	affinity	in	some	way.				 A	mainstream	academic	economist	made	a	similar	point,	setting	out	a	narrower	conception	of	cooperation:		 I	am	cooperative	with	my	wife	and	with	my	children	and	with	my	other	family	members.	But	as	I	keep	getting	further	and	further,	I	am	more	concerned	with	myself	and	my	family,	if	you	like,	than	with	others.	In	my	relationships	with	broader	society,	I	want	to	protect	my	interests,	and	promote	my	interests.			 This	was	a	common	view;	whether	the	conversant	fully	believed	in	homo	
economicus240	as	an	accurate	portrayal	of	human	nature,	s/he	tended	to	see	it	as	a	useful	tool.	Again,	this	view	came	from	a	surprisingly	wide	range	of	economists.	One	CCPA	economist	said,	“A	rational	self-interested	model	can	be	a	useful	model	in	some	cases,”	adding	that	his	problem	had	more	to	do	with	the	absence	of	time	and	debt	in	economic	models.			 Several	mainstream	academic	economists	concurred.	One	stated	that:			 Life	is	rarely	binary.	So	do	I	think	people	like	you	or	I	respond	to	financial	or	price	incentives,	like	those	produced	in	markets?	Yes.	For	many	things?	Yes.	For	everything	we	do	in	life?	No.	[.	.	.]	Love	and	compassion	and	generosity	and	altruism	–	all	of	those	things	are	important.	But	I	would	say,	if	you	want	to	understand	market	transactions,	[.	.	.]	which	are	a	huge	fraction	of	what’s	going	on	with	life,	I	think	modelling	things	as	homo	economicus,	or	modelling	things	as	people	respond	in	part	to	incentives	–	I	can’t	imagine	dispensing	with	that	idea.				 Another	professor	said	of	homo	economicus,	“Well,	certainly	I	don’t	believe	it.	But	it	is	a	convenient	tool.	[.	.	.]	Do	I	believe	that	individuals	and	companies	behave	slavishly,	totally	rationally	on	this	and	nothing	else?	No.”	But	although	these	assumptions	are	not	perfect,	“it’s	a	very	reasonable	way	of	going	about	doing	it.”	He	used	the	example	of	raising	the	minimum	wage:	first-year	economics	students	are	taught	that	it	increases	unemployment,	he	said,	but	“I	would	say	there	is	not	a	consensus	on	this”	and	that	the	research	is	mixed;	there	is	some	evidence	of	monopoly	power	at	the	selling	end	and	at	the	wage	end,	so	there	is	no	perfect	competition.	“Like	Walmart?”	I	asked.	“You’ve	got	it.	That’s	Exhibit	A,”	he	said;	“Well,	there’s	a	case	where	slavishly	following	a	very	simplistic	analysis	–	with	a	nice	little	assumption	of	perfect	competition,	by	the	way	–	can	lead	to	quite	questionable	and																																																									240	The	rational,	atomistic,	self-interested	human	–	“representative	agent”	–	of	many	economic	models.	
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seemingly	unrealistic	conclusions.	So	you	have	to	be	very	careful	with	the	assumptions	you	build	in.”	He	went	on	to	remark,	ruefully,	that	he	had	bought	a	house	essentially	to	warehouse	the	furniture	from	his	childhood	home	after	his	mom	died;	“The	biggest	economic	decision	I	made	in	my	life	was	based	on	emotion,”	he	said,	even	though	interest	rates	were	really	high	then	–	perhaps	not	the	most	rational	of	decisions,	but	not	a	bad	one.		 A	fellow	mainstream	economist	concurred	with	the	view	of	the	assumption	of	rationality	as	a	useful	tool,	saying:		 	The	vast	majority	of	economists	would	–	and	I	would	certainly	say	–	it’s	not	an	accurate	description	of	human	nature,	that	lots	of	other	things	like	altruism	and	so	on	play	a	role.	[.	.	.]	Whenever	you	try	to	model	behaviour,	you	have	to	simplify;	you	have	to	abstract	from	the	complexity	and	focus	on	the	core.	So	the	big	issue	is:	are	you	making	simplifications	that	are	unimportant	at	the	margin,	or	are	you	making	simplifications	that	are	really	fundamental?	And	that’s	a	tougher	problem.	For	people	who	have	been	defending	standard	neoclassical	economics	saying	that	we’re	going	to	assume	that	people	are	fully	rational,	they’re	well-informed,	they	maximise	utility	subject	to	a	budget	constraint,	they	know	that	that’s	not	accurate,	not	strictly	how	they	behave,	but	they	nonetheless	think	that	the	predictions	you	get	from	those	sorts	of	assumptions	are	useful.			 Another	mainstream	academic	seemed	slightly	irritated	by	the	question,	saying,	“I	think	the	question	is	a	bit	misplaced	in	a	way,	or	missing	in	nuance.”	He	stated	that	people	think	economists	believe	that	people	are	homo	economicus-like,	but	no	one	is	that	extreme.	If	you	assume	the	opposite,	however,	“it’s	very	sloppy”	and	“very	descriptive.”	Homo	economicus	simply	allows	economists	to	look	at	things	a	bit	differently;	economists	think	obesity	might	be	related	to	food	prices,	for	example,	and	the	homo	economicus	construct	can	help	us	think	about	crime	and	the	like,	whereas	“if	you	think	that	people	are	criminals	because	they’re	irrational,	none	of	these	policies	would	have	any	impact	and	we	shouldn’t	think	about	them	as	useful	tools.”	We	can	look	at	other	factors	if	homo	economicus	is	not	explanatory,	and	do	not	have	to	believe	in	the	concept	to	work	in	economics:	“It’s	really	just	an	elegant	working	tool	to	explore	certain	motivations,	how	important	are	incentives,	that	sort	of	thing.	So	if	you	ask	me	personally	where	I	think	people	stand,	I	think	it’s	kind	of	in	the	middle.	I	mean,	clearly	people	are	self-interested,	but	they’re	also	generous	to	their	community	and	things	like	that.”		 Another	academic	economist	shared	this	view:		 	
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We’re	somewhere	in	between	[self-interested	and	cooperative].	[.	.	.]	It’s	clear	that	it’s	very	extreme,	but	going	the	other	way	and	thinking	they’re	very	stupid	is	probably	not	very	fruitful	either.	So	there	are	obvious	reasons	why	they	might	not	be	completely	rational	[.	.	.]	but	as	a	general	rule	I	think	it’s	a	good	approximation,	and	since	it	comes	with	being	an	economist	too.	[laughs]	I	will	be	surprised	if	you	would	get	a	very	different	answer,	whoever	you	ask.			 Yet	another	mainstream	economist	said,	when	asked	whether	he	thought	homo	
economicus	worked	well	as	an	assumption:		 	We	have	some	evidence	that	when	people	do	experiments	and	they	look	at	the	predictions	for	various	games,	that	you	see	more	cooperation	than	you	would	expect.	[.	.	.]	But	I	don’t	think	it’s	something	you	can	rely	on.	Basing	our	policy	on	everyone	being	good-willed	I	think	is	a	mistake.			 The	theme	continued,	even	for	economists	who	had	an	opinion	about	human	nature	that	did	not	line	up	with	the	homo	economicus	model;	another	mainstream	academic	economist	said	that	“fundamentally,	most	parts	of	economics	is	about	individuals	being	selfish,	self-interested,	etc.,”	which	was	“a	very	useful	assumption”	even	though	he	did	not	think	people	were	like	that.	Milton	Friedman	used	the	analogy	of	playing	pool;	most	people	are	not	expert	in	geometry	but	still	make	similar	moves	in	the	game.	In	the	end,	this	economist	argued	that	humans	are	“something	in	between	[cooperative	and	self-interested].”		 This	was	also	the	view	of	a	third	COMER	member,	who	claimed	that	humans	were			 .	.	.	somewhere	in	the	middle,	but	it’s	a	pretty	wide	middle.	Some	people	I	think	would	say	that	humans	are	hard-wired	for	competition,	but	you	can	make	a	very	good	case	that	we’re	hard-wired	to	be	compassionate	and	cooperative	as	well.	The	louder	proponents	of	somewhat	unregulated	free	enterprise	talk	about	competition	as	what	does	it,	but	no	head	of	a	business	wants	competition	–	he	wants	certainty.			 Two	bank	chief	economists	agreed.	One	said	that	humans	were	“somewhere	in	the	middle”	and	that	she	thinks	about	it	a	lot;	sometimes	she	can	scarcely	believe	how	bad	people	are	from	watching	the	news	–	and	yet,	“people	are	capable	of	a	sense	of	community	and	a	sense	of	family	and	of	taking	care	of	each	other,	and	the	more	we	can	incentivise	that	the	better,”	while	at	the	same	time	“there’s	such	low	tolerance	for	people	who	are	different	in	whatever	way.”		 Her	counterpart	at	another	bank	said:			
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I	think	every	individual	is	different,	and	I	think	every	society	is	different	as	well.	It’s	probably	a	cliché,	but	countries	like	the	Scandinavian	countries	seem	very	cooperative,	whereas	countries	like	the	U.S.	seem	very	competitive	–	and	the	Chinese	too.	[.	.	.]	Canada	probably	falls	neatly	in	the	middle	there.	I	would	say	that	we’re	probably	still	a	little	bit	on	the	cooperative	side,	but	I	would	say	it	was,	over	time,	over	the	last	30	years,	it	was	more	on	the	competitive	side,	I	would	say.	For	better	or	for	worse.				 Two	conversants	who	perceived	humans	to	be	both	cooperative	and	self-interested	stood	at	nearly	opposite	ends	of	the	political	spectrum;	one	was	likely	the	most	conservative	academic	economist	I	spoke	with,	while	the	other	was	an	academic	economist	who	mentioned	donating	to	the	CCPA.	But	their	notional	oppositional	positioning	would	not	necessarily	have	been	apparent	from	their	answers.		 The	conservative	professor	said,	“I	think	they’re	both.	They’re	largely	self-interested	but	you	can	get	so	much	from	cooperation,”	and	a	person	has	more	to	gain	with	a	good	reputation.	When	I	asked	whether	he	judged	homo	economicus	to	be	an	accurate	portrayal	of	humans,	he	said	that	his	models	often	use	rational	expectations,	but	people	do	not	have	that	kind	of	“calculation	power.”	He	mentioned	agent-based	models,	which	he	thought	had	potential,	but	said	that	the	rational	expectations	assumption	is	“very	tempting”	for	economists	because	it	simplifies	things;	“one	of	the	biggest	shortcomings	of	economists	is	to	address	problems	because	they’re	simple	and	not	because	they’re	important.”		 The	other	(progressive)	professor	said:			 It’s	both.	[.	.	.]	There’s	the	Wealth	of	Nations	Adam	Smith,	and	there’s	the	Moral	Sentiments	Adam	Smith.	People	are	tremendously	motivated	by	collective	identities	in	various	forms,	and	people	go	crazy	if	they’re	unable	to	have	contact	with	other	people.	This	is	why	solitary	confinement	is	torture	–	because	we	literally	go	mad	if	we	are	not	with	other	people.	But	at	the	same	time,	betting	against	people	doing	what’s	in	their	best	interest	is	not	generally	wise.	So	we’re	both,	and	that’s	what	makes	economics	interesting.				 A	similarly	diverse	constellation	of	conversants	answered	that	humans’	tendencies	towards	cooperation	or	self-interest	were	contextual;	a	bank	chief	economist,	a	left-wing	academic	economist,	a	mainstream	economist,	a	Conference	Board	economist,	and	an	IRPP	economist	all	agreed	on	this	point.		 The	left-wing	academic	economist	viewed	the	spectrum,	in	fact,	as	spanning	the	poles	between	individualistic	and	socially	constructed	(in	terms	of	both	human	behaviour	and	identity).	She	then	said	that	she	viewed	humans	as	largely	socially	constructed,	their	behaviour	contextual,	and	she	viewed	the	economy	that	way	too.	
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She	felt	that	“economists	have	internalised	this	notion	of	the	rational	human	being”	and	that	things	happen	without	agency	on	the	part	of	people,	communities,	and	institutions.	Just	as	she	has	nothing	to	back	up	her	belief	in	bigger	government,	neither	can	others	back	up	their	belief	in	small	government	–	“but	at	least	I	admit	that	it’s	a	belief.”		 The	IRPP	economist	explicitly	considered	the	distinction	between	cooperation	or	self-interest	to	be	contextual,	and	viewed	homo	economicus	as	a	caricature.	He	spoke	of	studies	of	the	Ultimatum	Game	in	which	economists	tend	to	think	that	people	should	take	a	penny	because	it	is	“in	your	interest,”	whereas	he	himself	thought	that	“50/50	is	a	sensible	split”	and	that	“you	need	a	model	that	has	some	sense	of	fairness;	[.	.	.]	thinking	of	the	world	that	way	changes	the	way	you	interact	with	people”	and	can	make	you	“strategic,	heartless	maybe.”	When	I	asked	whether	he	viewed	humans	as	cooperative,	he	answered	that	it	depends	on	who	we	are	with.	He	went	on	to	say	that	models	built	on	rational	assumptions	still	get	you	somewhere,	but	you	then	have	to	go	further.		 A	Conference	Board	economist	laughed,	saying,	“I	think	that’s	a	–	that	would	be	an	overly	simplistic	way	of	analysing	humans.	I’m	over	60.	I	think	people	cooperate	when	they	have	collective	objectives	and	concerns	and	opportunity;	certainly	people	can	be	self-interested,”	but	it	is	not	something	you	can	put	on	a	1-to-10	scale.	“Well,	people	are	self-interested,	but	they	can	be	interested	in	their	community.	I	think	people	can	show	a	great	deal	of	concern	about	each	other	depending	on	the	situation”	and	engage	in	“lots	of	good	cooperative	behaviour	as	well.”		 A	mainstream	academic	economist	characterised	the	human	brain	as	a	Swiss	Army	knife,	with	tools	for	different	situations;	one	of	his	issues	with	behavioural	economists	was	that	they	did	not	sufficiently	acknowledge	the	role	of	context	in	human	behaviour.	As	for	homo	economicus,	“It’s	a	pretty	good	way	to	start.	[.	.	.]	In	terms	of	its	accuracy,	people	don’t	behave	that	way,	but	they	do	behave	in	ways	which	I	think	we	can	get	a	handle	on	using	evolutionary	psychology.”	He	cautioned	against	the	naturalistic	fallacy,	speaking	of	purported	differences	between	boys	and	girls;	“there’s	nothing	wrong	with	saying	we	should	change	things	to	try	and	make	things	better,”	he	claimed,	regardless	of	what	nature	and	nurture	have	currently	shaped	in	us,	pointing	to	the	flexibility	of	the	human	mind	in	the	face	of	a	changing	environment.	“Somewhere	in	the	middle,	you	get	the	possibility	that,	in	an	entirely	genetic	model,	there	would	be	a	gene	for	learning	and	being	affected	by	culture.”	He	
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went	on	to	note	that	studies	show	that	people	in	capitalist	countries	are	more	honest241	than	people	in	communist	and	former	communist	countries	–	but	officials	are	corrupt	there,	he	suggested,	and	social	norms	have	a	lot	to	do	with	how	we	behave	in	such	contexts.			 The	mainstream	academic	economist	above	was,	along	with	one	of	the	bank	chief	economists,	one	of	the	few	conversants	to	speak	in	normative	language	and	prescribe	an	approach	as	healthful	or	helpful.	This	was	striking.	The	bank	chief	economist	suggested	it	“depends	on	what	you’re	talking	about.	In	many	cases	we’re	very	cooperative;	in	many	cases	we	are	very	competitive.”	In	terms	of	business,	“I	think	we	have	to	become	more	cooperative,	and	less	competitive	in	certain	areas.”	He	went	on,	“I	think	you’ll	find	that	institutionally	we	have	to	move	to	a	more	cooperative	model.”			 In	answer	to	the	same	question,	his	counterpart	at	another	bank	said:		 I	don’t	know,	somewhere	in	the	middle,	I	guess?	I	come	back	to	the	economics	of	happiness	–	sense	of	community,	interacting	with	people,	helping	other	people,	always	rates	high	in	every	country	we	know	how	people	do	it.	But	there’s	a	fair	bit	of	self-interest	at	the	same	time,	so	it’s	a	balance	of	the	two.	And	Canada	–	almost	anything	you	can	think	of,	Canada	comes	right	in	between	Europe	and	the	United	States.	We’re	a	little	bit	of	the	European	influence	–	more	egalitarian,	more	cooperative	in	that	sense,	but	a	little	bit	like	the	United	States	as	well.			 A	C.D.	Howe	Institute	conversant	said,	“Well,	clearly	we’re	social	animals.	So	cooperation	and	altruism	are	built	way,	way	in.	[.	.	.]	Unfortunately	some	of	that	cooperation	is	against	other	groups	of	humans.”	He	continued,	“I	work	in	a	charity”	and	they	are	dependent	on	people’s	generosity,	but	people	also	respond	to	incentives	and	“will	pursue	their	own	self-interest	at	times,”	so	it	is	a	“constant	struggle	to	align	incentives,”	even	among	teachers,	doctors,	and	the	police;	he	invoked	the	concept	of	fiduciary	duty	as	well.	In	all,	his	view	was	that		 	.	.	.	.	we’re	a	mixture;	the	cooperative	end	of	it	is	extremely	strong,	and	that’s	why	we’re	having	this	conversation,	even.	But	then	the	competitive	analysis	is	also	very	useful	for	figuring	out	how	people’s	interests	might	diverge	from	what	you	might	like	them	to	do,	and	with	any	luck	you	can	find	ways	of	mitigating	that.			 Finally,	a	plurality	of	conversants	claimed	that	humans	were	on	the	cooperative	end	of	the	spectrum,	if	to	varying	degrees.	Conversants	in	this	camp	included	a	Bank																																																									241	In	studies	of	the	rate	at	which	a	(planted)	lost	wallet	is	returned.	
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of	Canada	economist,	a	COMER	member,	a	bank	chief	economist,	one	mainstream	and	two	heterodox	academic	economists,	a	Conference	Board	economist,	and	a	PEF-affiliated	economist;	if	one	includes	the	economists	who	believed	that	our	self-interest	leads	us	to	cooperate,	the	plurality	grows	considerably.	Each	economist	had	a	slightly	different	take	on	the	issue,	however,	and	there	was	a	range	of	assumed	cooperativeness	even	within	this	group.		 The	Bank	of	Canada	economist	suggested:		 I	think	people	do	want	to	cooperate	.	.	.	That’s	the	nature	of	community.	You	can’t	have	a	community	without	cooperation,	so	I’d	put	us	more	towards	the	cooperative	scale.	Because	there’s	a	lot	of	challenges	we	can’t	face	individually	–	I	think	that’s	perhaps	more	true	for	Canada,	because	we	have	inclement	weather	–	you	need	your	neighbours	to	help	push	your	car	out	of	the	snow	bank.				 One	bank	chief	economist	laughed,	saying,	“Generally	–	broad	generalisation	–	we’re	more	cooperative,	but	it	probably	varies	by	age	cohort	as	well.	Younger	people	are	probably	more	cooperative	than	older	people.	[.	.	.]	There’s	more	collaboration	going	on	than	when	I	was	young.”	This	statement	ran	counter	to	the	view	of	his	bank	counterpart	earlier,	who	held	that	cooperation	had	declined	in	recent	years.		 A	Conference	Board	economist	said,	“Oh	my	goodness.	Humans!	The	nature	of	humankind.	Well	ultimately,	I	think	it’s	about	getting	the	balance	right.	Most	people	I	think	are	naturally	cooperative.”	He	mentioned	how	his	team	loved	cooking	together	on	their	retreat,	then	employed	a	sports	analogy:	you	can	have	individual	stars,	and	cooperative	teams.	“Clearly	Soviet-style	cooperation	doesn’t	work	–	because	that’s	coercion.	Same	thing	with	the	ends	of	the	political	spectrum.	But	I	think	the	healthiest	societies	are	those	which	get	the	balance	right.”		 One	heterodox	academic	economist	said,	“I	think	that	a	lot	of	studies	have	shown	that	people	are	usually	ready	to	be	cooperative.”	He	had	been	reading	about	Ayn	Rand’s	view	on	the	topic,	and	“some	people	act	like	this,	and	I	think	in	particular	students	of	economics	tend	to	start	behaving	like	that.	[laughs]	But	I	think	naturally	people	are	on	the	other	extreme.	I	mean,	in	general.”	A	heterodox	colleague	said,	“Depends	if	you’re	a	Leviathan	or	not.	I	think	it	–	not	to	be	cliché	–	but	I	think	it	takes	a	village.	To	do	anything.”		 A	PEF-affiliated	economist	put	it	more	baldly:		 	The	defining	feature	of	humanity,	of	homo	sapiens,	is	we’re	the	only	species	that	can	cooperate	on	complex	tasks	outside	of	our	immediate	family	unit.	[.	.	.]	Any	
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social	science	other	than	economics	laughs	out	loud	at	this	idea	of	homo	





































economists	of	different	ages,	and	indeed	my	results	are	best	contextualised	by	situating	economists	in	time,	in	space,	and	along	the	political	spectrum.		 First,	as	became	clear	in	the	course	of	my	fieldwork,	economics	education	appears	to	have	been	more	varied	and	eclectic	–	even	in	high-ranked	mainstream	departments	–	in	the	1970s	and	earlier,	when	my	older	conversants	were	in	university.	The	youngest	generation	in	my	sample	would	have	been	educated	well	after	economics	departments	split	off	from	the	rest	of	the	social	sciences,	which	happened	over	the	course	of	several	decades,	with	Western	among	the	first	to	do	so	in	the	late	1960s	and	with	Toronto	among	the	last	in	1982.	This	may	have	had	an	effect	on	the	multidisciplinarity	of	the	education	of	those	who	took	economics	courses	before	and	after	the	split,	an	important	factor	for	a	field	that	is	known	for	being	especially	insular	and	uni-disciplinary	(Fourcade	et	al.,	2015,	p.	93).		 Indeed,	my	older	conversants	were	much	more	open	to	knowledge	from	other	disciplines.	Only	22%	of	economists	above	the	age	of	53	(Baby	Boomers	and	older)	answered	“No”	to	the	question,	“In	general,	is	interdisciplinary	knowledge	better	than	knowledge	obtained	by	a	single	discipline?”	whereas	40%	of	the	younger	economists	(aged	52	and	under)	answered	“No.”	Rather	remarkably,	the	total	for	my	survey	of	economists	was	31.6%	“No”	responses,	which	puts	Canadian	academic	economists	in	the	same	range	as	American	academic	sociologists	(25.3%	“No”),	political	scientists	(28%	“No”),	and	historians	(31.7%	“No”),	as	opposed	to	American	economics	academics	(57.3%	“No”),	in	terms	of	their	views	on	the	value	of	interdisciplinary	knowledge	(Fourcade	et	al.,	2015,	p.	95);	in	other	words,	my	older	survey	participants	appear	to	be	more	pro-interdisciplinary	than	academics	from	any	discipline	in	the	U.S.256,	even	though	the	proportion	of	U.S.-	and	otherwise	foreign-educated	academics	–	and	therefore	American	influence	–	is	larger	in	economics	than	in	other	academic	disciplines	in	Canada	(A.	Scott,	1993)	and	has	been	for	some	time	(A.	Scott	&	Grubel,	1969).		 The	greatest	variation	in	political	views	was	to	be	found	among	the	very	oldest	economists	in	my	sample.	Of	these	were	two	of	Canada’s	best-known	academic	economists	–	themselves	on	or	near	opposite	ends	of	the	political	spectrum	–	and	a	few	others	in	their	age	cohort,	all	of	whom	received	PhDs	in	the	1960s.	These	conversants,	from	every	point	on	the	political	spectrum,	all	seemed	to	recognise	the	dangers	of	homogeneity	or	the	dominance	of	one	sect	above	the	others	–	perhaps	in	part	because																																																									256	This	is	a	key	indicator	given	that	some	research	suggests	that	“abler	economists	tend	to	publish	more	general	research”	(Kendall,	2008),	contrary	to	some	departments’	emphasis	on	specialisation.	
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they	had	witnessed	several	examples	of	this	throughout	their	lives.	“Economics	gets	into	trouble	when	one	particular	group	gets	a	lock	on	the	journals	and	the	conferences	and	appointments	in	certain	key	departments,”	said	one	conservative	conversant,	lamenting	the	fact	that	“Cambridge	had	a	lock	on	economics”	for	several	decades	in	the	middle	of	the	last	century	“and	it	was	terrible.”	But	he	was	similarly	critical	of	attempts	to	curtail	diversity	and	debate	at	the	other	end	of	the	political	spectrum,	bemoaning	the	fact	that	“North	America	is	truncated,	because	Joe	McCarthy	and	his	buddies	did	a	really	good	number	on	the	left-wing	tradition	in	the	social	sciences	in	North	America.”		 An	eminent	academic	on	the	other	end	of	the	political	spectrum	worried:	“You	find	the	same	schools	are	generating	the	staff	for	a	whole	broad	set	of	universities,	and	they	come	along	with	a	groupthink	that	can	be	poisonously	uniform.	So	then	it	can	be	hard	to	keep	appropriately	broad	and	open	in	what	is	taught	to	students.”	Indeed,	in	the	U.S.	47%	of	the	faculty	at	PhD-granting	universities	attended	the	same	(top	ten)	universities,	with	yet	greater	concentration	at	the	upper	end	(Pieper	&	Willis,	1999,	p.	86).	Several	older	economists	remarked	upon	the	pressures	of	publishing,	the	econometrics-centric	preferences	of	the	top	journals,	and	departments’	emphasis	on	a	narrow	set	of	metrics,	all	of	which	result	in	a	situation	in	which	“policy	is	a	middle-aged	person’s	game,”	for	after	one	has	tenure.		 In	short,	among	the	oldest	group	of	economists	–	those	over	the	age	of	71	–	could	be	found	the	greatest	support	for	diversity	of	thought,	a	refreshing	tolerance	of	opposing	views,	and	often	a	healthy	dose	of	criticism	of	the	increasing	homogeneity	of	the	field.	It	may	not	be	an	accident	that	these	economists	were	exposed	to	the	most	eclectic	curricula	of	all	the	conversants	in	my	sample.	Indeed,	compared	to	their	younger	colleagues,	as	a	group	they	expressed	a	wider	range	of	views	themselves;	were	more	supportive	of	diversity	of	thought,	even	if	it	went	counter	to	their	own	beliefs;	and	were	more	comfortable	with	the	criticisms	of	economics	education	that	had	emerged	following	the	2007-2009	financial	crisis.			 This	older	group	of	economists	taught	a	generation	of	Baby	Boomer	economists,	who	were	broadly	tolerant	of	opposing	viewpoints	but	were	more	homogeneously	prosocial.	The	Baby	Boomers,	many	of	whom	were	educated	in	economics	throughout	the	late	1970s	and	1980s	–	during	the	ascendancy	of	Chicago	School	ideology	–	were	themselves	exposed	to	a	more	standardised	curriculum,	despite	their	broadly	egalitarian,	pro-government	views;	some	members	of	this	generation,	in	turn,	educated	a	fairly	uniformly	laissez-faire	generation	of	economists.	This	is	despite	the	fact	that,	as	a	
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	 Furthermore,	an	examination	of	the	Boards	of	Directors	of	equivalent	Canadian	and	American	organisations	–	the	Canadian	Association	of	Business	Economists	(CABE)	and	the	National	Association	of	Business	Economists	(NABE),	respectively	–	shows	that	there	is	a	significantly	greater	range	of	the	types	of	organisations	board	members	represented	in	CABE	as	opposed	to	NABE.	On	the	CABE	board	there	was	a	representative	of	a	large	cooperative	as	well	as	a	CCPA	economist,	for	example,	whereas	the	entirety	of	the	NABE	board	was	strictly	private-sector.	Thus	it	is	possible	that	the	upper	echelon	of	the	business	sector	in	Canada	is	somewhat	more	varied	than	in	the	U.S.267	Moreover,	a	couple	of	conversants	noted	that	private-sector,	government-sector,	and	Bank	of	Canada	economists	were	less	uniformly	neoclassical	than	their	academic	colleagues	in	Canada,	which	may	not	be	the	case	in	the	U.S.	Again,	I	did	not	have	enough	data	to	come	to	a	firm	conclusion	on	this,	but	it	warrants	further	investigation.		 The	U.S.	was	clearly	many	conversants’	reference	point	for	a	number	of	policy	issues	–	particularly	in	the	case	of	income	inequality,	capital	gains	taxation,	and	healthcare	policy;	conversants	expressed	their	own	views	(and	often	expressed	support	for	the	status	quo	in	Canada),	but	the	contrast	was	often	with	the	U.S.	Interestingly,	this	may	have	its	roots	in	a	well-documented	psychological	phenomenon.	Ariely’s	research	suggests	that,	when	a	member	of	the	out-group	(in	this	case,	a	student	wearing	a	rival	university’s	sweater)	behaves	badly,	the	in-group	becomes	more	virtuous	in	reaction;	cheating	all	but	disappeared	among	the	in-group	university	students	he	worked	with	in	such	cases	(Ariely,	2012).	It	is	worth	asking,	then,	whether	Canadian	social	norms	are	partly	established	and	maintained	by	way	of	reaction	against	what	is	perceived	as	the	out-group’s	bad	behaviour	–	the	American	tendency	towards	what	Canadians	may	believe	to	be	bad	economic	and	social	policy,	in	this	case.	Indeed,	Canadians’	anti-Americanism	is	more	or	less	a	cultural	trope,	and	Canadian	identity	at	times	has	been	defined	in	contrast	to	American	culture.	It	has	been	suggested	that	Canadian	anti-Americanism	is	a	unique	kind	of	anti-Americanism	(Nossal,	2005).	If	the	U.S.	constitutes	the	ultimate	out-group,	it	is	possible	that	it	has	shaped	Canadian	policy	indirectly	yet	powerfully	–	through	Canadians’	attempts	to	mold	public	policy	that	looks	as	little	like	American	public	policy	as	possible.		 A	conversant	pointed	out	another	factor	contributing	to	the	U.S-Canada	contrasts	under	discussion	here:	that	there	may	be	less	of	a	revolving	door	between	the	finance																																																									267	Indeed,	CABE	invited	Thomas	Piketty	to	deliver	an	address	on	income	inequality;	it	is	hard	to	imagine	NABE	issuing	a	similar	invitation.	
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	 Furthermore,	the	self-selection	mechanism	among	prospective	economics	students	in	Canada	may	be	attracting	individuals	on	the	basis	of	considerations	such	as	earning	potential,	talent	for	the	subject,	status,	and/or	a	facility	with	math;	yet	economists	end	up	pronouncing	upon	the	environment,	healthcare,	and	many	other	issues	that	these	motivations	do	not	particularly	select	for.	Students	who	are	interested	in	major	policy	issues	such	as	these	may	well	choose	to	study	another	subject,	especially	since	the	economics	profession	discourages	work	on	public	policy.	But	there	is	evidence	that	students	respond	well	to	pluralist	teaching	(Deane,	Van	Waeyenberge,	&	Maxwell,	2016),	which	could	attract	a	greater	variety	of	economics	students	to	the	field	should	there	be	an	increase	in	pluralist	offerings.286		 The	primary	challenges	of	the	21st	century	–	income	and	wealth	inequality,	climate	change,	and	economic	stagnation	most	obviously,	but	also	the	refugee	crisis,	gender	equality,	and	the	rise	of	xenophobic	right-wing	political	movements	–	almost	all	implicate	economics	in	some	way.	Income	and	wealth	inequality	necessitate	a	wide	range	of	policy	interventions,	up	to	and	including	shifts	in	taxation,	regulation,	and	global	coordination.	Economic	stagnation,	still	ever-present	in	industrialised	economies	as	we	pass	the	tenth	anniversary	of	the	financial	crisis,	is	a	puzzle	for	economists	and	policymakers	alike.	The	shift	towards	a	zero-emissions	economy,	the	gender	effects	of	recessions	that	tend	disproportionately	to	target	jobs	in	male-dominated	fields,	and	the	scapegoating	of	minority	groups	in	response	to	economic	woes	are	all	topics	within	which	non-economic	considerations	have	a	direct	impact	on	research	agendas	traditionally	left	to	economists.	These	are,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	issues	–	gender,	race,	and	the	environment	–	that	are	rarely	found	in	economics	curricula,	and	only	as	electives	if	they	are	there	at	all.	In	fact,	only	electives	have	evolved	within	the	field	in	recent	years;	required	courses	in	economics	have	hardly	changed	in	three	decades	(Siegfried	&	Walstad,	2014).	The	few	changes	that	have	occurred	arguably	pulled	the	discipline	in	the	wrong	direction;	once	a	mainstay	of	economics	programs,	now	“[e]conomic	history	is	almost	defunct	as	a	required	course”	(ibid.,	p.	154).			 What	the	world	may	need	is	some	populism-antidote	economics,	supportive	of	diversity/pluralism	and	a	liveable	planet;	an	economics	profession	that	has	both	the	relevant	skills	and	an	openness	to	critique,	diversity,	adaptation,	and	interdisciplinarity																																																									286	I	would	recommend	a	series	of	experiments	that	randomly	assign	first-year	students	to	economics	courses	with	different	introductory	approaches;	this	could	be	a	good	way	of	testing	which	sorts	of	introductions	to	the	field	attract	the	greatest	variety	and	quality	of	students.	
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don’t	like	the	term	usury.	[.	.	.]	I	think	usury	begins	wherever	monopoly	begins,	and	lack	of	choice	begins	[.	.	.	although]	people	who	are	facing	monopolists	are	in	a	vulnerable	position.”		 When	I	asked	whether	he	would	advocate	for	a	limit	in	cases	of	monopoly,	he	said,	“I’d	advocate	for	competition”	and	that	monopolies	“are	usually	created	by	some	government,”	going	on	to	opine	that	even	if	you	are	in	a	corner	of	Canada	with	only	one	bank,	it	probably	will	not	overcharge	you	because	other	Canadians	“could	be	listening,”	which	would	be	a	risk	to	the	bank’s	reputation.294			 His	colleague	was	similarly	firm,	but	more	accurate;	he	correctly	identified	the	figure	of	60%	for	the	current	interest	rate	limit	in	Canada,	referred	to	usury	as	a	religious	concept	that	is	used	in	Islam,	and	proceeded	to	say,	simply,	“The	economic	system	itself	determines	what	the	interest	rate	is”	and	that	there	will	always	be	people	who	are	outside	“the	normal	range	of	risk”	who	would	be	unable	to	get	a	loan	except	at	a	high	rate	of	interest.		 Another	Montréal-based	professor	paused	for	a	remarkable	length	of	time	before	answering:	“Ppph	.	.	.	When	.	.	.	[further	long	pause]	.	.	.	When	the	interest	the	lender	is	asking	is	above	the	market	price.”	I	asked	if	this	would	be	the	case	even	if	the	rate	is	higher	than	100%	and	he	responded	immediately,	“It’s	never	going	to	be	100%.”	When	I	raised	the	issue	of	the	compound	interest	of	payday	loans,	he	said,	somewhat	cryptically,	“Anything	I	cannot	explain	in	a	rational	fashion	is	unfair,	so	to	speak.”			 A	fourth	Montréal-area	professor	was	the	only	one	in	this	group	to	express	concern	about	usury	as	a	concept,	but	he	too	had	some	interesting	preconceptions	regarding	the	reasons	for	the	use	of	payday	loans.	The	industry	did	clearly	bother	him,	however;	he	guessed	that	credit	card	interest	rates	were	around	18%	and	that	payday	lending	operations	were	probably	charging			
way	in	excess	of	that.	Which	I	find	highly	depressing.	I	find	it	actually	exceedingly	depressing	that	there	is	this	industry.	[.	.	.]	I	mean,	I	understand	that	they’re	providing	a	social	service.	They’re	clearly	providing	a	social	service.	They’re	providing	a	social	service	that	I	think	is	unfortunately	in	demand.	And	I’d	like	to	live	in	a	world	where	that	wasn’t	in	demand.	That’s	very	pie-in-the-sky	and	fuzzy,	a	bit	naive	perhaps,	but	anyways.																																																										294	We	did	not	have	time	to	explore	that	scenario	further,	but	this	professor	did	not	mention	communities	with	no	bank	at	all	(including	a	substantial	proportion	of	First	Nations),	communities	with	a	financial	institution	that	does	not	have	a	national	franchise	(and	therefore	has	no	nation-wide	reputational	risk),	the	reality	of	a	payday	loan	industry	that	does	not	seem	overly	concerned	with	reputational	risks,	and	so	on.	
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He	initially	put	forward	the	idea	that	the	payday	lending	industry	existed	solely	because	people	do	not	have	bank	accounts	and	therefore	cannot	cash	cheques	at	all.	Although	this	probably	happens	sometimes,	and	indeed	3%	of	Canadians	are	estimated	to	be	“unbanked”	(MacKay,	1998),	there	were	surely	other	factors	in	many	cases:		 Professor:	“My	understanding	is	that	the	payday	loan	industry	exists	only	because,	basically,	people	who	have	a	payday	don’t	have	bank	accounts,	right?	Because	in	a	world	of	bank	accounts,	they	would	deposit	their	cheque	in	the	bank	account	or	it	would	get	deposited	automatically	or	they	would	deposit	their	envelope	of	cash	in	the	bank	account,	and	then	they	would	take	out	what	they	needed.	Which	would	completely	obviate	the	need	for	a	payday	loan.	So	in	my	view,	this	thing	can	only	exist	for	people	that	either	do	not	have	or	do	not	want	to	have,	cannot	have,	for	some	reason,	a	bank	account.	Which	strikes	me	as	just	a	terrible	situation.	And	I	don’t	understand	the	cause	of	it.	But	it	just	to	me	is	a	depressing	marker	for	society	that	we	have	payday	loans.	Unless	I	completely	misunderstand	them.	Have	I	misunderstood	them?”		 Me:	“Well,	I’m	not	sure	if	–	I	think	that’s	part	of	it,	and	then	I	think	also	it’s	usually	an	advance;	at	the	end	of	the	month	people	run	out	of	money	.	.	.”		 Professor:	“Yeah,	right.	So	let	me	add	the	second	thing.	So	the	other	thing	about	the	payday	loan	is	that	people	are	on	fumes	at	they	end	of	their	payday,	right?	That	means	they	have	zero	stock	of	money,	right?	They	don’t	have,	you	know,	two	paycheques	sitting	in	a	bank	account,	or	four,	or	half	–	they’ve	got	zero.	So	that’s	equally	depressing	in	my	view.”295				My	question	to	another	Montréal-area	professor	prompted	the	following	exchange:			 Professor:	Interest	comes	from	the	fact	that	people	value	things	that	they	can	get	now	more	highly	than	they	value	stuff	they	can	get	a	year	from	now.	Usury	I’m	not	too	worried	about	on	the	whole,	except	.	.	.	it	would	only	come	in	situations	of	monopoly,	imperfect	competition	of	some	kind,	monopoly	power.	[.	.	.]	So	the	question	there	is	are	these	nasty,	exploitative	people	who	should	be	banned,	or	do	they	serve	a	useful	social	purpose?	I	think	the	jury’s	kind	of	out	on	that.	[.	.	.]	So	if	you’re	willing	to	admit	that	degree	of	irrationality,	and	I	think	I	am,	it’s	probably	the	case	that	some	of	these	payday	loan	operations	basically	are	taking	advantage	of	some	kind	of	fundamental	individual	irrationality.	So	there	is	an	imperfection,	a	market	failure,	there	might	be	room	for	government	intervention	to	step	in	and	make	things	better,	but	[.	.	.]	can	you	really	be	sure	that	the	government	itself	is	going	to	make	things	a	lot	better?			 Me:	So	if	you	were	to	put	a	limit	in	place,	where	would	you	put	it?																																																									295	For	many	people	living	under	the	poverty	line	it	would	surely	be	unlikely	to	have	two	extra	paycheques’	worth	of	money	in	the	bank,	let	alone	four.	Indeed,	studies	have	demonstrated	that	a	significant	percentage	of	the	adult	population	would	struggle	to	manage	even	a	modest	unanticipated	expense;	a	recent	poll	shows	that	48%	of	Canadians	are	less	than	$200	away	from	being	unable	to	pay	their	monthly	bills	(Ipsos,	2016).		
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	 Professor:	A	number?	On	interest	rates?	I	wouldn’t	do	that.	Because	[.	.	.]	there	are	arbitrage	possibilities,	right?	The	bank	is	charging	you	too	high	an	interest	rate,	if	you’ve	got	any	kind	of	an	extended	family	you	might	be	able	to	turn	around	and	get	a	loan	from	your	cousin	.	.	.	so	it’s	only	in	situations	where	there’s	some	sort	of	really	binding	monopoly	power	is	in	effect,	for	geographic	reasons	or	whatever,	in	the	short	run,	that	I	think	it	would	be	problematic.		He	appeared	to	assume	that	most	people	had	extended	family	or	social	networks	with	resources	to	lend,	and	that	“monopoly	power”	was	a	rare	condition	within	the	market.	That	geographic	as	opposed	to	socioeconomic	factors	would	come	to	mind	first	was	also	notable.	He	was	surprised	that	there	was	an	interest	rate	limit	(“I	think	that	–	I’m	surprised	–	well,	I’m	not	surprised	that	the	government	thinks	it	knows	a	number,	but	I	wouldn’t	be	very	confident	about	the	number	that	they	come	up	with.”),	and	even	more	surprised	by	the	fact	that	it	was	60%,	which	he	seemed	to	try	to	justify	upon	hearing	it,	saying,	for	example,	“credit	card	debt	is	highly	risky”	so	the	lender	has	to	be	compensated	for	that	risk.	He	went	on	to	say:		 Once	again,	I	can	imagine	circumstances	in	which	you’re	faced	with	some	sort	of	unexpected	expense,	and	you’ve	got	all	your	savings	in	some	sort	of	illiquid	guaranteed	–	or	you	don’t	have	any	savings.	And,	I	don’t	know,	your	wife	has	just	died	and	you’re	not	going	to	get	any	of	her	inheritance	money	for	four	weeks	because	it’s	tied	up	at	the	notary	and	you	need	money	to	get	through	until	the	next	week.	Sixty	percent	a	year	might	be	a	reasonable	interest	rate	for	that	kind	of	circumstance.			His	examples	–	of	an	inheritance	held	up	at	the	notary,	or	savings	in	illiquid	form	–	were	quite	manifestly	unimaginable	for	many	people	living	in	poverty,	and	made	it	seem	as	though	he	had	not	thought	much	about	the	circumstances	of	payday	lending	customers.	Among	my	academic	conversants,	this	professor	took	some	of	most	laissez	faire	positions,	and	to	an	almost	unique	extent	he	had	found	ways	to	justify	his	pro-market	orientation	whenever	possible;	I	noticed	at	least	three	instances	in	the	interview	in	which	he	proposed	a	market	solution,	then	proceeded	to	re-labelled	it	a	government	intervention	when	it	was	shown	not	to	work.	For	instance,	this	professor	raised	the	example	of	the	price	of	generators	in	a	snowstorm:		 Professor:	Should	you	allow	prices	to	rise	to	clear	the	market?	There	you’re	really	faced	with	the	fundamental	trade-off	between	redistribution	and	efficiency.	By	allowing	prices	to	rise	in	order	for	the	market	to	clear,	then	you’re	ensuring	that	people	who	value,	at	the	margin,	generators	most	highly	are	the	ones	who	are	going	to	get	them.	But	they	might	also	be	highly	correlated	with	the	richer	people,	so	there	is	an	issue	of	redistribution.	I	don’t	even	want	to	pretend	necessarily	that	
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I’m	the	government,	but	if	I	were	to	do	so,	you	might	want	to	say	that	the	best	thing	to	do	would	be	to	step	in	and	give	people	lump-sum	transfers,	so	if	we	were	going	to	give	everybody,	say,	600	bucks	and	you	do	what	you	want	with	it,	and	that	could	include	going	out	and	renting	a	generator.			 Me:	But	wouldn’t	that	then	raise	the	price	of	it	by	about	600	bucks?			 Professor:	[Laughs]	Yes.	So,	this	is	the	old	law	of	unintended	consequences.	[Laughs	again]	So	that’s	probably	not	the	smartest	policy	you	could	come	up	with.	And	most	interventionist	type	of	policies	you	could	come	up	with	are	probably	going	to	have	unintended	side	effects	as	well.			 A	UCalgary	professor	also	used	the	example	of	generators	after	a	natural	disaster,	saying:			 Well,	here	I’m	influenced	by	my	discipline;	economics	tends	to	think	that	as	long	as	it’s	a	voluntary	transaction,	you	set	the	price	where	you	think	you	can	get	and	it	will	send	a	signal	to	the	market	that	we	need	more	generators,	or	we	need	more	of	this	or	that.	I	think	that	within	a	community,	for	example,	people	will	often	not	try	to	gouge	each	other,	because	there’s	more	at	stake	than	just	making	money	in	that	case,	but	if	you’re	talking	about	an	anonymous	market	I	don’t	see	any	reason	why	someone	who	I	don’t	know	wants	to	charge	me	a	high	price	for	a	generator	that	I	desperately	need	–	they’re	entitled	to	do	that.	I	don’t	have	to	buy	from	them.	So	I	don’t	really	see	a	moral	problem	with	that.	But	I	think	if	you’re	talking	about	within	a	community	[.	.	.]	there’s	reciprocity;	communities	do	all	kinds	of	things	for	each	other	[.	.	.]	that	are	not	market-based	transactions	and	anybody	who	doesn’t	recognise	that	and	would	try	to	gouge	someone	in	their	neighbourhood	in	a	crisis	situation	is	probably	not	really	thinking	it	through.		Interestingly,	he	cited	the	thinking	of	his	discipline	in	laying	out	his	reasoning,	and	seemed	to	hold	a	number	of	assumptions:	that	the	market	would	have	time	to	respond	to	an	increase	in	demand	for	generators	in	a	crisis,	for	example,	or	that	consumer	choice	would	come	into	play	in	an	emergency	(“I	don’t	have	to	buy	from	them”	–	but	what	about	an	emergency	situation?).296			 The	same	professor,	when	asked	about	payday	loans,	said:			 I	think	they’re	fine,	with	one	caveat,	which	is	that	if	people	are	very	uneducated	and	they	don’t	really	understand	what	they’re	getting	into,	what	they’re	buying	or	what	they’re	giving	away,	then	I	think	that	it’s	morally	problematic,	[.	.	.]	–	but	even	then,	I	think	that	you	can’t	push	that	argument	too	far	either,	and	you	don’t	want	to	assume	that	just	because	it’s	a	poor	neighbourhood	that	they	don’t	have	the	right	to	demand	cash	on	the	spot	even	at	a	high	interest	rate.	[.	.	.]	Presumably	it’s	a																																																									296	I	suspect	many	people	would	view	such	a	scenario	as	being	outside	the	realm	of	“market-based	transactions,”	and	indeed	in	the	case	of	floods	and	storms	in	Canada	there	tend	to	be	stories	of	sharing	and	mutual	aid	that	would	render	the	market	price	of	generators	largely	irrelevant.	
	 286	
competitive	market	so	if	it	really	is	a	terrible	deal,	why	isn’t	somebody	else	moving	into	the	neighbourhood	and	offering	a	better	rate?	So	I	don’t	really	see	big	problems	with	that.	But	I	can	imagine	situations	where	it’d	be	clearly	exploiting	people’s	naiveté.			 His	UCalgary	colleague	was	similarly	opposed	to	setting	a	limit	on	interest	rates,	but	was	clearly	uncomfortable	with	the	question.	He	began	by	saying,	after	a	pause:	“So	long	as	I	respect	the	law,	and	I	don’t	do	anything	immoral,	then	I	should	be	able	to	take	advantage	of	you	economically,”	provided	there	is	no	coercion	–	even	in	the	case	of	someone	selling	a	kidney.	“I’m	pretty	‘small-l’	liberal	in	a	British	sense	about	that,”	he	said.	When	I	asked	him	about	payday	loans,	however,	he	said,	“See,	there	are	always	those	areas	of	grey	–	so	interesting!”	He	went	on	to	say	that	“you	can’t	legislate	it	away	anyway”	and	that	attempting	to	do	so	just	drives	it	underground,	as	is	the	case	with	drugs,	which	are	“horrible,	horrible,	horrible”	but	should	nevertheless	be	legalised	and	regulated;	he	claimed	to	be	“pretty	sure	it	would	be	better”	for	governments	to	put	cartels	out	of	business	in	this	case.297			 A	Western	professor	was	similarly	uncomfortable	with	this	issue:			 Usury!	What	a	question	for	the	last	question!	Some	moneylenders	gouge	just	the	way	some	ice	cream	stores	gouge	kids	for	their	ice	cream	and	I	don’t	see	very	much	difference.	And	some	moneylenders	enforce	contracts	with	a	rather	terrible	degree	of	roughness	that	I	wouldn’t	want	to	see	any	kind	of	contract	enforced	with.	But	between	Smith	and	Bentham	I’m	on	Bentham’s	side.	Smith	was	very	much	in	favour	of	usury	laws.		He	went	on	to	say	that	usury	laws	had	been	very	influential	in	the	evolution	of	monetary	policy	in	the	UK,	where	there	had	been	a	5%	limit,	and	that	states	in	the	U.S.	had	low	interest	limits	when	he	was	there	as	a	student,	which	resulted	in	dubious	work-arounds	on	the	part	of	the	banks	–	“so	usury	laws	are	a	real	nuisance.”		 I	was	particularly	interested	in	hearing	from	the	bank	chief	economists	on	this	issue,	since	they	were	the	only	conversants	on	the	lenders’	side	of	the	equation.	One	of	them	said	firmly,	“I’d	default	to	the	markets	–	the	collective	wisdom	of	many	over	the	infinite	wisdom	of	one,”	and	that	the	interest	rate	is	based	on	the	“cost	of	borrowing,	the	default	risk,”	and	other	factors.	However,	he	went	on	to	say:		 Some	of	the	extremes,	like	that	payday	lending	stuff,	that’s	usury	because	they	quote	an	interest	rate	for	a	week;	if	you	were	to	annualise	that	it’s	in	the	hundreds																																																									297	If	we	had	had	time,	I	would	have	been	interested	in	exploring	the	issue	further;	interest	rates	limits	could	be	viewed	as	a	form	of	regulation	of	the	legalised	industry	of	payday	lending,	which	has	its	parallels	in	the	legalisation	and	regulation	of	drugs.	
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of	percent.	You	could	probably	talk	to	somebody	in	the	industry,	but	I’m	not	sure	that	it’s	related	to	the	credit	profile	of	the	individual,	[.	.	.]	whereas	if	you	look	at	lending	within	the	financial	community,	they	do	extensive	data	analysis	on	the	probably	of	repayment.298		This	conversant’s	counterpart	at	another	bank	said:		 I	think	it’s	extremely	unfortunate	that	people	have	to	use	those	services.	I	think	it’s	probably	over	the	line	in	terms	of	the	costs.	But	it	is	a	service	they’re	providing.	What	can	you	say?	It’s	better	than	loan	sharks.	Not	to	be	trite.	I	do	believe	they	should	be	heavily	regulated.	But	they	do	provide	a	real	service	that	obviously	some	people	do	need.			When	asked	what	he	thought	an	appropriate	limit	would	be,	he	said,	“I	think	maybe	we	should	look	at	credit	card	rates	as	a	sort	of	upper	limit,	[.	.	.]	maybe	with	a	service	charge	too”	–	around	20%	on	an	annualised	basis.	It	was	rare	that	any	economist	in	my	sample	was	willing	to	cite	a	number	they	were	comfortable	with,	and	interestingly	this	was	on	the	lower	end	–	quite	remarkable	for	a	bank	chief	economist.		 A	fellow	chief	economist	laughed	at	the	question,	saying,	“Talking	to	a	bank	chief	economist?	I	mean	usury	is	in	the	mind	of	the	beholder,”	the	more	relevant	question	being,	“Are	there	interest	rate	tipping	points	that	cause	economic	damage?”	It	is	a	“sad	fact”	that	many	people	in	the	U.S.	use	payday	loans	week	to	week,	he	said,	not	having	seen	data	on	Canada	or	Europe,	“but	that	goes	back	to	your	income	distribution	issue;	that	goes	back	to	the	poverty	issue”	as	these	services	are	a	symptom	of	these	problems,	and	they	exist	because	people	need	them.	When	I	asked	whether	there	was	a	rate	that	was	too	high,	the	response	was,	“There	are	many	things	that	can	be	regulated	in	that	particular	market	space.	And	in	fact	these	are	huge	organisations	now.	It’s	a	phenomenon	that’s	grown	very	dramatically.”	They	take	on	“exceptionally	high-risk	individuals	with	a	risk	of	losses	that	are	very	high”	and	they	are	“developing	that	market	niche,	as	economists	would	say.”	He	identified	alternatives	such	as	microfinance	and	crowd-funding,	but	acknowledged	that	it	was	a	problem.		 Although	there	were	some	exceptions,	in	general	most	of	the	COMER	members,	heterodox	economists,	CCPA	economists,	and	PEF-affiliated	academic	economists	I	spoke	with	took	an	even	more	dubious	view	of	high	interest	rates	than	the	aforementioned	economists.	One	COMER	member	seemed	to	view	all	interest	as	usury,																																																									298	This	was	an	interesting	point	–	that	interest	rates	may	not	be	based	on	risk	analysis	in	the	case	of	payday	loans.	In	other	words,	there	may	be	no	explicit	link	between	risk	level	and	interest	rate,	which	was	a	factor	several	conversants	cited	in	justifying	high	interest	rates.	
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returns	and	create	jobs,”	and	declined	to	elaborate	further,	instead	directing	me	to	a	colleague	for	an	answer.	His	colleague	elaborated	somewhat,	but	deflected	the	question	to	a	discussion	about	various	forms	of	taxation:	“We	need	a	fundamental	review	of	the	whole	tax	system”	because	of	low	growth	and	productivity;	“capital	gains	tax	is	just	one	of	many	many	tools.”	When	I	asked	what	he	would	recommend,	he	replied,	“Sales	tax	is	the	most	stable	base	[and	.	.	.]	also	the	least	distorting.	[.	.	.	We]	need	a	much	simpler	tax	system.”		 Conversely,	a	C.D.	Howe	conversant	invoked	a	consensus	among	economists	to	argue	for	the	status	quo	–	preferential	treatment	of	capital	gains,	with	taxation	at	50%.303	The	C.D.	Howe	conversant	in	question	seemed	to	hold	the	implicit	assumption	that	the	case	for	lower	capital	gains	taxes	was	the	side	of	the	argument	that	needed	defending,	detailing	that	case	before	setting	out	his	main	reason	for	opposing	the	elimination	of	capital	gains	taxes	altogether:		 Most	economists	who	look	at	the	effects	of	taxes	on	behaviour	and	growth,	I	would	say	–	I	said	most	economists,	but	certainly	there’s	a	large	number	that	think	that	taxing	saving	and	taxing	investment	is	not	very	helpful.	The	more	you	tax	saving	and	investment	the	more	you	incline	people	to	consume	in	the	present,	and	that’s	likely	to	be	a	problem	for	building	your	resources	over	time	and	if	you	go	too	far	down	that	road	then	you	worry	that	the	next	generation	might	not	live	as	well	as	their	parents	did.		This	conversant	noted	that	reduced	capital	gains	taxation	benefits	small	business	owners	and	that	it	is	preferable	to	be	in	sync	with	income	taxation,	but	in	general	he	was	in	favour	of	not	“discouraging”	people	from	investing	and	saving	in	Canada,	claiming	that	it	is	not	“efficient”	and	that	the	tax	system	should	be	“neutral.”	He	continued,	however,	“I	think	that	taxing	[capital	gains]	at	a	reduced	rate	makes	sense	[because]	people	would	find	a	way	to	turn	their	income	into	capital	gains”	if	they	were	not	taxed.	“A	lot	of	very	very	wealthy	people	own	small	businesses,	so	it	can	actually	be	quite	a	regressive	policy.”			 The	latter	concern	was	echoed	by	two	academic	conversants;	interestingly,	they	fell	near	the	opposite	ends	of	the	political	spectrum.	One	had	been	an	early	player	in	the	Chicago	School-esque	rise	of	Western’s	economics	department;	somewhat	surprisingly,	he	said	that	“the	trouble	with	not	taxing	them	is	any	smart	accountant	can	fit	a	lot	of	income	into	capital	gains.	That’s	the	real	problem.”	But	he	went	on	to	say	that	taxing																																																									303	This	is	as	opposed	to	taxing	capital	gains	at	the	full	100%,	exempting	them	from	taxes	entirely,	or	some	other	balance	between	the	two.	
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them	as	income	“treats	the	proceeds	of	risky	enterprise	the	same	as	a	stable	salary”	and	advocated	instead	for	consumption	taxes	with	perhaps	a	surcharge	for	high	incomes.	His	counterpart	on	the	PEF	end	of	the	political	spectrum	said	of	capital	gains	taxes:			 I’m	in	favour	of	taxing	capital	income	–	I’m	in	somewhat	of	a	minority	view	on	that.	But	I	think	there	are	lots	of	reasons	to	tax	capital	income.	One	of	the	reasons	is	that	if	you	don’t	tax	capital	income	there	are	too	many	possibilities	for	tax	avoidance	–	by	making	labour	income	look	like	capital	income.	[.	.	.	We]	should	have	some	taxes	on	capital	gains,	just	as	we	should	have	taxes	on	investment	income	in	general.		Her	further	concern	was	that	reduced	capital	gains	taxes	would	translate	into	an	increase	in	taxation	of	labour	income	and	consumption,	“which	has	undesirable	effects	on	the	economy.”	But	she	acknowledged	the	complexity	of	capital	gains	policy:		 In	an	ideal	world	you	would	wish	to	tax	real	returns	rather	than	nominal	returns,	so	you	have	to	find	some	way	of	dealing	with	inflation.	The	special	treatment	of	capital	gains	under	the	income	tax	system	can	be	thought	of	as	partly	a	way	of	dealing	with	inflation;	it	can	be	thought	of	partly	as	a	way	of	integrating	the	corporate	income	tax	and	the	personal	income	tax.	I	don’t	think	it	does	either	of	those	things	particularly	well.			 Strikingly,	the	latter	position	turned	out	to	be	the	dominant	view	of	the	bank	chief	economists	as	well.	Among	these	conversants,	there	was	a	general	acceptance	–	even	defence	–	of	the	status	quo;	one	chief	economist	stated	explicitly,	“I	agree	that	dividends	and	capital	gains	should	have	preferential	tax	treatment.”	For	another,	“I	think	we’re	about	okay	where	we	are	right	now,”	while	a	third	said,	“I	actually	think	that	how	they’re	treated	now	is	appropriate.”	This	individual	went	on	to	echo	the	concern	of	the	PEF-affiliated	academic,	saying,	“I	mean,	it’s	not	ideal;	I	do	think	that	if	you’ve	had	an	investment	for	a	long	period	of	time	there’s	a	pretty	strong	case	to	be	made	that	it	should	be	inflation-adjusted.”	This	position	was	echoed	by	several	of	the	others	as	well;	one	of	the	economists	in	favour	of	the	status	quo	believed	that	we	should	ideally	have	a	system	that	reflects	risk	and	allows	people	to	deduct	losses,	calculating	gains	in	real	as	opposed	to	nominal	terms,304	but	that	the	current	50%	inclusion	rate	is	“a	crude	balance	[	.	.	.	]	people	always	forget	that,	and	they	think	that	capital	gains	are	tax	favourable.”	But	if	you	bought	something	20	years	ago	and	are	taxed	on	gains	since	then,	“that	wouldn’t	be	very	fair	either.	[	.	.	.	]	We	did	have	a	100%	inclusion	rate	at	one	time,	and	we’ve	been	reducing	it	since.”		
																																																								304	“Real”	returns	take	inflation	into	account,	while	“nominal”	returns	do	not.	
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	 Two	of	my	conversants	seemed	keen	to	avoid	answering	directly.	One	launched	into	the	features	of	an	ideal	tax	system,	declaring,	“you	want	a	fair	structure,”	but	then	asked	the	question:	“Are	our	private	equity	firms	paying	their	fair	share?	Probably	not,”	going	on	to	explain	that	“you	want	government	to	be	as	neutral	as	possible”	and	not	pick	winners	and	losers,	although	“some	things	on	the	tax	side	are	probably	not	fair.”	After	contrasting	the	Canadian	attitude	towards	taxes	with	that	of	the	U.S.,	this	conversant	circled	back	to	their	bank’s	approach:	“We	try	to	stay	as	neutral	as	we	can.”	Despite	my	questioning,	I	never	did	uncover	this	conversant’s	opinion	on	capital	gains	taxation.	A	second	reluctant	conversant,	an	academic,	deployed	similar	tactics,	referring	to	the	“endless	amount	of	debate”	on	the	subject.	“Do	I	think	we	should	have	incentives	that	favour	capital	gains,	in	other	words	investment?	Absolutely.	The	question	is	how	much.”	When	I	asked	how	much,	however,	the	response	was	thus:	“I’ll	let	Jack	[Mintz]	answer	that	one.”		 From	the	two	remaining	bank	chief	economists	it	was	revealing	to	see	from	which	direction	they	thought	the	argument	would	come	–	that	capital	gains	taxes	should	be	raised	or	lowered	(or	even	eliminated).	When	asked	whether	the	rate	should	be	changed,	one	of	them	immediately	assumed	that	I	was	referring	to	their	elimination,	launching	in	to	defend	them	by	saying	that	if	we	did	not	have	capital	gains	taxes	we	would	have	to	raise	the	money	elsewhere.	He	claimed	to	be	comfortable	with	the	status	quo,	“unless	you	want	to	shrink	government,	which	I	don’t	necessarily	advocate.	[.	.	.]	Most	of	the	people	who	earn	capital	gains	are	wealthier	people.”	His	counterpart	at	another	bank	argued	that	capital	gains	should	be	taxed	at	a	lower	rate	than	income	taxes,	noting	that	the	U.S.	has	an	estate	tax	and	a	tax	on	capital	gains	from	residential	real	estate,	implying	that	this	might	be	a	good	idea	in	Canada	as	well.	She	seemed	shocked	when	I	asked	whether	capital	gains	should	be	eliminated,	however:		 No	–	that	would	just	widen	the	income	gap.	I	do	believe	that	in	a	country	as	rich	as	ours	or	the	United	States	that	it’s	unconscionable	that	you’d	have	child	poverty	or	terrible	public	schools	in	certain	districts,	in	the	U.S.	anyway,	no	access	to	good	healthcare.	So	all	of	that	has	to	be	paid	for.			 Among	mainstream	academic	economists,	there	was	general	support	for	the	status	quo,	often	seemingly	in	defence	of	the	idea	of	taxing	capital	gains	at	all.	When	I	asked	one	high-profile	conversant	whether	she	was	in	favour	of	capital	gains	taxes,	she	said,	“Yes,	sure.”	When	I	mentioned	that	this	was	somewhat	rare	among	certain	groups	of	economists	to	whom	I	had	spoken,	she	replied:	
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Carbon	Tax			 Carbon	taxation	was	one	issue	about	which	there	was	near	unanimity,	with	minor	variations	mainly	according	to	sector	and	geography.	Almost	everyone	was	in	favour	of	pricing	carbon,	many	citing	economists’	preference	for	pricing	mechanisms	and	the	internalising	of	externalities	in	expressing	their	support.	Of	23	direct	responses	to	a	question	about	carbon	taxation,	only	two	conversants	expressed	real	reservations.	A	Fraser	Institute	conversant	laughed	nervously	before	responding:	“Ha.	Well,	the	easy	answer	is	conceptually,	on	a	blackboard,	I	am,”	but	that	“in	the	real	world	of	politics	it	doesn’t	stay	as	a	carbon	tax,”	including	in	B.C.,	where	he	claimed	it	was	unevenly	applied	and	therefore	misunderstood.	“I	don’t	know	an	economist	in	the	world	who	wouldn’t	agree	with	[a	carbon	tax],”	but	it	never	works	as	planned.			 A	conversant	from	C.D.	Howe	emphasised	that	he	was	offering	a	personal	opinion	before	saying,	“I	think	that	it’s	awkward	to	try	to	figure	out	the	carbon	content	of	things”	and	where	along	the	chain	the	tax	should	be	applied;	he	did	not	think	the	tax	should	“hit”	producers,	which	can	cause	them	to	agitate	as	a	lobby	group.	Instead	he	advocated	for	a	VAT;308	“that	way	you’ll	discourage	the	consumption	of	resources	of	all	kinds,”	we	can	avoid	incentivising	“silly	things”	like	biofuels,	and	it	would	be	more	“transparent”	and	fair.	He	thought	that	both	carbon	taxes	and	the	VAT	would	be	unpopular,	however,	as	they	are	“very	visible	to	consumers.”		 The	bank	chief	economists	gave	some	of	the	most	detailed	answers,	aside	from	one	who	simply	said,	“I	am	in	favour	of	a	carbon	tax.”	Two	others	expressed	concern	about	acting	without	matching	commitments	from	an	international	coalition.	One	said,	“you	don’t	want	to	run	too	far	ahead	of	the	pack,”	that	there	should	be	a	global	focus	and	an	emphasis	on	technology-sharing,	but	that	his	generation	(the	Baby	Boomers)	were	acknowledging	the	“damage	that	has	been	done,”	and	continued:	“We	all	get	accustomed	to	what’s	‘normal’	to	us	[.	.	.	but]	we	can’t	get	stuck	in	the	way	we	used	to	do	things	because	[we’ll	be]	a	dinosaur.	[.	.	.]	I	think	the	carbon	tax	is	the	easier,	simpler	way	to	go.”			 One	bank	chief	economist	who	had	otherwise	been	on	the	progressive	end	of	the	political	spectrum	relative	to	his	colleagues	took	a	surprisingly	negative	view;	he	said	that	“economists	are	big	fans	of	carbon	taxes”	and	“probably	95%	of	economists”	would	favour	them	over	specific	regulations.	This,	he	went	on,	would	be	society’s	cheapest	way																																																									308	The	Value	Added	Tax,	a	sales	tax	that	increases	at	each	stage	of	production	(according	to	improvements	to	the	value	of	the	item	in	question).	
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to	reduce	carbon,	but	the	drawback	was	that	if	only	one	country	did	it,	the	result	would	be	to	shift	oil	production	from	Canada	to	Venezuela,	for	example.	He	claimed	to	be	in	favour	of	a	carbon	tax,	ultimately,	but	he	did	not	like	the	“mishmash”	of	policies	among	the	provinces.	He	went	on	to	say	that	although	climate	change	is	a	problem,	and	the	science	is	right	(although	“highly	uncertain	on	the	magnitudes”),	Canada	should	only	act	when	others	do,	or	it	will	fail	to	make	any	difference	–	“this	is	one	area	where	I’ve	agreed	with	Stephen	Harper	all	along.”	He	spoke	of	the	success	of	ozone	pollutant	regulation,	saying	that	this	should	have	been	in	place	ten	years	ago	for	carbon.	He	added	that	the	U.S.	coal	sector	is	way	worse	than	the	Alberta	oil	sands,	but	we	view	each	coalmine	and	factory	as	separate,	whereas	we	lump	the	oil	sands	together	as	one.			 The	other	three	bank	chief	economists	came	out	more	or	less	unambiguously	in	favour	of	a	carbon	tax.	The	first	indicated,	“I	would	say	I	am	[in	favour	.	.	.]	I	think	we	at	least	need	to	be	seen,	if	not	in	fact,	to	be	playing	our	role,	and	I	do	think	it’s	a	relatively	efficient	way	to	do	it”	and	that	it	is	preferable	to	cap-and-trade	because	of	the	“potential	fraud”	associated	with	a	carbon	tax	and	the	difficulty	of	accounting	for	differences	in	the	provinces’	economies.	He	claimed	that	cap-and-trade	may	be	more	saleable	than	a	carbon	tax	because	it	is	not	“overt”	–	“although,	to	her	credit,	Kathleen	Wynne	said	if	you	want	to	call	this	[cap-and-trade	agreement]	a	tax,	this	is	a	tax.	[.	.	.]	But	I	just	think	a	straight	carbon	tax	is	a	fairer	way	to	do	it”	and	it	has	worked	well	in	B.C.		 A	second	bank	chief	economist	also	cited	B.C.	as	a	largely	positive	example,	saying,	“I	think	carbon	taxes	are	vastly	more	efficient	than	trading	credits	–	it’s	simpler,	less	prone	to	political	manipulation.”	He	worried	that	the	environmental	movement	was	becoming	“single-issue”	in	focusing	on	carbon	–	he	felt	water	was	the	big	issue,	although	less	so	in	Canada	–	but	suggested	that	“the	only	way	you	change	behaviour	is	to	change	relative	pricing.	Or	convenience.”	When	I	asked	whether	he	preferred	pricing	mechanisms	over	regulation,	he	said,	“It’ll	be	a	mixture	of	both.	I’m	an	economist	–	I	like	pricing	mechanisms.	But	we	know	that	there	are	certain	issues”	for	which	regulation	is	necessary	as	well.		 The	third	bank	chief	economist	was	more	unequivocal;	he	averred,	“Yeah.	We	should	definitely	be	pricing	[carbon],”	and	he	would	“prefer”	a	carbon	tax	as	it	is	“simpler.”	He	criticised	the	hypocrisy	of	the	federal	government	over	the	course	of	decades	of	international	climate	change	negotiations,	asserting	that	with	Kyoto	and	Rio	“we	were	running	the	greatest	deceit	in	the	world	[.	.	.]	and	again,	that’s	not	the	monopoly	of	the	Conservatives;”	the	Liberals	have	been	hypocrites	too.	
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	 Perhaps	most	surprising	was	that	two	academics	at	UCalgary,	a	major	beneficiary	of	oil	and	gas	industry	funding	located	in	an	oil-dependent	province,	brought	up	carbon	taxation	unprompted	and	clearly	came	out	in	favour	in	both	cases.	One	professor	even	had	a	history	of	consulting	for	the	oil	and	gas	industry,	yet	mentioned	signing	a	pro-carbon	tax	statement,	stating,	“I	would	say	the	overwhelming	majority	of	economists	in	Canada”	are	in	favour	“because	it	conforms	perfectly	with	the	economic	model	instead	of	tampering	in	many	ways.”	He	raised	the	concern	that	the	carbon	tax	is	currently	too	low	to	be	effective;	when	I	asked	whether	the	level	was	high	enough	in	Alberta,	he	felt	it	was	hard	to	know	and	that	we	should	study	the	effect	of	the	tax	over	time	–	but	that,	ultimately,	“it’s	consistent	with	economic	theory.”	His	colleague,	who	also	mentioned	carbon	taxes	unprompted,	claimed	that	most	economists	and	even	oil	companies	are	in	favour	of	carbon	pricing,	but	that	it	needs	to	be	clear	and	predictable	and	provide	certainty.	He	thought	that	the	carbon	tax	should	be	higher,	and	that	gas	taxes	should	increase	in	order	to	reduce	the	motivation	for	people	to	buy	big	SUVs.309		 Similarly,	a	professor	associated	with	the	rise	of	Chicago	School-style	macroeconomics	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	stated,	unprompted,	“I	find	[Harper’s]	discussion	of	things	like	carbon	taxes	to	be	absolutely	incompetent	or	dishonest.	[.	.	.]	It	may	be	that	he’s	such	a	prisoner	of	the	oil	industry	that	he	dare	not	tell	the	truth	about	that.	But	he	really	ought	to	know	better.”	When	I	asked	directly	whether	he	was	sympathetic	to	calls	for	a	carbon	tax,	he	exclaimed,	“Oh	sure!”	and	said	that	B.C.’s	tax	seemed	to	be	working	well.		 Given	that	multiple	conversants,	including	one	from	within	the	organisation	itself,	had	identified	the	Conference	Board	as	being	–	alongside	the	C.D.	Howe	Institute	–	slightly	right-of-centre,	it	was	somewhat	surprising	to	see	the	unanimity	and	lack	of	ambiguity	in	their	support	for	carbon	taxation;	all	three	Conference	Board	conversants	came	out	in	favour,	one	volunteering,	“I	would	also	put	a	price	on	carbon,	by	the	way.	And	I	would	do	that	through	a	carbon	tax.”	His	colleague	said,	“I	think	carbon	taxes	do	have	a	role”	and	have	worked	quite	well	in	B.C.,	“partly	because	of	the	mechanisms	they	put	in	place	to	redistribute	the	funds.	[.	.	.]	Carbon	is	something	we	have	to	be	worried	about.	No	question.	Transitioning	off	of	fossil	fuels,	from	a	scientific	perspective,	is	something	that	needs	to	be	done.”	The	third	Conference	Board	conversant	concurred,	saying	he	was	“all	in	favour	of	cleaning	up	the	environment”	and	that,	if	you	think	emissions	are	the	problem,	you	have	to	go	to	the	root	of	it,	although	he	did	not	think																																																									309	Sport	Utility	Vehicles	–	notoriously	gas-guzzling	vehicles.	
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government	should	get	too	involved	in	choices	because	“in	the	end	it’s	the	consumer	who	pays.”	He	was	ultimately	unequivocal,	however,	stating,	“I	think	a	carbon	tax	is	the	best	way	to	get	at	it”	and	that	it	should	be	incremental,	going	up	slowly,	“forever.”	As	might	be	expected,	professors	from	B.C.	expressed	support	for	carbon	taxes	across	the	board.	One	said	simply,	“We	have	a	carbon	tax,	and	I	am	in	favour	of	it.”	Another	declared,	“Oh	yeah,”	mentioning	some	work	he	had	done	on	it	and	identifying	it	as	“classic	Pigouvian	taxation	–	[.	.	.]	You	can	tax	working,	when	we	like	working,	or	you	can	tax	polluting	when	we	don’t	like	polluting.	What	do	you	choose?”	Carbon,	and	fossil	fuels	in	general,	he	pointed	out,	are	also	simple	to	calculate:	“You	buy	a	gigajoule	of	natural	gas,	it’s	very	easy	to	measure.	You’re	done!”		 A	third	B.C.	professor	asked,	“It’s	quite	clear,	right?	What’s	not	to	like	about	the	B.C.	tax,	right?”	It	makes	people	aware	of	which	things	are	carbon-intensive,	and	“takes	some	of	the	very	obvious	externalities	and	internalises	them.	But	it’s	not	enough.”	Carbon	taxes	and	other	such	solutions	are	“mechanistic,	self-centred;”	he	continued,	“the	really	big	changes	in	environmental	behaviour	are	going	to	happen	when	social	norms	change,	and	they	can	happen	very	big-time	when	the	social	norms	change.”		 The	conviction	that	carbon	taxes	were	just	one	aspect	of	the	solution	to	climate	change	was	repeated	by	a	heterodox	economist	at	the	other	end	of	the	country,	who	was	“absolutely”	in	favour	of	a	carbon	tax	but	maintained	that	we	could	also	raise	the	price	of	gas,	invest	in	public	transit,	and	a	lot	more.			 In	general,	however,	heterodox	economists	were	largely	quiet	on	the	environment.	One	heterodox	professor	gamely	responded	to	my	line	of	questioning	as	to	the	compatibility	between	Post-Keynesian	theory	and	the	reality	of	a	finite	biosphere;	he	admitted	that	this	was	a	source	of	tremendous	disagreement	among	heterodox	economists,	as	environmental	economists	tend	to	favour	zero-growth	models,	while	Post-Keynesians’	models	all	rely	upon	continuous	growth	to	offset	deficit	spending.	One	PEF-affiliated	economist	spoke	at	length	about	climate	change:	“If	you	think	like	an	economist	you	believe	incentives	matter,	and	so	if	carbon	is	more	expensive	people	will	use	less	of	it,	and	that	would	be	a	good	thing.”	Her	trouble	was	with	taxes	on	domestic	automobile	use	and	the	like;	“well,	those	taxes	are	regressive.	There’s	no	way	of	getting	around	that	–	carbon	taxes	are	regressive.”	The	government	could	issue	refunds,	as	they	
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do	in	B.C.,	but	they	tend	not	to	be	well-targeted.310	“If	you’re	thinking	about	where	it	would	really	make	a	difference,	the	really	horrendous	stuff	like	the	bitumen	in	Alberta	[.	.	.]	if	you	have	serious	carbon	taxes	you’re	going	to	kill	the	oil	sands,	right?	Is	there	a	political	will	to	do	that?	I’m	not	sure.”	Of	the	oil	sands	she	said:			 I	find	them	very	scary	–	the	environmental	damage,	the	tailing	ponds	–	we	haven’t	really	got	a	solution	for	those	tailing	ponds.	[.	.	.]	You’re	talking	about	major	potential	destruction	of	entire	ecosystems	–	think	about	the	consequences	of	that	for	agriculture,	think	of	the	consequences	of	that	for	food	sustainability	[and]	watersheds	[	.	.	.]	The	problem	is	people	can’t	imagine	the	scale	of	it.			 A	CCPA	economist	viewed	carbon	taxes	as	an	environmental	boon,	but	also	a	source	of	revenue	for	infrastructure,	healthcare,	and	other	public	goods;	“I	actually	would	argue	we’re	going	to	have	to	raise	revenues	to	move	into	the	21st	Century.”	As	a	rule,	carbon	taxes	enjoyed	support	across	the	board;	as	one	mainstream	academic	economist	asserted,	“These	are	ideas	that	I	think	are	good.	You	use	the	self-interest	of	individuals	and	you	guide	that	self-interest	into	a	public	direction.”	A	financial	economist	with	an	international	perspective,	remarking	on	Canada’s	inaction	on	climate	change,	put	it	succinctly:	“We’re	out	of	step	with	the	rest	of	the	world,	and	we’re	going	to	suffer	for	it.”																																																																								310	They	can	end	up	largely	going	to	university	students,	for	example,	who	have	relatively	low	incomes	but	who	were	not	emitting	much	carbon	in	the	first	place	and	are	therefore	unlikely	to	further	reduce	their	emissions.	
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Appendix	IV		I	intend	to	invite	a	panel	of	Canadian	economists	to	critique	my	thesis	after	submission.	I	have	selected	economists	from	a	variety	of	backgrounds,	with	an	eye	to	diversity	of	employment,	gender,	race,	and	ideology.	I	suspect	only	a	few	of	them	will	have	the	time	or	inclination	to	submit	feedback,	but	any	critiques	from	Canadian	economists	themselves	would	be	useful	in	the	extreme.	I	will	invite	the	following:		Bill	Watson	Frances	Woolley	Armine	Yalnizyan	John	Helliwell	David	Laidler	Jean-Francois	Wen	or	Ron	Kneebone	Jim	Davies	Jack	Mintz	Don	Drummond	Avery	Shenfeld,	Doug	Porter,	or	Craig	Wright	Stephen	Tapp	Marc	Lavoie	Angie	Redish	Krishna	Pendakur	Wendy	Dobson	Charles	Beach	or	Lorne	Carmichael	John	Chant	Chris	Ragan	Steve	Ambler	Sherry	Cooper	Jim	Stanford	Glen	Hodgson	Ben	Dachis										
	
	
	
	 303	
Appendix	V		People	I	wish	I	had	interviewed	(or	tried	unsuccessfully	to	interview)	and	whom	I	will	attempt	to	contact	for	interviews	after	my	final	submission	date:		Sylvia	Ostry		Kari	Polanyi	Levitt	Grant	Reuber	Jack	Knetsch	Mike	Veall	Professors	from	Waterloo,	Manitoba,	and	Dalhousie	Donald	Moggridge	Robert	Mundell	Paul	Hellyer	Beata	Caranci	Dick	Lipsey	Miles	Corak	An	economist	from	IISD			
